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
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HEGEL

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AS THE NATIONAL PHILOSOPHER OF GERMANY.

BY DR. KARL ROSENKRANZ,

*Professor of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg; Author
of the "Life of Hegel," &c.*

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY GEO. S. HALL. A. A.

G. S. Hall, Sec. 1

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CONTENTS.

	Page
I. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophic Method, by Wm. T. Harris..	1
II. The Science of Logic	17
III. Relation of Logic to the Phenomenology.....	31
IV. The Essential and the Unessential in the Hegelian Method.....	33
V. The Encyclopedia	37
VI. Hegel as Publicist.....	41
VII. Hegel, Prussia, and the Philosophy of Right.....	47
VIII. Philosophy of History	63
IX. Psychology	74
X. What is to be understood by Hegel's Science of Absolute Spirit?	83
XI. Difficulties in Hegel's Division of the Science of Absolute Spirit.	86
XII. <i>Æsthetics</i>	91
XIII. Philosophy of Religion	99
XIV. History of Philosophy.....	117
XV. Completion of the Hegelian System in the second edition of the Encyclopedia in 1827.....	125
XVI. The Phenomenology of Mind	130

Reviews: N.T.T.

NOTICE TO THE READER.

The following work contains about one-half of the German work of the same title, prepared by Professor Rosenkranz as his tribute to the celebration of the centennial anniversary of Hegel's birth-day, 27th of August, 1869. In order that the reader may see the relation of what is here translated to the whole work, I give the table of contents of the rest of the work, marking by Roman numbers the location of the chapters of this work as given on the previous page:

(1) Preface and Introduction; (2) Definition of the attempt here made; (3) Ancient German Mysticism as the preliminary foundation of German Philosophy; (4) The Wolffian Popular Philosophy; (5) The Philosophy of the "Illumination"; (6) Kant, the first Classic Philosopher of Germany; (7) Schiller, Reinhold, and Fichte; (8) Schelling; (9) Hegel's Education to Philosophy; (10) The Embryo of Hegel's System; (11) Hegel's Sketch of a New Constitution for Germany; (12) The Difference between the Fichtian System and that of Schelling; (13) Critical Journal of Philosophy; (14) XVI. (see previous page); (15) Hegel as Journalist in Bamberg; (16) His Philosophical Propædæutic and Lectures at the Gymnasium; (17) II.; (18) III.; (19) IV.; (20) V.; (21) VI.; (22) VII. (23) VIII.; (24) IX.; (25) X.; (26) XI.; (27) XII.; (28) XIII.; (29) XIV.; (30) XV.; (31) Hegel as Critic; (32) Hegel as Stylist; (33) Relation of Hegel to his contemporaries—Schelling, Baader, Krause, Herbart, Schopenhauer; (34) Hegel's Position in German Literature; (35) His Position in the World Literature; (36) Prejudice and Polemics against Hegel; (37) The Future of the Hegelian System; (38) The Summary of Results; (39) Epilogue.

The parts translated and herewith presented are believed to be the most interesting and valuable portions of the work.

~~John~~
GEORGE S. HALL.

Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio,
April 10, 1874.

Introduction to
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHIC METHOD.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

To Hegel has been ascribed the honor of discovering a new Philosophic Method. In the Introduction to his great central work, "The Logic," Hegel himself claims that although the method which he has "followed in that book—or rather the method which the system itself has followed—may be capable of much improvement, or more thoroughness of elaboration, as regards details, yet I know that it is the only true method." "Because," he adds, "it is identical with its object and content; for it is the content in itself, the Dialectic which it has in itself that constitutes its evolution." "The only thing essentially necessary to an insight into the method of scientific evolution is a knowledge of the logical nature of the negative; that it is positive in its results,—in other words, that its self-contradiction does not result in zero or the abstract nothing, but rather in the negation of its special content only; that such negation is not simple [or absolute] negation, but the negation of a definite object which annuls itself, and is therefore a definite negation. Hence in the result there is contained essentially that from which it resulted—which amounts to a tautology, for otherwise the somewhat would be an independent original existence and not a result."

If we restate his method and affirm it to be the process of discovering in the finite or limited what it is that constitutes its limitation or finitude, and thereby of ascending through

successive syntheses to the self-limited or infinite, we shall see in that statement its substantial identity with the Platonic Dialectic. To trace out the dependent to that on which it depends is to go from the part to the whole, from that which is not self-existent to that which is self-existent. (Plato's definition we shall quote below.)

The triad—Being, Naught, and Becoming—with which Hegel begins his Logic furnishes an example of an application of the general method as well as an exhibition of what is peculiarly Hegelian. In consideration of the fact that this triad is better known than anything else of Hegel, and that it has furnished the point of attack to his most powerful opponents—Trendelenburg in particular*—an exposition of his method in the evolution of this triad will serve to exhibit the true nature of the Hegelian Philosophy more directly than any general disquisition on its results.

Let us at once, then, proceed to grapple with this much disputed beginning of Hegelian Logic, and make, *first*, an abstract exposition of the theme; *second*, a more concrete or explanatory one; *third*, a critical one, directed towards the position of Trendelenburg. We will attempt to give Hegel's thought in our own manner.

I. Abstract Exposition.

A. *Introduction: why we begin with the category of Being.*

Whatever we postulate as a beginning of pure science must be, as such, not yet scientifically determined. It is the object of pure science to develop a system, and of course the beginning cannot be a system. Since in pure science we must not receive determinations (attributes, qualities, categories, definitions, logical terms, &c.) except those justified and defined by the system, any determination that *we* postulate, and that is not objectively evolved, must be regarded as unscientific and therefore rejected. Determination and negation are identical, and the complete removal of determination or negation should give us pure being as a beginning or starting-point of our system. Were our system to start with any other category, as for example with the Ego,

* *Logische Untersuchungen.*

that category must be as empty as pure being; if not, it would contain pure being plus determinations, and thus duality would be present before the system had evolved it. It would be ostensibly seized as a simple somewhat, and yet the mind would *mean* something else more concrete. Science has to do with what is *expressed* and not with what is merely *meant*. Hence, unless Science is to start unscientifically, it must commence with pure Being.

B. Being: what comes of the pure thought of it.

- I. Being is the simple undetermined.
- II. Since it is the not-determined, it is distinguished from the determined, and is already determined by the contrast. (The abstraction from the world of concrete being here becomes explicit.)
- III. But since according to its definition (I.) it is the absolutely undetermined, it must be the negative of all determined somewhats, and hence of itself, if it is determined through contrast. It is therefore negative of itself as Being, if Being be defined at all as contrasted. Such a universal negative may be named, substantively, Naught.

Remark.—Here we have I. its definition, whence results II. its opposition or contrast, III. its self-relation. Thought endeavors to seize the object (Being) as a whole, i.e. to comprehend it in its entirety. It seizes first the abstract definition, and then proceeds to realize it as thus defined. It finds contrast, and then further, universal negation as the more adequate statement of the idea which it is contemplating.

C. Naught: the result of attempting to think it purely.

- I. Being can comply with its definition—which requires it to be kept distinct from its determination or negation—only by negating itself and thus becoming *Naught*. Naught is the negative of all Being.
- II. Naught as the negative of all Being is defined through contrast: it is distinguished from Being.
- III. But since Naught is the negation of all Being, it is the negative of itself; for if Being were regarded as the determined, Naught would be the undetermined, and hence the negative of itself as the opposite of Being (i.e. contrasted with Being); or, if Being is defined as the undetermined, then Being becomes universal ne-

gation, and Naught as the negation of Being must be the negation of universal negation or negation of itself.

Resumé.—The thought of Being is the thought of a vanishing, a negation of itself. It is hence a form of Becoming. But the thought of Naught is the thought of a self-negation or a determining of itself, hence the thought of origination or beginning to be. Naught can be thought, therefore, only as a form of Becoming. Origination (beginning) and evanescence (ceasing) are the two forms of Becoming. Becoming is the thought which results from thinking Being and Naught.

D. *Becoming: Results from trying to think the All as a Becoming.*

- I. Becoming in general is a union of Being and Naught, but a union wherein their difference vanishes and each passes into the other. The difference must persist, and likewise the annulling of that difference must persist, or else the Becoming will cease.
- II. The union of Being and Naught in the Becoming is a union wherein each is a self-annulment. Not Being nor Naught in their simple abstraction, but each a vanishing—the former as Ceasing, the latter as Beginning. Being and Naught have proved themselves no adequate categories, but in their places we have two forms of Becoming.
- III. Becoming considered by itself is a self-nugatory, for it implies duality and involves a *from* and a *to*; but not from *Being* to *Naught* nor the contrary, but from Beginning to Ceasing, and the contrary; for the difference that remains in the Becoming is that between the two kinds of Becoming only. Beginning likewise, as a form of Becoming, possesses duality and is a *from* and *to*, but for the reason stated can have in itself only the difference of the two forms of Becoming, and hence contains within it its own opposite; Ceasing, too, contains in itself its opposite in so far as it is Becoming. Hence the difference upon which Becoming rests also vanishes, and each side becomes identical through its evolution of its opposite from itself. Thus instead of Becoming we have rather determined (or definite) Being. Each form of Becoming is a process that returns into itself through its opposite, and by this each becomes the total process, and the total process is a present unity of Being and Naught or of Beginning and Ceasing.

Note.—The “*from and to*” involved in Becoming is not a spatial one. If Spatial, then we have a concrete form of Becoming, to wit, motion. But Becoming involves only beginning and ceasing, and this applies as well to ideas as to natural things, and hence includes spatial motion under it as one species distinct and separate from the activity of thinking as another species. All spatial motion is measured in feet or decimals of a foot, but ideas do not admit of such measurement, and the activity of passing from one to another is therefore non-spatial.

Remark.—This deduction will seem wholly arbitrary and a mere play of words to most people. All exposition of pure thought—that in Plato’s *Parmenides*, for example—seems arbitrary word-jugglery.

Let us go over the ground once more in a more explanatory and familiar manner, when some of the difficulties may clear up.

II. Explanatory Exposition.

BEING AND NAUGHT.

I wish to know the truth—to think it; and by truth I mean the abiding, that which is universally and necessarily valid, and all that is involved in it.

How shall I begin? I wish to think the truth, the abiding, that which must be as it is and can be nothing else. Hence I am to find the universal conditions of Being; and these universal conditions must result from Being itself as its nature. Let me think Being then and see what else is implied.

If I think Being as self-sufficing, I do not set it opposite to Naught as something else than it, for thus it would receive distinction or determination through this very contrast. I must think Being by itself; as excluding all multiplicity, for the multiple can be only where there is distinction of parts, and distinction is negation or Not-being. Hence if I would not let in the opposite of Being (or Non-being) into my thought of the same, I must think being as simple and undetermined; otherwise it will be a self-contradiction—it will be a being that contains negation or limitation already.

Having now before me the thought of pure simple Being, let me examine it. What is pure simple Being? It is—undetermined; it has no content; it is—Naught. It cannot differ from Naught; for if it did, it would differ by means of some

characteristic or determination, and this would render its simple pure Being, determined Being. I think pure Being, therefore, as identical with Naught when I think it by itself. "It at once becomes its opposite"? No, it does not become its opposite; it *is* Naught, and does not seem *to become* it. Let me pause, however, and consider the result at which I have arrived. For it is clear that in trying to seize Being purely by itself, and without negation or limitation, I have arrived at a dead result identical with Naught. I set out with the resolve to think Being pure and simple, and even without opposition or contrast. But by removing all difference from it I get only Naught as a result. I must, however, investigate this result and see what implications my thought of it contains.

What do I mean by the thought of Naught? It is the thought of the negation of All—a negation by itself, for I am considering each category by itself, as a universal. It is the negation of all, and yet is all. But as such it is a negation of itself. Either it is a negation which does not negate anything, or it is a negation that negates itself. It is the content of its own negation. At all events, the thinking of negation in the universal form of Naught gives as result the cancelling of negation.

Here we are arrived at a very strange view. At first, Being seemed identical with Naught without Becoming,—two names for one concept; now, Naught has shown itself to involve self-opposition; it is inherently antithetic, and posits distinction or difference instead of identity. It therefore posits duality, and the duality of Being and Naught rises before us as an immediate distinction which cannot be resolved into any other or more simple one. Being and Naught are opposites and contradictories, and yet are this only when in one unity. If we try to seize them isolatedly each becomes the opposite of itself, and each has no truth or meaning outside of the synthetic thought which unites them.

Note.—A psychological question arises: Why is not the absolute Naught, the *Nihil negativum*, entirely outside of all relation or contrast, and hence, no "negation of all"? It is made relative by thinking it as active negation. It seems, therefore, an assumption to pass from "naught" to "negation of all"—an unwarrantable substitution, a *petitio principii*.

Of course, so soon as one can see Naught to be a self-negation, the dialectical self-movement must be apparent. Hegel has omitted any notice of this point in treating of Being, Naught, or Becoming, but has elucidated the question in its proper place under "*Reflexion*" (vol. ii. of the large Logic) and also under "*Begriff*" (vol. iii. of the same). In the third or critical exposition of this subject, which follows, an endeavor will be made to clear up this point.

BECOMING.

If I review my result, it is this: my thought of Being is a thought of the becoming of Naught—a ceasing to be, a departing, an evanescence. My thought of Naught is a thought of the becoming of Being—a beginning to be, an arising or origination. These I perceive are two species of Becoming, and they exhaust the genus. These appear distinct, and their distinction is the distinction which I formerly supposed I saw between Being and Naught, but which proved on examination to be really a distinction between these two kinds of Becoming. I note also that Becoming cannot be a becoming of Naught or of Being, for each of these latter categories has shown itself to be in reality a species of Becoming.

Is this distinction between the two forms of Becoming a true and abiding one? Is Becoming the "solvent word" which explains the All?

Let me examine this distinction more closely: the Becoming is a duality, it is a *from* and a *to*: a union of distinct somewhats in the process of uniting. Ceasing is *from* Being to Naught; Beginning is *from* Naught to Being. Becoming is the term indifferently applied to either. But Ceasing cannot become Naught, for the thought of pure Naught showed it to be a self-dirempting, a Beginning. Hence Ceasing can only cease in Beginning. Beginning cannot become Being, for pure Being is a self-nugatory whose more adequate statement is Ceasing. Hence Beginning is a movement towards Ceasing, inseparable from it, and therefore no simple pure species of Becoming, but rather a movement that is at once "reflected into itself." Beginning is a movement from itself to Ceasing which is a movement to Beginning. Each species of Becoming has the other species as its own content. Each process traced out is a becoming of itself through the becoming of its other. Beginning becomes Ceasing, which, again,

becomes Beginning. Such a process to itself through its other has been called "Reflection into itself."

The form of Reflection into itself cannot be considered as a Becoming. Its form is that of self-relation. Each of its sides is reflected into itself through the other, and hence each is identical with the other. Each is itself *plus* the other in one process. Becoming can persist only so long as the inequality or non-identity of the two sides persists. The becoming of the same from the same is no becoming; it is rather an unchangeable continuance of one phase.

I must, therefore, seek another name, since Becoming is no longer an appropriate predicate for the All. Being and Naught were no adequate designations of the All; they were mere phases of the process of Becoming. The phases Beginning and Ceasing vanish in more comprehensive processes. Instead of Being, Naught, or Becoming, I have before me the thought of the Determining of Being: two forms of self-relation, Being or Ceasing returning into itself through Naught or Beginning, and the opposite of this, i.e. Naught reflected into itself through Being. Here is Determination: determined Being and determined Naught. The abyss of difference that yawned for me between Being and Naught is now narrowed to that between Reality and Negation, the two forms of determined Being. Each is a form of Being, for each begins and ends with itself, i.e. has the form of self-sufficiency, and not the form of dependence or of relation to another.

Remark 1.—We note that the Dialectic movement carries with it two threads which are ever becoming identical in a new Category. Thus at first our two threads were Being and Naught; next, Beginning and Ceasing, whose general name is Becoming; then, again, Reality and Negation, the sides of Determined Being. These two threads become identical in the respect wherein they were first distinguished, and this their identity is a new Category. But their distinction reappears in the new Category, as a less essential one.

Remark 2.—Upon inspection of the Dialectic movement one will see that it is not a method of proceeding from a first principle "which continues to remain valid"—as, e.g., some mathematical axiom. One is rather engaged in a process of proving his first principles to be untrue or inadequate, and is leaving them behind him as abstract untrue elements and

arriving at comparatively concrete and true ones. Each new category is richer in what it contains than the preceding, for it is a unity resulting from a synthesis of what has gone before.

Remark 3.—Thus the dialectical procedure is a retrograde movement from error back to truth, from the abstract and untrue back to the concrete and true; from the finite and dependent back to the Infinite and Self-subsistent. We are proceeding toward a First Principle rather than from one.

In Plato's Republic, book vii., chapter xiii. (*Stallbaum*), a clear distinction is drawn between the Dialectic Method (*ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος*) of pure science (*ἐπιστήμη*), which cancels one after the other its hypothetical categories or principles on its way to the highest principle (*τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν*), and Geometry with its kindred sciences, which use fixed hypotheses or axioms (*ὥς ἂν ὑποθέσεις χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῷσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν*) and are not able to deduce them. Thus our hypothetical "Being," "Naught," &c., have been removed on our way to the first principle.

Remark 4.—We do not lose any of our categories, but only reduce them to subordinate elements ("moments"). The unity wherein they are thus annulled is called a "Negative Unity."

Remark 5.—Hegel's logic in this manner proceeds to show up one after another all the general ideas or categories of thought, finding for each the exact place in the series which its extension and comprehension gives it. The highest and ultimate is the IDEA as definition of Personality—the self-conscious Absolute, the *νόησις νοήσεως* which Aristotle finds to be the highest, and which Theology defines as God.

Before arriving at this point such questions have arisen as :

- (1) Is not all this a play on words?
- (2) If not a play on words, is it not merely a subjective play of thought, and not in anywise a process related to objective truth?
- (3) Do you not in every instance presuppose concrete categories (movement, for example) as underlying the pure thoughts with which the dialectic begins?
- (4) If you were really to begin without presuppositions, could you find any language into which to translate your results? Do you not in fact merely translate one set of categories into another set not scientifically deduced?

In order to clear up these and a multitude of other similar objections which have no answer in the foregoing expositions the following considerations are presented. Those acquainted with the objections of Trendelenburg and others will perhaps see their pertinence best.

III. Critical Exposition.

A. "*The presuppositionless Beginning.*"

1. That Pure Science should begin without presupposition means that it should begin with an idea that is not analytically resolvable into simpler ones. If the idea with which we begin involves others simpler than it, we should discover ourselves in the act of thinking those simpler presuppositions while on our way to think the beginning; that is to say, if we turned our attention fully upon our unconscious processes. Our attempted beginning would be a farce, for we should at once repudiate it: our first thinking would result in detecting the ideas implicit in it, and from these elements we should make a new commencement.

2. In science all should be explicit, or should become so. A term should not *mean* more than it is defined to mean. But when we claim that Pure Science should begin without assuming results implicitly contained in some synthetic idea, we do not mean that Pure Science does not imply or presuppose—(a) that the philosopher who is to understand it must have ideas and names for them; (b) that his progress will consist in recognizing, in the Pure Science, ideas before familiar to him and known by name. He will learn in Pure Science to know their necessity, scope, and affiliation. A familiar unscientific knowledge goes before a scientific one. The description of the categories of Pure Science must at the beginning be made by means of terms not yet dialectically examined. Trendelenburg criticizes Hegel (*Logische Untersuchungen*, 2°. *Auflage*, p. 37 sqq.) for using the expression "unity" in speaking of the "unity of Being and Naught in the Becoming." It was a presupposition surreptitiously brought in where all presupposition was expressly excluded. So, too, he points out the expression "pure abstraction," and more especially the idea of "movement" where Hegel says of Being and Naught, "Their truth is therefore this *movement* of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: Becoming, &c." The idea of movement, says Trendelenburg, "is the vehicle of the dialectic evolution in thought."

Here is a misunderstanding of the sense in which presupposition is applied. Trendelenburg would demand strictly that Pure Science should, according to Hegel, generate not

only its ideas from the *à priori* activity of thought, but also the names and predicates applied to them. He would prohibit any recognition of any determinations that arose in thought, for recognition would imply that the ideas were known before in some shape, and hence were presupposed and not originated. Such a demand completely stultifies all pure science inasmuch as the latter sets out with the express problem before it of deducing the content of experience, or at least the form of experience, and every result in pure science must consequently be an identification (act of recognition) of its *à priori* determinations with the content of experience. Only in this way could science explain anything by exhibiting its origin and necessity.

3. It can, however, be reasonably asked of pure science that it shall at its close leave no category of pure thought undeduced. Each category must exhibit what ideas it presupposes as its elements or moments analytically contained in it, as well as what ideas it demands either to complement its defects, or to transcend and include it in a higher totality. But science cannot deduce all ideas at once. Its beginning must be made with the simplest idea and the others must be introduced in the order of their complexity. Pure science cannot be said to be complete until it explains and deduces the simple idea with which it began. It must be a circle.

4. We may call thinking finite so long as it is involved with a content foreign to itself—i.e. with some matter of Experience derived from the senses. Through the act of Reflection (in the form of analysis and abstraction) thought steps back from the world of Experience and contemplates its own generalizations or abstractions. The *summum genus* of such generalization is Being. When it abstracts from all multiplicity and says all things in the world are, or have Being, Being is contemplated as the ultimate result of analysis. Thought has cut off one by one all special determinations (properties, characteristics, attributes, predicates), and now has before it the empty form of itself: of itself, because experience gave only the multiplicity, and analysis has eliminated it all. Being is therefore the empty form of pure thought from which all content has been removed. It is justly considered a great era for Philosophy when the Eleatics announced

Being as the highest principle. It was the first time that a Philosophy had announced a pure thought for its principle. Neither Pythagoras nor Heraclitus did this explicitly. When thought becomes its own object it assumes the form of the infinite; i.e. it is no longer limited by and dependent on an external object, but is self-limited and independent, in its cognition.

5. Being is the limit of Analytic thinking. How does thought become synthetic and find its way back to concrete Categories? Simply by extending its consciousness into self-consciousness. In reflection it is conscious of the object and of its negative power of abstraction. In the speculative activity of thought it must objectify its entire activity and observe it. In sense-perception only the object is known, and no notice is taken of the function performed by thought in furnishing the general ideas through which we recognize the object. In reflection we recognize the general ideas as the basis of the particular. In the speculative we must cognize the primitive synthesis of Reason which makes it possible. Reflection, therefore, always recognizes only dead results. It fails to grasp the synthetic movement that takes place unconsciously in the mind, as its counterpart.

B. The Dialectic: how synthesis arises from analysis.

6. Being is defined as the undetermined. Abstraction has removed all determinations in order to seize Being purely. But if we now try to seize Being and realize its definition in thought, we come upon this contradiction: it is defined as indefinite. When we attempt to seize Being as the negative of all, we seize it as determined and defined by this negative attitude. We correct this act of determination and limitation of the idea of Being by recurrence to the definition of indeterminateness, and hence we think it as negative to itself as thus defined and limited. It flees itself. We thus find our thought of Being an infinite regress: first we apply a predicate to it, but we immediately annul the predicate on account of its inconsistency; we continue to annul its predicates, but the act of annulling them is the act of predicating them. Predicatelessness is itself a predicate, and to think without the act of predication is impossible. Hence our thinking

activity necessarily posits a self-negative idea when it posits Pure Being. It posits a regress *ad infinitum*: a vanishing; an idea which perpetually finds itself in opposition and thus has become a particular, and therefore annuls itself and escapes beyond itself. It is a self-remover, a self-negative. It must flee all particular, i.e. retire to the extreme of simplicity; but thus it goes into self-contradiction, for it should be pure from all relations or antitheses, and hence pure from purity.

But such a thought is no longer simply analytic, but an active synthesis—the thought of self-determination or self-annulment.

7. Self-annulment of Being is a form of Becoming. In our synthetic act as the totality of the thought of Being, we have Becoming in both forms. As Being it is a self-cancelling—ceasing-to-be. But it is just as much an act of opposition or antithesis in itself, and hence a specializing or particularizing of itself, a becoming of something or a beginning-to-be. Thus it is an activity of determining itself while in the act of annulling determinations; and vice versa. This remarkable result we have arrived at only through observing our whole thought, its process as well as its results. Reflection noted results; the speculative thought notes processes as well.

8. Becoming is then the more adequate name of the object of pure thought as it is now before us. But it is Becoming as a process which unites two counter activities each of which is a becoming. A tendency *to*, and a tendency *from*, are the extremes of its activity. But each of these extremes is likewise dual, and sustains itself only through its opposite. The Ceasing (or self-annulment of Being) is only an activity of self-opposition by which it reduces its simple empty being to a definite particular—and thus it is a Beginning. But it is the latter only in so far as it is an active cancelling of such opposition and particularization. Hence we now see that our activity is a circular one and returns back into itself continually. Becoming is therefore now seen to be no adequate designation of the synthesis before us. It is a self-sustained process of determination (called by Hegel *Daseyn*) which we may call determined Being.

We can proceed further to examine the adequacy of our

new designation and trace out its synthesis of the two counter movements which we recognized in it as (a) Beginning returning into itself through Ceasing, and (b) Ceasing returning into itself through Beginning.

This is enough, however, to show the critical basis of Hegel's method, and to furnish a key to the insight into the difference between its procedure and that of the Analytical Reflection. Plato's "Knowing by wholes" (i.e. knowing the results in their entire process) has here its explanation.

C. Pure Thought objective as well as subjective.

9. We now will inquire briefly what are the grounds of the assertion that this pure thought has objective validity and furnishes the key to the explanation of the world of Experience.

Pure thought is the universal and necessary form of thought and hence the net result of all thought. What is found in pure thought is the thought which underlies all concrete thinking. Pure thought brings to consciousness the whole process, while in ordinary thinking we know only the results of our thinking activity, and not only can give no account of the process within us, but for the most part never suspect the existence of such a process. We refer the results of the unconscious dialectic process within us to an objective origin.

Thought exhibits its process exhaustively in pure science. Hence it would be as impossible to think of an objective existence which transcended the categories of pure thought as it would be to think without thinking. Any special act of thought can be analyzed at once, and the pure thought which lies at its basis exhibited. The possibility of all special thinking lies primarily in pure thinking.

Not only is it impossible to think or express anything that transcends the categories of pure thought, but the speculative insight is certain of the universal and necessary objective validity of what it recognizes as the total process of the thinking activity. It is perfectly certain that what it finds true of quantity in general can never be untrue of quantity in particular. For the thought of any particular quantity is limited by the thought of quantity in general. So of Cause and Effect,

of Substance, Essence, Design, &c. When we determine *a priori* a mathematical theorem we are perfectly certain that we can never experience its opposite in Space or Time. For it is the logical condition of the existence of phenomena in Time and Space. So pure thought is the logical condition of all thought, and hence no one can ever cognize an experience other than through it and in accordance with it.

10. In fancy or imagination our thinking activity exhibits its arbitrariness and caprice, and hence in them we do not find objectively valid thoughts. Even Reflection is an activity partly confined to images which it is unable wholly to transcend. It cannot seize the living process, and is therefore inadequate to state what is universally and necessarily valid in the objective world. The Speculative Reason, however, is occupied solely in the contemplation of this living process not only as defined in pure thought, but also as manifested in the world of Experience.

11. Think in universals. Place every idea "under the form of eternity"; i.e. make it universal, and see what will come of it. Its dialectic will then appear. The dialectic is the soul of the whole revealing itself in the part. The partial exhibits its implications or presuppositions when it is posited as universal by thought. Trace out these implications and the true whole will appear.

12. That there hovers before the mind a "presupposition of the world from which abstraction has been made" when one discusses pure being, is a critical saying of Trendelenburg. Undoubtedly he is right; but of what nature is this presupposition? It is not a presupposition of some idea more simple than Being—of some idea that must be thought before thinking Being. On the contrary, Being is the idea that must necessarily be thought prior to the idea of the world. Let one endeavor to think the world (or any other concrete idea), and his first mental act will be the predication of the undetermined Being of it: the world is. The second act of thought will necessarily be the simple first determination of it—the thought of its negation or limit. The next thought (whether this process is conscious or unconscious, it is, all the same, involved in every mental act of seizing an idea) will be that of the synthesis of its Being and its limit, and only after these

three steps will the mind recognize before it the definite being of its object. These three steps are rarely separated consciously; their result alone is seized as the first step. The triad Being, Naught, and Becoming, takes us but a little way forward in Logic. Hegel considered it the nadir of pure thought, and opposite to it held up the idea of Personality as the zenith of his system ("*Die höchste zugeschärfste Spitze*"). But the spirit of his method may be exhibited even in these barren abstractions.

The Dialectic is a process of passing from Seeming to Truth. Pure Science furnishes the general formulas for the solution of all problems. It is a Calculus, a general theory without which particular solution is impossible, inasmuch as it underlies all synthesis.

HEGEL AS THE NATIONAL PHILOSOPHER OF GERMANY.

I.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

Much as that which Hegel accomplished as pedagogue demands recognition; still, that which had greatest scientific significance, which he wrought out all in quiet during his rectorate, and which grew up to him partly from the ever newly formed *dictata* of which he made use in his lectures, was the elaboration of the Logic, which appeared, like the Phenomenology, at an unfavorable time, in the midst of the great war of nations in Europe.

The Logic should make only the beginning of the system of science, to which the Phenomenology had furnished an introduction in so far as it had had, as its result, from the development of consciousness, the conception of absolute knowledge. This stand-point of self-consciousness, in which the antithesis of subject and object was absolutely cancelled, was to unfold itself in the organic form of free, self-subsistent idea. Inasmuch as, in the depiction of the embryonic plan of the Hegelian system, the historical connection of his Logic with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been already given, we will here revert to this no further than is unavoidably necessary in order to characterize the position which Hegel's Logic assumes in science, and from which alone its form and its language can be rightly understood and judged.

The general problem transmitted from Kant to Hegel was to develop the idea of pure reason in the totality of its deter-

minations in such a manner that the understanding, which with Kant remained master of reason and prescribed for it boundaries which it must not transcend, should subordinate itself to reason as its tool. To this end it was necessary to rescue the categories from the uncritical dead form in which they had been adopted by Kant from the old formal logic. The latter had selected its distinctions only empirically. There are, according to it, ideas, judgments, syllogisms, in manifold form, just as there are negroes, Mongolians, &c., in manifold varieties. The determinations were found ready made in tradition, only always differently arranged by logicians, furnished with more or less illustrations, and in general brought into relation to more or less matter entirely foreign to themselves. Hegel now demanded that the idea of reason, as that of the logical idea, should develop itself in a connection in which every determination must be mediated as necessary, but at the same time, likewise, should mediate another. The categories could not, therefore, appear as fixed, unmoved conceptions of the understanding, but they are essentially dialectic, i.e. they pass through themselves over into other and opposite conceptions, quality into quantity, something into other, one into many, essence into appearance, ground into consequence, content into form, substantiality into causality, cause into effect, general into special, &c. It must, therefore, be shown how an idea is changed in and through its development, i.e. how it advances to the idea which is the opposite of itself, which emerges from its sublation [dissolution] as its positive result; for negation does not come from without to the idea, but it produces its negation itself from within outward. All ideas of pure reason make up, therefore, a system in which the lower is richer in extent but poorer in content, while the higher is poorer in extent and richer in content, inasmuch as the latter embraces in itself, as steps of its formation, all that have gone before it; for it is higher only in that it includes in itself all that is presupposed by it, through a determination which has power to transcend it and to sublate it into itself. The higher step not only preserves the lower in itself, but also changes them, in that it elevates them to itself.

The correctness of this problem in apprehending the deter-

minations of pure reason as dialectic, is to be granted throughout. The science of logic, which treats of the laws of thought, contradicts itself when it presents these laws in a formless shape, as an inorganic mass, as a medley of fixed ideas. Thinking—the final ground of all motion, of all life—cannot be unmoved and lifeless in itself. Of the necessity of this problem, by the solution of which Kant's Critique was emancipated from the enchantment of the understanding, Hegel was entirely conscious, and so said that he must re-form the Logic from the very beginning.

The second special problem bequeathed from Kant to Hegel lay in the solution of the old metaphysics by means of logic. Fichte and Schelling, Kant's immediate successors, had neither a logic nor a metaphysics, but, with them all, the elements of these sciences had become moments of consciousness. Hegel returned to a metaphysics within logic, by developing the categories of Kant, and by making them precede the idea of the universal. He declared the determinations, quality, quantity, relation, modality, to be definitions of Being in itself, as categories of objective logic, in distinction from idea, judgment, syllogism, as the moments of subjective logic. The metaphysics of logic should be made to consist in the fact that the latter is the ideal archetype of all reality. The idea of pure reason is the *prius* of all concrete reality, which is rational only in so far as it is thought in itself, and is, therefore, thinkable for us. The idea as logical, to speak like Kant, is the ideal prototype of nature and of mind. In the idea of reason, e.g., the pure idea of quality exists; in nature, qualities—red, yellow, sweet, sour, hard, soft, rough, smooth, heavy, light, &c.—exist. So also in mind, dull, shrewd, upright, false, strong, weak, &c. The idea of quality in itself is, therefore, that of pure quality, because in that real quality it gains existence, but itself is no definite quality. The same is true of quantity, &c.

Consequently, all those ideas must be excluded from logic which belong to nature or to mind, like the conception of life, which falls to nature; or the knowledge of the true, or the willing of the good, which fall to mind. In this Hegel is still biassed by Kant, who applied the dialectic to the ideas of soul, world, and God. The idea of the absolute idea, purely

as idea, Hegel seems not to have regarded as significant enough, and therefore he determined it further as life, and as knowledge of the true, and as willing of the good. The science of the logical idea must also, in conclusion, sublate [cancel] itself, i.e. pass over to nature; but it does not follow hence that it must itself develop the idea of life in which nature reaches itself as idea.

With respect to the idea of mind this difficulty exists, viz. that the idea of reason is unthinkable without that of mind, for reason is the totality of the abstract determinations of thinking, but thinking exists, *in actu*, only as the activity of a thinking subject; hence ordinary logic takes it up psychologically from the stand-point of knowledge, and inquires how we come to form ideas, judgments, and syllogisms. But with the determinations of thinking as such, it is found that they are independent in themselves, and are valid not only for thinking, but for all being. They are law not merely for our ideal subjectivity, but no less for all real objectivity. It is by virtue of this that they can appear as the neutral indifference of nature and mind in the autonomy and autarchy of the logical idea; in which, however, it must not be forgotten that the principle of reason, the ground of its existence, is ultimately the absolute mind itself. When Hegel said in the preface to his *Logic*, that it presents the truth as it is unveiled, he sought thus to express that the categories of reason are the absolute form, without which neither nature nor mind can be thought. It would be impossible to think the concrete—star, plant, animal, fantasy, action, family, &c.—without the abstract determination of reason; the latter are contained, therefore, in the concrete as its unity, difference, ground, &c., but in a concrete manner; for nature and mind are not merely the veil of pure reason, as though they were related only externally to it, as though they presented only a masked reason, but, compared with the abstract form of reason, they are as it were higher forms of the idea. Hegelians misunderstand Hegel when they behave as if in all philosophy only logic were ultimately concerned, of which nature and mind properly are only superfluous translations.

Still another expression of Hegel, in the same place, has led to many disputes. He said that the *Logic* could be

regarded as the exposition of God as He was before the creation, of nature, and of the finite mind. This has been received as though he had put the conception of the logical idea in the place of God. All Hegelians who are pantheists, or atheists, or Logo-theists, make the idea of God vanish in that of reason, and regard logic as the fortunate destruction of all theology. It is still not to be left out of account that Hegel himself distinguished, on the one hand, between reason and God, and, on the other, between God and the finite mind, He says, when we abstract from nature and from the finite mind, and therefore from ourselves, only the abstraction of pure thinking remains. God can then be determined only as Logos. He is, then, pure Being, absolute essence, idea in itself. He would say that philosophy concerns itself only with definitions of the absolute, and that hence those of reason are in and for themselves divine. To obviate misunderstanding, he declared later in the Encyclopedia that of the categories only the first and third, but not the second, could have validity as definitions of God; for only the former were affirmative, while the later, intermediate between them, was negative; e.g. quality, quantity, measure, make up the ontological trichotomy. Thus I must think of God as the essence of all qualities as well as the measure of all things, but not as quantity, because as infinite He transcends all quantitative limitations; thus I must think of Him as essence and reality, but not as phenomenon, &c. Hegel exhibits here an imperfect reserve, which was first developed into greater clearness and distinctness in his lectures on the proofs of the existence of God.

The unmistakable enthusiasm with which Hegel was wont to speak of the Logic, has its cause in the absolute interest of science, and of thinking in general, in the categories. Can these be fortuitous? Can there be now this, now that significance arbitrarily given to a category? Certainly not. In common life, to be sure, we carelessly use related categories promiscuously. We speak of something and thing, essence and substance, reality and actuality, ground and cause, &c., as equivalents in meaning; but in science we must undertake a critical sifting. If these most general ideas are not fortuitous but necessary, they must

hang together among themselves, and make up an accordant totality in which every determination results only from a mediation which concerns only it. The uncritical consciousness lays hold of now this, now that category, according to its needs, and operates therewith as well as it can; the scientific consciousness, on the contrary, renders account of the categories, and limits each to its appropriate sphere. We uncritically apply, e.g., the category of *thingness* to every possible object. We apply it rightly in naming, e.g., a lump of sugar, or a thimble; but if any one should name family, or state, or poetry, a thing, we should ourselves take offence in common conversational language. Hegel has, therefore, rightly apprehended the problem of the science of the logical idea, even if his solution of it may be contested in single points. It is impossible that those determinations, from the truth of which all other truth in thought depends, should not be necessary. My caprice must not decree what is to be understood by being, essence, phenomenon, content, form, &c. My caprice cannot decide which idea has to develop itself earlier, which later, in this logical cosmos. Let it be undertaken with a single idea, in order to show the truth of what has been said. Let any one undertake to say what effect is, and he is obliged to go back from it to cause. Can he rest at cause? No; cause leads to the idea of substance, which is active, and from which the change of being which we designate as effect arises. But what is substance? Substance is a reality subsisting through itself, in contrast to a merely accidental existence which definitely is only in and through another definite being. Thus, analytically, we can ever regress until we arrive at the general conception of Being, of pure Being without predicates, beyond or beneath which nothing more can be thought. Or, let the contrary method be followed. Let us ask ourselves — What arises from effect? Obviously, a new effect; i.e. the effect becomes itself, in turn, a cause. When an officer in a battle gives to his soldiers the command to *fire*, this word is an effect of his thinking, and considered as sound, of his vocal organs. But this effect becomes the cause of the soldiers' discharging their weapons. This effect becomes cause that, of the hostile soldiers, some are killed or wounded. This effect becomes cause

that they either energetically resist the attack, or flee, &c. There arises, therefore, an infinite progress. At the same time the idea of cause and effect is changed into that of reciprocity; action invariably follows reaction, &c. Thus thinking pursues its onward way synthetically through deduction, until here, too, it arrives at an ultimate, viz. the idea, which in the causal process of substances constitutes the principle of their activity. In the adduced example, one would proceed *in concreto* from soldiers to armies, from armies to nations, from nations to their wars, from wars to history, from history to freedom, which is the idea of mind. The process goes no farther. All the remaining categories lie midway between the idea of the being without predicates and that of the idea, which is the unity of the particular idea and its reality. Included in logic are the determinations of being, of essence, of idea, in all their differences,—still themselves the content, to the universality of which nature and history are related as examples.

Over against the fulness of the concrete idea in nature and history, the cosmos of the logical idea with its abstract categories appears in fact as a world of shadows. It is remarkable that Hegel is so often reproached with offering up the world of blooming life to idea as to a desolate Hades. Can Hegel make the abstract something other than it is? Is not, then, this abstract contained in the concrete as its logical soul, just as the shades in Hades are not absolutely dead, but are departed souls that must drink blood in order to make themselves apprehensible? Hegel himself designated the logical ideas as pure essences, souls; and so, too, they are with him as they are in reality; but what is the logic of so many logicians? Not a Hades, in which souls longing for life drift about, but a church-yard, into which the bones of the corpses of ideas are desolately and promiscuously thrown.

If Hegel sought to present the connection of the categories as in itself self-producing, he must make each one to appear analogously, as a special formation of the logical idea, the same as he did in the Phenomenology with the different stand-points of consciousness. It has been supposed that he changed categories into individualities, and reduced them to

speculative poetical figures that waver past like the shapes in Goethe's masquerade procession. In order to gain a clear conception of Hegel's process, it is only necessary to institute the attempt to make any category develop itself with perfect objectivity, and without mixing in, one's own personality. As soon as it is no longer said, e.g., we pass over now from quality to quantity, or, in another form, after we have disposed of the conception of quality, we come now to that of quantity, &c.; but when quality shall sublate [develop] itself into quantity, it will be found that quite another language will be used. It will be seen how the idea of quality changes with each progressive distinction which is made, until finally through itself it projects the determination opposed to it (that of the indifferent external boundary) on itself, and thereby passes over into the category of quantity. It is true that Hegel has constructed a new language for logic; but this was a necessity, which moreover had the advantage of being truly German, without lapsing into a fantastic purism. How far the effect of this most admirable language extends, must by no means be overlooked. We read everywhere that the Logic was composed in a very dark, oracle-like tone, which must frighten the "uninitiated" from its study; but far rather, such remarks themselves are intended to create the prejudice which frightens students from it. I will here extract a few passages at random from the Logic, and then let it be asked whether they are written plainly, whether they are German, whether they are in good taste, and how they should be written otherwise. In the doctrine of extensive and intensive *quantum*, e.g. in the elucidation of their difference, he says:

"Degree is thus determinate magnitude, quantum, but not at the same time multitude, or the Plural within itself; it is only a plurality; plurality is the plural aggregated in simple determination, extant-being gone back into being-for-self. Its determinateness must, indeed, be expressed by a number as the most perfect determinate being of quantum; but it is not a sum, but simple, only *one* degree. When we speak of 10, 20 degrees, the quantum which has so many degrees is the tenth, twentieth degree, and not the amount or sum of the same: in that case it would be extensive; but it is only *one*, the tenth, twentieth degree. It contains the determinateness

which lies in the enumeration 10, 20, but does not contain it as plural; but it is the number as sublated [cancelled] enumeration, as simple determinateness."

What is there to be changed in this?—We take the liberty of extracting from the doctrine of the idea of Actuality another passage, in which the difference between might [*Macht*] and power [*Gewalt*] is described:

"Power [external constraint] is the phenomenon of might, or it is might as external. Might is, however, external only in so far as the causal substance, in its action, i.e. in its positing of itself, is at the same time presupposing, i.e. posits itself as sublated. Hence, conversely, an act of power is none the less an act of might. It is only an Other presupposed by itself upon which the powerful cause works; its working thereon is negative relation to itself, or the manifestation of itself. The passive is independent, which is only posited; something broken within itself—a reality which is condition, and, indeed, condition in its truth, viz. a reality which is only a possibility; or, conversely, inherent being, that is, only determinateness of inherent being, only passive. It is, hence, not only possible, but necessary, for him on whom power is exerted, to exert power; whatever has power over another, has it because it is the might thereof, which thereby manifests itself and the other. Passive substance is posited by power only as that which it in truth is, especially because it is the simple Positive or immediate substance only in order to be posited. The prerogative of being a condition is the semblance of immediateness, which real causality strips off of it. Through the penetrating influence of another power, justice is thus done to passive substance. What it loses is the above immediateness, substantiality foreign to it. What it receives as foreign to it, viz. to become determined as a posited being, is its own determination."

How plainly and how strikingly all this is said! Let the experiment be made on one example to see whether Hegel's inflections must necessarily be used. The vital, e.g., is the might which exerts power upon the inorganic world; the inorganic—air, light, water, &c.—is immediately present over against the Vital; the Vital presupposes it as its condition. But in laying hold on it, it ceases to be self-subsisting in respect to the might of life, and is sublated by it. In this sublation, might manifests itself as power, which manifests at the same time itself and that which it determines as passive to it. Thus the sculptor who exerts power upon a block

of marble, in order to make a statue of it; thus the teacher who exerts power upon the intelligence of a child, in order to make therefrom a cultivated understanding, &c. In this metaphysical category morality is, of course, not involved; might may not conduct itself with injustice, as if *potestas* and *jus* were ethically the same, but only causality is involved. Ordinary consciousness receives much only from the side of activity or passivity, without bringing both determinations together in the unity of reciprocity. Men complain, e.g., that the state exerts power in taxation, or in enforcing military duty; but forget that the state is their own substance, without which they can possess no property and would enjoy no personal safety. How far a government may impose too many burdens on the citizens, &c., is another question.

Hegel's style made great progress in the *Logic*, The language of the *Phenomenology*, full of spirit, pervaded with an ironical tone, artistic in bold pictures, often highly pathetic in its descriptions, mystic in its imagery, only recurs when Hegel regards indignantly the want of confidence in the mind to recognize truth, or the frippery of formal logic, or the hypocrisy and bad preëminence of positive sciences. Otherwise he writes entirely to the point, and with pedagogical regard for his readers. Neither does he fail, at important points, to adduce the history of science, and to show how the idea of being-in-itself belongs to the Eleatics; that of becoming, to Heraclitus; that of the One, to Leucippus and Democritus; that of quantity, to Pythagoras; that of measure, of identity, of difference, and of ground, to Leibnitz; that of the Negative, to the Skeptics; that of the thing-in-itself, and of phenomenon, to Kant; that of content and form, of matter and form, to Aristotle; that of substance, to Spinoza; that of the general idea, to Plato; that of the absolute idea, to Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. His *Logic* allowed no true principle of science which had ever made an epoch in its history, to escape it. But that which appears in the history of philosophy in connection with a thousand-fold other relations, enters the *Logic* as a simple idea in its systematic place.

Where it seemed necessary to him, he made remarks and

digressions, of which that upon the idea of the differential calculus, under the category of quantitative infinity, is one of the most weighty, to which, in the second edition of the Logic, only that upon Berzelius' theory of chemical affinity, and Berthollet's critique, can be compared. He would never have resolved upon such a casual, loose form of expression in the Phenomenology; for that needed to be a plastic, definite, beautifully articulated work of art. Now clearness of understanding was his supreme aim; the æsthetic design, to form out of the Logic a scientific work of art, was not lost sight of, but it became subordinate to didactic necessity.

As pedagogue, he had learned also the art of exemplification, and knew how to make good use of it in the Logic. He had acquired the tact of remarking where and how an illustration was necessary to the reader. He speaks, for example, of the formal syllogism, and seeks to show that it can attribute to the same subject contradictory determinations because it can make of the different sides of the subject a *medius terminus*. The conclusion can accordingly be correct in form, yet false in content. This he explains by illustrations:

"When from the *medius terminus* of sensuousness the conclusion is reached that man is neither good nor bad, because neither the one nor the other can be predicated of the sensuous, this is correct; but the concluding clause is *false*, because of man as concrete the *medius terminus* of spirituality is no less valid. From the *medius terminus* of the gravity of the planets, satellites, and comets, toward the sun, it duly follows that these bodies fall into the sun; yet they do not fall into it, because they are in equal degree their own centre of gravity, or, as we say, they are impelled by centrifugal force. Also, from the *medius terminus* of the sociality, community of goods of citizens can be deduced; but from the *medius terminus* of individuality, when it is driven into like abstraction, the dissolution of the state ensues, as has been the case, e.g., with the German empire, because it has adhered to the latter *medius terminus*. There is, in short, nothing which is held to be so insufficient as such a formal conclusion, because it reposes upon chance or upon arbitrariness, which *medius terminus* is to be made use of. When such a deduction has spun off through conclusions ever so finely, and its correctness has been fully granted, still it leads at least to nothing; for the fact ever remains that other *medii termini* arise, from which the exact opposite can with equal propriety

be deduced. Kant's antinomies of reason are nothing else than that, from a conception, now one of its determinations is made fundamental, and now, with equal necessity, the other."

Hegel opposed logical formulism. It is quite erroneous to think that he despised the forms of formal logic; on the contrary, he respected them as products of mind, which, in his estimation, was higher than nature. Hence he expressly took them under his protection, and said:

"If it is thought not unimportant to have discovered more than sixty species of the parrot, and thirty-seven species of the veronica, &c., the discovery of forms of reason must be esteemed still more important. Is not a figure of logical syllogism something infinitely higher than a species of parrot, or veronica?"

Hegel has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that no true determination of formal logic is lost in speculative logic, but that, rather, the former is dialectically reproduced in the latter. When, e.g., formal logic posits the idea of the general, special, and individual, it describes these determinations, in part psychologically, in part grammatically, until it forgets this, and suddenly treats them as in-and-for-themselves independent. It commences psychologically. It calls upon consciousness to abstract from the Manifold in immediate contemplation; thereby the unity which exists in the Manifold is attained; this identity is the generality which therefore appears as the product of an act of theoretical intelligence. The general is the idea. Now it proceeds to combining conceptions into judgments. This combination is again an act of consciousness; it is not the conceptions which combine themselves, but it is the thinking subject which brings together into a proposition those which are taken as external to one another. Thereby logic becomes grammatical. It names the judgments expressly, logical sentences, *enunciationes*, *propositiones*. It is the thinker who joins the predicate—or, more properly, any predicate—to the subject, in that he ties it to it with the copula. The copula is, in turn, regarded as a bond which is external and indifferent alike to the subject and to the predicate, although it unites both. In the syllogism, formal logic combines judgments with one

another by deriving from the relation of two judgments with each other, a third as result. Hence they can no longer affirm their subjectivity, for the dependence of the determinations upon each other, and therewith the metaphysical element of logic, come here to light. The so-called rules of inference express nothing but the independence of the idea toward the thinking subject. *Ex propositionibus mere negativis nihil sequitur. Ex propositionibus mere particularibus nihil sequitur.* But why not? In the first case, because the affirmative nature of the idea forbids it; in the second, because the special cannot be subsumed under the special, but only under the general. *Quid valet de omnibus, valet etiam de singulis;* because in the idea, generality is identical with individuality. *A majori ad minus, non a minori ad majus valet consequentia;* of course, because the individual must contain determinations which are not in the special; and the special, distinctions which are not expressly posited in the general. Logic recognizes here, therefore, that ideas determine themselves so that, when their objective relations are not attended to, the conclusion has no validity. It finds itself compelled also to distinguish the essential from the unessential characteristics; qualitative from quantitative; positive from negative; substantiality from causality; possibility from actuality; chance from necessity; i.e. the entire metaphysics breaks suddenly into logic, and is smuggled in, now here, now there, in the form of abrupt definitions. Once arrived at this point, logic falls into the opposite extreme of subjectivity with which it psychologically began. In the figures of the syllogism it began to calculate by means of ideas. Calculating is, in fact, thinking, as Bardili said in his Logic, with which he would cure 1800 as with a *medicina mentis* of Kant's Critique of Reason. "Whoever calculates, thinks." With these words he begins his Logic. The arithmetic of numerical relations in nature and history shows us that they have been reckoned, that they rest upon syllogisms, and therefore betray a subject which has thought them; but in the form of thinking as mere reckoning the vitality of the idea is destroyed, for, in order to be able to reckon, the moments of the idea must be reduced to dead *quantums*. Hence Hegel declares himself decidedly opposed

to that tendency in logic which would transmute thinking into reckoning, like Ploucquet's Calculus, &c., although he knows that reckoning without thinking at all is impossible. On the contrary, he took pains, in the third part of his *Logic*, especially at the beginning, and in the first chapter of the first division, to describe the dialectic nature of the idea. This is unquestionably one of the most difficult problems which he attempted to solve. Many readers have been frightened away from the Hegelian logic because they became giddy in this constant transition of opposite into opposite. They were accustomed to have general and special and individual nicely distinguished side by side, but now Hegel comes and shows them that (1) all three determinations are moments of one idea; (2) that just for that reason each of them contains both the others in itself; (3) that every moment is equal to every other in value, and that nevertheless they are found in subordination; (4) that therefore the conception of general, special, and individual, is distinguished, but that the perfect, true conception can be only the totality, the concrete unity of these distinctions. The general is also the special, for it distinguishes itself from itself, and it is this distinction which we call the special. But the general is also the individual, for without having it for a content the realization of the special into an existence independent in itself would be only a unit, not an individual. This individual is also thus itself again the general. Each moment of the total idea is, as determined, not what the others are, but at the same time as a moment of the whole no less *is* what they are.

Mathematicians do each other the justice, or at least the fairness, of admiring, in the work of others, even the elegance with which a problem is treated. From such a recognition philosophy is yet far removed. It allows the difficulties with which its presentation has to contend to be so little suspected, because it uses language accessible to all. The art with which Hegel has described the idea has been as yet but poorly estimated. We are wont to speak as if the "Hegelian idea" were something quite apart, which he construed in his *Logic*, while it really contains the objective thoughts which have absolutely nothing to do with the casual individuality of the thinker. The Hegelian idea is really the idea of idea, and no speculative idiosyncrasy.

RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY.

Phenomenology was to constitute the *first part of the system of science*. In the first edition this title stood first. *Phenomenology of mind* was placed underneath, as designating the content of the first part.

In the preface as well as in the introduction to logic, Hegel mentioned expressly the Phenomenology and its relation to logic, especially that it should present the *arising* of the stand-point of absolute knowledge, in which the antithesis of subject and object has vanished, and from which, therefore, knowing should begin as pure science without antithesis. Within the perfected system, of course, phenomenology could not appear with that fulness with which at first it had absorbed the entire kingdoms of nature and mind into itself; for in the systematic totality this same content appears in a simple organic form, uninvolved in the struggle of consciousness to master its own essence in it. Phenomenology shows us how mind as consciousness, as individuality, as ethics, as right, as morality, as religion, as art, as science, stands related as opposed to nature, so far as it seeks to find the reality of its idea in these forms, until it arrives at absolute knowledge, as the absolute unity of the subject with the object, because the object has here become the absolute itself, in the absolute form itself of the idea. In the system of science phenomenology could, therefore, become only a moment of the sphere of the subjective mind, of ordinary so-called psychology. The stages, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, were here the essentials.

Just before his death, Hegel began to revise the Phenomenology for a second edition, but he reached scarcely the middle of the preface. In its main features he left it much the same, but crossed out those passages which referred to the intended second part of the system. The suppression of these has been explained as if he had thereby retracted the original relation of the phenomenology as the mediation of the stand-point from which logic proceeds for thinking consciousness. This, however, does not follow; but merely that, since the publication of his system had taken place in another than the intended manner, the said announcement had lost its significance.

Hegel orally designated the *Phenomenology* in Berlin as the work in which he had made his "voyage of discovery." This expression can relate only to the concrete content of nature and history which he wrought over in it, and not to the general idea of consciousness, which also retained the same moments in the system of the philosophy of mind. Hegel conceded, however, by that expression, that he could have brought in a still more extended content into the *Phenomenology* than he did. When, later, he reduced the relation of the knowing subject to speculation (so far as concerns the beginning of speculative thinking), to the transition through skepticism, and to the simple resolution to will to think the truth absolutely, it must not be forgotten that no one would come to this resolve whose consciousness had not previously in some way completed in experience all its other content.

Hegel's division of consciousness remained (1) consciousness, (2) self-consciousness, (3) rational self-consciousness. To this, the following division of the *Logic* would correspond: (1) objective logic, (2) subjective logic, (3) absolute logic. The first would have contained the categories of being in general; the second, the moments of the idea; the third, the canon of the absolute idea. That Hegel confounded this trichotomy with another in the *Logic*—viz. being, essence, idea—is explained by the fact that he distinguished the idea of idea itself again into (1) the subjective, (2) the objective, (3) the idea. Hence one of the greatest difficulties of the *Logic* has arisen. We will here touch only upon the point adduced by criticism, that the same categories occur in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Logic*; so that the *Logic* was properly already contained in the *Phenomenology*.

This is quite right, but it cannot be otherwise. First, the content of phenomenology, as well as that of every other science, is formally ruled by logic. It cannot dispense with logical forms, which must therefore become manifest in its articulation. Second, the logical categories must themselves become objects of consciousness in concrete forms. Consciousness must, in the course of its culture, become master of the idea of logical forms. The existence of the logical in the concrete matter of consciousness cannot be excluded from its experience. Sensuous certainty, for example, cannot do otherwise

than make being, as definite being, its object. The senses make their appearance as the mediation of the certainty that something now and here looks red, tastes sweet, or feels smooth, &c.; but sense does not know that this something, as red, is distinguished from another, e.g. a green something. This knowing is an act of consciousness which distinguishes that excitation of the nerves of sight which we designate as red, from another as green. The animal does not attain this objectivization of its sensations, but rests in sensation. Red and green are distinguished even for the eye of the animal, but the animal cannot conclude *this is red*. It does not know that red is a different color from green. It knows nothing of *here* and *now*. It knows nothing of an individual object. It is, indeed, a self-feeling individualization, but knows not itself as subject in opposition to an object. It is consciousness which makes the sensuous an object, and thereby becomes certain of itself, i.e. knows being as distinct, as *this definite being*. Thus apprehension cannot perfect itself without the categories of the essential and the unessential, of the thing and its properties, &c.

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE UNESSENTIAL IN THE HEGELIAN METHOD.

The great problem which Hegel proposed in his *Logic*, centred itself about his conception of the dialectic method, which he regarded as the only true one. It consisted in the Platonic method, made profound by the method of Aristotle's metaphysics, and more accurately determined by the forms of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Subjectively it was to constitute the absolute organ of all genuine knowing, but objectively it was also to contain the immanent rythmus of ontological development which is immanent in reality. What Kant had distinguished on the one side as understanding, judgment, and reason, and on the other as idea, reflection, and syllogism, was to become united in the abstract, reflected, and speculative determinations of the logical idea. Its course was to be not merely analytic from the individual to the general, not merely synthetic from the general to the individual, but regressive and progressive at the same time, because the general unity was to distinguish itself from itself,

and only ultimately to be determined to its genuine concrete idea. In the treatment of the Phenomenology and of the Logic, Hegel himself gave an example of this method. He had made the idea expound itself, and thereby build itself up to a new idea. Idea as such is identical with itself, but through its differentiation it produces new ideas, and in that degree changes itself.

This must be rightly understood. The idea of a point, e.g., is always the same; but in so far as the point moves it begets another, the other of itself, in which it sublates itself as the true. The line again, by moving in different ways, produces the difference of straight and crooked. The point makes itself analytically a line, but synthetically it remains contained in it; the line makes itself analytically a straight or a crooked line, but synthetically it is posited as a line in the one as well as in the other. The soul of this dialectic was thus here, as with Plato and Aristotle, the negative of the idea, the antithesis which it brought forth out of itself. This is the incontrovertible truth of this process. Closely connected with this, however, is the unessential, so easily possible in its presentation, viz. error in regard to that which is posited as the negative. Hegel's thought strove toward the absolute independence of the idea from the philosopher. The part of the latter should be only that of looking on its movement. In the above illustration it is not I who make the point become a line; but it itself, by moving itself, produces itself as a line. I look upon this its self-formation. This highest ideal of all scientific investigation was not insured in its realization against the contingency of the philosopher, for here in the transition from the general to the special the distinction necessary in itself could very easily be varied, and the immanent antithesis be falsified. Even the abstract generality might be transposed with the concrete, the first with the last. Then, despite all claim of infallibility, the method fell into fallacious construction. In Hegel himself examples may be found where he is deluded and vacillating in this respect; e.g. in the Philosophy of Right, under the conception of the state power, he has set up royal sovereignty as the first, therefore abstract, moment; while in the second edition of the Encyclopedia it is the final and concrete moment.

Among the adherents of Hegel, the differences are still greater. Opponents of his philosophy receive these as proof of the falsity of his method, while the ground lies only in its uncritical use. Hegel wished manifestation of the idea, but the school often fell back to the mere construction of the philosophy of Schelling through precipitate and external application of the logical categories. That which can be called the unessential in Hegel's method has been especially evoked by the fact that the idea of antithesis became confounded with that of contradiction. Hegel took up the antinomy from Kant's dialectic with great satisfaction. While Kant placed contradiction only in our knowledge, Hegel said it should belong also to actuality itself. Contradiction, as real, is also possible, and can therefore become actual. It is not merely a phenomenon of our intelligence. Hegel now affirmed that, in the development of the idea, antinomies everywhere present themselves which must be solved into a higher unity. He did not intend to explain the contradiction as that which is true, for that which is true cannot contradict itself, but he discerned the foundation of all life, of all activity, in the fact that in the phenomenal world antithesis grew into contradiction, which latter manifested the unity in whose depth it sank away. The higher a particular being stands, and the more sides it has, so much the more easily can it involve itself in manifold contradictions. Hegel, therefore, took up contradiction as a constitutive moment into his system, and aroused endless contradiction thereby, because by this it was customary to understand the absurdity of something unthinkable, logically impossible. Contradiction is also antithesis; but antithesis as such, brought to the tension of negative actusity *versus* identity, is not contradiction, but in the world of phenomena it may every moment become contradiction. The antithesis of positive and negative electricity is in itself ever and everywhere present, but only in the thunderstorm does it become a contradiction which solves itself in lightning. Egoness, as individualization of mind, is immediately antithetical to its universality, but it becomes bad only when it negates it *in actu* and with consciousness. Physical selfishness is not yet ethical egotism. It cannot be

denied that Hegel's philosophy has not distinguished the contradictory, the contrary, and the repugnant, with sufficient care, and has caused confusion thereby; but still less can it be denied that the zeal which would again exile contradiction from philosophy without surmounting it, has resulted in the most lamentable shallowness.

The idea in-and-for-itself is, to be sure, without contradiction; but in its development, contradiction produces itself in the steps of transition. It must, therefore, always be measured on the higher. Eudemonism is the quite consequent issue of psychology. In itself there is nothing contradictory in being happy, in the satisfaction of one's instincts and appetites, but this principle leads to the contradiction of pleasure with itself, and this contradiction is solved not by psychology but by ethics. Man shall be more than happy—he shall be free.

When, therefore, Hegel is reproached with discerning truth in contradiction, an error is made; the contradiction which begets itself is in the same degree sublated; unity continues, not only negative but affirmative, through the totality of the development. The unity with which an idea begins is abstract identity; from this proceeds its difference; these station themselves over against one another in order to sublimate themselves into a higher unity. Thus backwards this is concrete, but forwards it manifests itself as a contradiction which sinks away in the depth of a higher unity opposed to it, which nevertheless in the beginning of its formation, or immediately, is only an abstract identity. The abstract in-and-for-itself is without contradiction, but the different steps of the phenomenal universe, re-interlinked with one another through contradiction (since it demands solution) into living unity.

That which is true, therefore, in the Hegelian method is the unrest of the negative, which makes its appearance in every sphere save that of the pure absolute. But this unrest is at the same time full of the repose which accrues to every moment of the whole as necessary and for itself positive. The higher step negates that which is presupposed and lower, and includes it in itself (as Hegel was wont to say) as its negative identity, but does not destroy it in its relative inde-

pendence. When, e.g., man as a microcosm comprehends the macrocosm of all nature compendiously in himself, the persistence of nature in itself is not destroyed.

The transition of one idea to another is no gradual metamorphosis as students of nature so readily seek to derive the origin of new forms by successive transformation of those already existing, but the existence of the higher grade is posited through the idea of the idea. The lower grade often reveals types in which the higher already has its analogy. It is the types which may deceive, but they are only the humorous prelude, not yet the thing itself; as the *Rosaceæ* envelope their kernel with the superfluity of a flesh which is yet no real, feeling flesh—as the *apè* seems to foreshadow the human form, yet is separated from man by an impassable gulf—as relief extends picture-like over surfaces, but is as yet no painting. Hegel could not call his method merely synthetic, because the higher step is the teleological ground of the lower; in its execution however, which he was not able himself to carry on to its completion—i.e. in the lectures published after his death—he has often, it is true, contented himself with a synthetic derivation. Here then, as with Spinoza, dogmatism entered, and in such a manner that presentation not infrequently sunk into that form which Hegel most abhorred in philosophy—to narration; in the school this increased still more—the trichotomies of the idea were decreed only in an assertorical manner. The discipline of thought, as Hegel had named the method, was quite thrown off to make way for the most motley anarchy.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA.

It was natural that a mind which found itself upon so high a stand-point of scientific unity must approach the wish to live in a sphere adequate to itself. Hegel longed for academic activity. The favor of fortune came to him in various offers. He had already decided upon Heidelberg, when notice was also taken of him from Berlin.

There were especially two men, quite opposed to each other, who were instrumental in his appointment, Paulus and Daub. With the first he had stood in relations of personal friendship since Jena. With the latter he became

acquainted in Heidelberg, and through him was gradually alienated from Paulus, who observed the fact with great displeasure. Paulus was the most decided opponent of Romanticism, and could not pardon Hegel's sympathy for Daub and Creuzer, which he, in common with Voss, construed into a suspicion of crypto-catholicism. Hegel had never expressed himself publicly against Paulus, but Paulus persecuted him, when he was dead, in pamphlets and periodicals, and especially in a work which he entitled "*Geister revue*." He waged this polemic under the name "*Magis amica veritas*." Many bitter things which were retailed, ever more sarcastically, ever in wider circulation, owe their origin to their attacks under this pseudonym.

In Heidelberg, Hegel must have felt the necessity of giving to the public a presentation of his philosophy in its totality, for the *Phenomenology of Mind* had been a propædæutic work, and logic had been only the first part of his system. Both were, moreover, in a dialectic form so strict that they could have been understood only by the narrow circle of philosophers. Hegel's predecessor in Heidelberg had been Fries. With his totally different apprehension of speculation, it was necessary for Hegel to take pains to present in outline to the students the difference of his philosophy from that of Fries, at least in its chief moments. He proposed, therefore, a guide for his lectures which he named "*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*."

By the word *Encyclopedia* he wanted, as he himself said, to designate the unity of science, which composes a circle of circles. Beginning from itself, it widens itself to ever new determinations, which at the same time constitute deeper insights of the principle, until an ultimate stage is attained beyond which progress cannot be made, and with which knowing reverts into its beginning. Ever since Bacon, European science has striven toward totality. Since he had given to it only a psychological foundation in reason, memory, and phantasy, the unity remained external. The French *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and D'Alembert followed out, in the organization of sciences, essentially the plan of Bacon, but split up in execution into the atomistic multiplicity of the alphabetical article. In Germany, the division of the

Leibnitz-Wolff philosophy into theoretical and practical sciences had acquired validity and had been adopted by Kant, although he set up a higher division in the *Architectonique* of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; the physiology of pure reason, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of ethics—or science of the idea of that which should be in general, of that which is, and of that which should be. This trichotomy Hegel elevated to the distinct grasp of the idea, (1) as logic, (2) as nature, (3) as mind. Every system since then, which, in the place of this simple articulation, would place another, has fallen. One very important step of Hegel was the presentation of natural philosophy. It should, consequently, have followed the *Logic* as an independent whole. Now it appears as an integral part of the total cycle of sciences, in an abbreviated form, which scarcely suffices to make clear the inner connection of nature with the idea as logic and as mind.

Still more scanty and difficult of understanding was the composition of the last part of the philosophy of mind. Its division into the idea of the subjective, objective, and absolute mind, was, to be sure, of convincing simplicity; but the presentation of absolute mind as art-religion, revealed religion, and philosophy, must at once awaken doubt. Why was art apprehended at the same time as religion? Why was religion, as revealed, distinguished from the idea of religion in general? Why was the absoluteness of knowledge placed only in philosophy, which, as human activity, is not yet free from ignorance, error, and doubt, i.e. is infected with problematic knowing? Why was it not plainly enunciated whether the absolute mind also exists in-and-for-itself as subject, or whether Hegel under this word had in view only art, religion, and science, within the phenomena of the human mind? In the enigmatical paragraphs, only one very scanty extract from the last chapter of the *Phenomenology* can be detected. We shall see later what weighty consequences are attached to this indistinctness.

As Hegel wished to give a clue for his lectures, he omitted the proper dialectic development, and gave only a list of definitions in which he had much practice in the notes for the philosophical propædæutics at the gymnasium, and had at-

tained great skill in using modes of expression. This form, moreover, has not been without influence upon the school, because it favored its dogmatism and abjured stricter philosophy. It is no exaggeration to affirm that, with the exception of Euclid, no text-book exists of such concentrated precision. Every word in this laconic language is freighted with meaning.

To logic, natural philosophy, and psychology, Hegel appended remarks in which he gave a trenchant criticism of those views which contradicted his own. In this way he skilfully incited to free reflection.

II.

HEGEL AS PUBLICIST.

When compendiums are printed, their style is usually meagre and skeleton-like; the paragraphs of the Hegelian Encyclopedia, on the contrary, preserve for us a lively, didactic prose, in the intensive fullness of which it is throughout felt that a high geniality has imposed such a limitation upon itself with freedom. Behind these well-weighed words, the rich spirit may be conjectured which is able to broaden each into an entire world of meaning and to defend each in its own peculiar significance.

The Heidelberg professors had made the "Heidelberg Yearbook" a critical organ, which, at the time of Hegel's sojourn there, was at the acme of its highest prosperity. At first it represented the stand-point of Romanticism, which at the time of the French dominion had a national patriotic significance. Daub, Creuzer, and Goerres, who had previously been united in the editorship of the "Studien," exercised at first the greatest influence upon it. At the time of Hegel, Paulus had assumed its editorship. He procured Hegel's coöperation. The latter furnished only two criticisms, which however for philosophy as well as for himself were of great significance. One was upon Jacobi, the other upon the Württemberg Constitution.

In the "Critical Journal," which he published with Schelling, he had sharply attacked the stand-point of Jacobi. Now, as Jacobi, at the close of his career, began to publish his collective works, he desired to explain himself once more to him, and, aside from all positive differences, to become, out of respect for his endeavors, reconciled with him. This he could not do without affecting Schelling, who in the meantime had come to a most violent rupture with Jacobi. Every recognition of Jacobi on the part of Hegel, although it be qualified, must offend Schelling, however much Hegel might emphasize Schelling's scientific right as opposed to Jacobi. This is a point which for the further relations of both philosophers is so often overlooked. That which is, however, often still more

overlooked, was that in this critique Hegel was necessitated to pronounce with reference to atheism.

The reproach of atheism was first raised against Fichte by the government of Saxony — against Schelling by a philosopher, by Jacobi. The latter saw in Schelling's philosophy renewed Spinozism. Against this Hegel had decidedly pronounced in the "Phenomenology of Mind," and had expressly recognized the Christian religion as absolutely true. Later, in his Logic, he had subjected Spinozism to extended criticism and had shown its untenableness. He accorded right, therefore, to Jacobi in finding Spinozism defective, because, in the conception of the Absolute, it suppresses the moment of subjectivity. It follows hence that substance is to be apprehended, not merely as being and essence, but also as subject; i.e. not merely as causal necessity, but also as self-determining and self-conceiving freedom. The introduction to the third part of his Logic, which he entitled Subjective Logic, has no other purpose. Hegel must, therefore, admit to Jacobi that he could find no satisfaction in Spinozism. It is impossible for one to express himself clearer than Hegel has here done upon the point whether God is to be known only as substance, or at the same time as subject. The Absolute is not as it were only so far subject as it becomes so in plants, animals, and man, but it is subject in and for itself.

When Jacobi, however, affirmed that we could apprehend the Absolute only in faith, only in feeling and not in thought, in self-conscious conception, Hegel denied it in the most decisive way. Jacobi had even advanced to the paradoxical proposition that all demonstrative philosophy must lead to atheism. Hegel, on the other hand, proved the necessity of proof if the question of science was at all involved. The tenderness with which Hegel treated Schelling as well as Jacobi, without in the least sacrificing positive sharpness or his own dignity, makes this critique one of the most exemplary polemics. While he allowed no doubt to remain that he apprehended the Absolute in and for Itself as subject, there was offered to him, on the other hand, an opportunity to express himself in a popular manner upon the conception of the state, which he had done in the short paragraphs of the *Encyclopedia* only in very general and often dark outlines.

Now came the proceedings of the Diet of Würtemberg upon the new constitution of the state, which, through the confederacy of the Rhine, had grown into a kingdom. The state, even after the war of emancipation, was still a conglomeration of the most diverse particular rights. It needed to be transformed upon the principle of the freedom of person and of property; the equality of all citizens before the law; the uniform distribution of the burdens of taxation; freedom of religion and freedom of the press; the legal participation of the citizens in legislation, and the responsibility of ministers. The kings of Würtemberg recognized this necessity, and laid the plan of a constitution before the aristocracy. It met with determined opposition, because it must of course demand the surrender of many privileges. These were named by the aristocracy "good old German rights," and the royal presumption in proposing to sacrifice them to the common good was rejected with indignation, while the constitution was suspected of being a means of despotism. It was not only the nobility who were hostile, but especially the guild of advocates and notaries, who feared that under a new constitution they would lose much of their influence and of their incomes, because the incessant collisions of multitudinous privileges was the occasion of innumerable suits at law, by conducting which they were able to watch over and plunder the rest of the citizens. After violent contests, in which all the animosity of political passions was let loose, the kingdom finally accomplished its work. The proceedings were printed, and Hegel undertook their criticism. So far as the public was concerned, he here entered a sphere of activity which was entirely new, for the question was now not upon the judgment of a philosophical system by any single author, but upon the political act of two princes of a neighboring state, of the same stock as that from which Hegel was descended, the capital of which was his early home, and the constitution of which, as early as the close of the preceding century, he had made the subject of an unpublished reformitory article. Upon which side should he, as a philosopher, take his stand in his critique? Upon the side of the so-called good old right of the aristocracy? Impossible; for this right was the prerogative of feudalism, the privilege of the guild,

the purchased monopoly of the rich. He must, therefore, take his stand with the kings, for they were, in this case, the representatives of rational freedom, of the true idea of the state.

That this took place in a small German state does not affect its importance. The reproach has been made that Hegel glorified the petty Schwabian kingdom with Asiatic flattery. The inhabitants of Würtemberg themselves, later, became proud of their constitution, and the contests in their chambers have exercised a politically-shaping influence upon all Germany. The names of Uhland and Pfizer were as popular in Berlin as in Stuttgart. Hegel always had strong political instincts. It was natural that the occurrences in his narrow fatherland should interest him intensely. He was patriotic so far as to recognize the independence of nationality as one of the essential conditions of a healthy state life; but he was not patriotic in the polemic, fanatic sense, the Germanic tendency of which proceeded from Fichte, Fries, and others, who attempted to organize the student corps into an exclusively German party. In his opening address at Heidelberg, Hegel had emphasized the maintenance of our nationality itself as a chief moment, through which the higher advancement of scientific thought might be secured among us. No modern state can make national purism its principle, because the purity of races is everywhere impaired. Germans have everywhere come in contact with Roman, Celtic and Slavic elements, and the reason of the state must subject itself to the peculiarity of its population. The Jews, scattered among all nations, are careful that this be not forgotten. That which in his youth had so interested Hegel in the French revolution, viz. the creation of a state in accordance with the Idea, now attracted him strongly in the proceedings in his fatherland. In France it was the people who wrested the modern state from the kingdom, while in Würtemberg it was the kingdom which must win the free constitution from the people. In the introduction to his critique he delineated this noteworthy situation in a masterly way, such as was possible only from a profound understanding of history. Hegel's style has nothing of what is wont to be called rhetoric in the ordinary sense, for all phrases, all Ciceronian *ornate et copiose dicere*, was opposed to his strictly matter-of-fact nature.

The German language stood at his command in rare compass, to give to his thoughts the most happy and manifold utterance. The dramatic vividness with which he depicted the course of the proceedings of the Diet is incomparable. The loftiness of his style passes over now and then to the bitter *comique*, with which he lashes the hypocrisy of that egoism which perverts the words fatherland, freedom, right, fidelity, and uses them against laws and princes in order to conceal its own private interests. The case which Hegel treated as a concrete one is the same in all history. It is the conflict of the progress of freedom with positive right, which over against the self-consciousness of more cultured reason has become a wrong, and struggles against dissolution because it has hitherto been accredited as a recognized chartered right. On this point Hegel had a perfectly philosophical consciousness, and the incisive words with which he expressed it will ever renewedly awaken the liveliest interest in the historian and the philosopher. Those who know the course of real affairs will not wonder that the passion of the reactionary party which Hegel, with his firm frankness and truly statesmanlike superiority had found so sensitive, turned upon him with rage because he defended the princes in their constitutional endeavors, and abused him as a servile man. Hegel has never uttered a word respecting this suspicion; he was above such insinuations of the crowd. It is, however, unprecedented that now, after several decades, his enemies are not weary of persecuting him, on account of this critique, as an anti-popular servant of kings, without being able to adduce a single actual proof for such bitter disparagement.

Even a historian like Gervinus, in his history of modern times, is not free from this acidity which has become traditional. Dr. Haym's groundless aspersion of Hegel, in his work "*Hegel and His Time*," as if he would have purchased, by his criticism of the government of Würtemberg, the chancellorship of the University of Tübingen, I have answered in my "*Hegel's Apology before Dr. Haym*." The proof which I demanded for the foundation of such an insinuation has not yet to my knowledge been furnished.

Since the July revolution, Germans have made great progress in political science. In this they were very backward

when Hegel wrote. Hegel lacks the declamatory pathos in which Fichte was so great, as well as the diplomatic dexterity of a Genz; but the philosophic sobriety which permeates his political inspiration imparts to his language, in its apt acuteness, a peculiar nobility. The great philosopher enchants us ever by the exalted naivety of his soul, which knows no other cultus than the truth; and this naivety, replete with a deep infusion of history, makes the philosopher a classic publicist, who judges his age, and knows how, fittingly, to say to it what it has to do.

III.

HEGEL, PRUSSIA, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

The local spirit of the beautiful city of Heidelberg seems to favor the so-called positive sciences rather than philosophy, and Spinoza indulged perhaps a proper instinct when he refused the call of the elector of the Palatinate to a professorship there. And yet Hegel's efficiency during the two years, 1816 and 1817, in which he lectured there, was of comparatively great significance. He prepared, however, in 1818 to go to Berlin, with which he had previously had relations. In this, as in all that is historical, the element of chance can be discerned, but for Prussia as well as for Hegel it was necessity. Prussia is the philosophic state *par excellence* in Germany, which has allowed no great German philosopher since Leibnitz to remain outside it. The chair which Fichte had occupied had been vacant since 1814. Solger proposed Hegel for the place. In the biography of Fries the correspondence is given which DeWette carried on with him concerning this call. Fries wished especially to come to Berlin. DeWette, his theological disciple, left no means untried to influence the majority of the Senate in his favor. In this electoral contest, and the passionate agitations which attended it, the two parties may be seen which in the University of Berlin opposed one another even more resolutely, and in which was reflected the great antithesis which pervaded the entire age.

At the beginning of the century, Hegel had almost abhorred Prussia on account of its bureaucracy and its court service, and had foreseen the fate of the Prussian army at Jena. But this state had undergone a new birth which showed that it yet bore within itself a great future. This future is at the same time the future of Germany itself, for the Ultramontanists and the South-Germans may abuse Prussia as much as they will; still Germany will not again get rid of Prussia, for it is the only German state that can save united Germany and conduct it to a higher national plane. The Congress of Vienna would not round off Prussia; it gave to it the Rhine

province as an *enclave* between Hussia, Nassau, Rhinic Bavaria, France, Belgium and Holland, and thus imposed upon it the Watch on the Rhine. Eventually, the Rhinic province with Westphalia could be again snatched from Prussia, and be declared an independent kingdom for any prince. Prussia must make vast endeavors so to organize its own military power that it could be ready to commence war with France at any moment. It was thus that it became stronger than its intriguing enemies had intended. Its geographical position brought it into immediate territorial contact with Russia as well as with France, as was the case with no other German state. It bordered on Austria and (with the exception of Würtemberg and Baden) nearly all the German middle and smaller states. Although the wasp-like contour of the Prussian state was made the occasion of much reproach, yet it was from the very fact of its many-sided border-contacts that it rose to an influence over all Germany, which rendered the foundation of the *Zollverein* possible as the first real unification of the German states. With the Rhine it had also taken into its domain the last of the great streams which flow from south to north into the sea. Cologne, under the Prussian administration, rose to renewed prosperity as a commercial city. Besides the encouragement of material interests, Prussia had undertaken through the Rhine provinces the difficult task of winning the confidence of the other Rhinic provinces, for the intensity of the prejudices with which these were then filled against the Prussian government can scarcely yet be correctly represented.

Hegel entered the Prussian state as a stranger. He felt in Berlin that an intense thought-life pervaded the entire atmosphere. This predominance of North-German reflection impressed him favorably with Berlin, because it responded to his character as a philosopher. He unduly transferred the impression which Berlin made upon him to the entire Prussian state, just as most Frenchmen and Englishmen are wont to do who conceive the one-sided views of Berlin to be the exhaustive expression of the entire Prussian community. Hegel began to interest himself in Prussia as a model state, but as a philosopher he cherished still another ideal which by no means tallied with the actual condition of Prussia.

That, which the great Prussian statesmen and military heroes of that epoch strove for, surpassed, in its tendency, the Hegelian conception of the state, in the greater participation which it allowed to the people in legislation. In a state where the system of defence obliged all citizens without exception to defend the land from invasion, they would admit all to participate in legislation. In a state where municipal communities administered their own affairs, the question of a bureaucratic omnipotence of the ministers as in France could not arise. In a state where rights of seignior and tutelage were removed, where the possession of land and industry were left free, where access to all state offices was conditioned only upon proof of competency,—in such a state mediæval conditions, forms, institutions, could find no longer a footing.

Rejuvenated, well-matured Prussia was built from 1810 to 1815 upon democratic foundations, which were given by the monarch himself. The elevation of the entire system of instruction by Wilhelm von Humboldt and von Altenstein, the establishment of the universities of Berlin, Breslau and Bonn, and the more munificent endowment and equipment of those at Halle and Königsberg, was accomplished in a democratic sense, for Prussia had made attendance at schools compulsory upon all. But after Napoleon had been conquered, and especially after his death, the reaction of the aristocracy and hierarchy against the political establishments of Prussia grew stronger even in Prussia itself. It resulted in that sad policy of restoration which now we are wont to call, from its most prominent representative, the policy of Metternich. This policy invaded Prussia, and began to imprint upon the government a political character of distrust for the people. The immediate result was that the people found no legislative representation, but provincial diets were established in their stead.

The combinations of the student-corps furnished occasion and pretext to the governments to persecute the democratic movement as revolutionary. Fichte, in his discourses in Berlin on the German nation, had declared the then passing generation incapable of achieving a *renaissance* by reason of the general depravity, and he called on the better trained young men to save the nation. These young men had actually fol-

lowed with enthusiasm the call of the king into the war with France, and, thirsting for freedom and braving death, had shed their blood upon the battle-field. They dreamed of a great united German kingdom with an emperor at its head. In songs of wondrous beauty they sang of the indissoluble fraternity of Germans, and of the future glory of the new kingdom which was to arise from it. And not youths alone grew eloquent over the resurrection of the old Barbarossa, whom the saga makes to slumber with sword in hand, now in Kyffhäuser on the golden Au, now under the mountain near Salzburg; but many men joined this movement, and, old and young, united in societies for physical culture in gymnastic halls and in Turner expeditions. The danger of this tendency lay in over-exciting patriotic feeling, and in over-stimulating national purism for want of deeper political conceptions. The attack on President von Ibell and the murder of Kotzebue by Sand were outbursts of an enthusiasm which had degenerated to fanaticism. As the student-corps conceived it to be a holy resolve to murder Kotzebue, they might with the same propriety resolve to remove by assassination a prince who was displeasing to them.

Princes trembled upon their unsteady thrones before such a secret tribunal, and the military trials filled not only fortresses with their sacrifices, but occasioned, after the resolutions of Carlsbad, a fanatical tendency to censure all liberalistic movements. Hegel, no doubt, harmonized with the governments in their opposition to these movements and excesses of the students; he certainly never approved of the frequently terrible severity of the Inquisition. What could he do? He sought to save the young by offering to them rational conceptions of right and of the state. Many in maturer years have thanked him for reconciling them with the present by his instruction—by explaining to them, instead of the Utopian ideal of their morbid aspiration, the organism of the state. While he won the love of very many sturdy members of the student-corps, he remained filled with inappeasable indignation against the leaders of the corps and especially toward Fries.

He published in 1821 a text-book on the Philosophy of Right and of the State, in which he more widely developed the

brief hints in the paragraphs of his Encyclopedia. As in the latter so here in this presentation he assumed a more dogmatic tone, and in the numerous remarks which were directed against views which deviated from his own, a more polemic tone than that which he had allowed to pervade the dialectic genesis of the Phenomenology and the Logic. The didactic end he had in view might justify this form, for he sought only to establish a foundation for his lectures; but it remains a subject of regret that he treated so important material only in the form of categorical dictation, for the element of proof became therefor too meagre. Within this limit his language, like the style of inscriptions on monuments, is uniformly significant. Since he presented the dialectic here only in the general construction, he became for the first time intelligible to the public at large, which has an appetite only for the *results* of thought.

It is quite inconceivable how the construction of servility to the Prussian government can be put upon this work, as if in his paragraphs he had copied the Prussian state as it was empirically presented to him. Hegel did not become false in Prussia to that conception of the state which he had defended in Bavaria against the Würtemberg reaction. Prussia was then not a constitutional state; there was no publicity or oral procedure in the maintenance of justice, no freedom of the press, no equality of citizens before the law, no participation of the people in legislation or assent on their part to taxation,—and all this Hegel taught as a philosophic necessity. When in remarks he lashed the caricatures which often distorted the idea in the field of every-day reality, even this was quite in order, and even this contributed to clarify conceptions. In order to bring him under the suspicion of the crowd, these caricatures, painted with satirical colors, have been excerpted and peddled about as his own definitions.

That which distinguished Hegel from preceding philosophers was the conception of constitutional monarchy as the absolute form of the state. He well knew that a state could pass through different constitutional forms, but as a philosopher he considered this the only form which fully corresponded to the idea of freedom. It is a very common opinion that a philosopher can only be a republican in politics, although

it is generally added by way of lament that the imperfection, and especially the moral weakness of man, renders the realization of a republic very difficult. Hegel contradicted this current view by the emphasis with which he insisted on monarchy. Many make this a ground of reproach against either the profundity, or, still worse, against the sincerity, of his thought. He was, however, in thorough earnest with his deduction of monarchy, and he had taught it in Jena just as well as in Heidelberg and Berlin. He had a rich political experience, having made himself acquainted with the most diverse constitutions, including those of the republics at Bern and Frankfort. He had witnessed the rise of the French republic and its transition to despotism, the fall of the Polish and the German elective monarchies as well as the impotence of hereditary monarchies, which cherished only dynastic egotism and which had never been organically united with the people. He did not, however, derive his proof of the necessity of hereditary monarchy from experience or from comparative studies, but from the conception of the sovereignty of the state, which must exist self-consciously in a real person and which must be securely removed from the instability of parties. Such an influx of nature into history would be fortuitous and unphilosophical, if, in the first place, the royal family itself had not been mediated historically, so that its call to the governmental functions was a natural fact; and secondly, if the ruler had not the freedom to renounce the throne if he felt himself uncalled to rule. Montesquieu was the first who, in his *Esprit des Lois*, made the conception of a constitutional government popular and put forward the view of the separate organization of the powers of government. Hegel is the philosopher who taught, not like Kant, the general necessity of the representative system, but who identified the idea of constitutional monarchy with that of the fully developed, rational state. He was very far from deifying the person of the prince in the sense of the abstract legitimist theory, for he often said that in a well-organized state very little depended on the special excellence of the ruler; he was only the essential conclusion of the ascending series, the personal summation of the entire state—the dot on the “i,” which without it would be a mere perpendicular

mark. His tendency to relegate the person and the individuality of rulers to relative indifference was exhibited in his polemic with Haller, who sought with his restorational policy to make rulers, by the grace of God, the private possessors of land and people.

If we compare this legal and political philosophy of Hegel with the principles which he had earlier advocated at Jena, we shall find the same fundamental idea, viz. that of realizing a system of ethics in the state, and shall at the same time see how untiringly he had labored, and revised his labor, in the development of this idea. In his original system, the plan was at the same time the most simple and the most inclusive, because there he omitted the contraposition of legality and morality. He there divided jurisprudence into three parts. In the first, he treated the elementary distinctions of right, viz. freedom, personality, labor, acquisition of property, exchange and commerce, and up to the origin of the family. In the second, he treated the negation of all these positive elements, the violation of Right—trespass and crime—in all its forms, and the entire world of Injustice. In the third, he presented ethics, which in laws and customs constitutes the will directed to the realization of the good, and in courts constitutes the negation of the negation caused by injustice. Later, he construed ethics as the higher unity of legality and morality, so that the system is finally divided thus: (1) right in itself, (2) morality, (3) ethics. Under the latter he subsumed the idea of the family, of civil society, and of the state, and closed with a perspective into universal history. Hegel had great horror of a state founded merely upon right, where only the externality of personal justification made the frigidity of egoistic rectitude a dominant principle. In this respect, also, he bore a certain grudge against Roman jurisprudence. He regarded with great aversion a state in which the moral ideal held the sceptre, and where all should be made to depend upon good intention, upon subjective consciousness, and upon the conflict of virtue with vice. This moral stand-point, which goes to the extreme of calling the vanity of its own conceit "warmheartedness," and, as satirized in the *Xenia*, "does the behests of duty with horror," and which finally ends in the complacent pride which, in order not to soil itself,

does nothing at all,—this stand-point of abstract internality he treats with almost malicious disparagement. Hegel desired a state which should neither stiffen into the mechanism of a merely external right, nor grow stolid in the virtuous feeling of mere internality. An ideal here ever hovered before him similar to that which Hölderlin has depicted with such aspiration in his *Hyperion*, and from which he has complained that the Germans stood so far removed. He approached here nearer to Fries and to DeWette than he thought, and Michelet has now openly acknowledged this in his *Philosophy of Right* by the development of the idea of unions and associations. Hegel was so strongly possessed with the idea of the state as the “terrestrial God,” as he termed it, that in this enthusiasm he can be compared only with Plato, to whom he expressly appeals in the preface of his text-book, although, as he expressly showed in the extended criticism in his *History of Philosophy*, he rejected the content of this state.

Hegel was convinced that his construction of practical philosophy was the only correct one, and that his method was correspondingly correct. In a remark in the *Psychology*, which Boumann had printed, he expressed himself with the greatest distinctness, because the antithesis of the objective and the subjective in right and morals was absolutely cancelled by the unity of both in ethics. With such divisions of the subject, one must not look to the right hand or to the left, but must submit himself entirely to the necessity of the idea. I confess still that I have ever found ground of offence in the position he assigns to morality. With such transitions—as those from subject to object, or from object to subject—alone, it is not accomplished. The relation of the general to the special and of the abstract to the concrete is also involved.

The most general conception of the entire practical sphere is the conception of good; for the conception of will in general, without reference to its content, falls to the sphere of psychology. The domain of psychology extends as far as the formal freedom which seeks happiness in the satisfaction of the appetites and passions, i.e. as far as Eudæmonism. Ethics, on the other hand, proceeds from the necessity with which good determines the will as with the truth of its contents. That will only which recognizes and which realizes good, or

its law, is really free. Hegel did not forget these elementary determinations; but, instead of making them constitute the first part of the Ethics, he treated them only in the form of an Introduction.

The general conception of good can be realized only through the power of the individual will to which it prescribes duty as the categorical imperative. This is the sphere of morality, which describes the special essence of action. It is an old dispute in morals whether the conception of duty must precede that of virtue, or the converse. This dispute rests upon the fact that we reflect upon the contents of action according to our concrete determinations. Each of these may be presented as a duty or as a virtue. Hegel condemned the latitude with which this was wont to be done by rightly declaring that each moment of the moral life could issue either in the form of duty or of virtue. Family piety, e.g., becomes the duty of filial, paternal and fraternal love. It need therefore, according to Hegel, only be added to the conception of piety that it constitutes now the duty and now the virtue of the members of the family; and likewise with all the relations of family and of state. We find, therefore, in Hegel no special doctrine of duty and of virtue, because the ethical organism embraces them as its vital development. This thought of Hegel is quite correct, and by means of it the useless and extensive repetitions of content in the ordinary treatment of morals is dispensed with. The meagreness to which he reduced the *morale* does not result from this. Hegel devotes only three chapters to morals, viz.: (1) design and guilt; (2) intention and well-being; (3) the good and conscience. But the idea of duty contains an entire system of determinations which through the moral organism are entirely independent from its concrete contents, e.g. the difference between categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive duty, or the difference between the duty of love and that of compulsion. The same is true of the conception of virtue, the peculiar field of which lies in the difference of virtues, as physical, intellectual, and practical and physical training, and in the formation of character. There is no doubt that the acquisition of all virtues is our duty; but it does not follow thence that the conception of virtue must precede that of duty, for virtue is dependent upon

the conception of duty. I must first know what I ought to do before I venture to act. The realization of duty is virtue. Children, e.g., know nothing at all of virtue. Educators make cleanliness, temperance, punctuality, honesty, modesty, etc., duties for them, and accustom them to practise them. With every virtue, the conception of duty, that it is something which *ought to be*, is posited. The conception of action as something which must precede the virtuous act, can be only perfected in the conception of duty as complementary to a necessary action.

The transition from morality to ethics Hegel makes through the conception of conscience in so far as it can sublate itself through its reflexion. According to him, the eternal laws of ethics, which man must obey without equivocation, are the positive negation of all moral skepticism. But this is the difference of right in general from morality; for right is the will which is valid not for me alone, but for all others as Good. In morality, I stand only before my *forum internum*, before conscience; in right, also, before the *forum externum*, before recognition through general consciousness. That right attains also the external form of a law fixed by authority or by letter, detracts nothing from its high significance, any more than does the fact that empirical rights can exist which in their content are unethical, like the *jus primæ noctis* of the French feudal lords. The circumstance that right can be practised without moral disposition detracts still less from its significance; for right itself is not responsible for this. I must proceed consciously in the practice of right, and must regard in so doing the well-being of others. The internality of the moral stand-point for itself, which is therefore so often apprehended as the stepping-stone to religion, appears higher than the mere externality of positive right; but there is manifestly nothing in right in itself which hinders the existence of morality. Hegel always accepts right in itself only as formal; he cannot deny, however, that ethics assumes essentially the form of right. Private, then, as well as public right embraces the same content which exists as the ethical (*Sitte*). The decay of all ethical organisms takes place when morality evacuates them and leaves only the naked, atomic person with the demands of his denuded rights. Hegel makes the transition

from right itself to morality through the idea of imputation, which leads to the idea of premeditation and guilt, and, further on, to intention and well-being. These, however, are ideas which right, in the conception of will and of action in general, already presupposes for itself, as appears immediately in the idea of wrong.

The distinction of ethics from right and from morality rests, according to Hegel, upon the fact that right and duty are always posited as unity, as correlatives, in their determinations. This reciprocity is by no means wanting to personal right; for the right of my own personal freedom evokes, as my right, the duty to respect the right of another; and not to treat him as a slave; the right to acquire property is identical with the duty to respect that of another; the service which is engaged to me by a bargain with another, involves the duty of a return service on my part, etc. A Crusoe upon a lonely island can live very morally, but there exist for him only duties; right exists for him only *potentia*, and can only develop itself *actu* when at least one other person lives with him, because only with this other would a recognition of his willing and acting become possible. He might, indeed, be immoral toward himself; he might be lazy, intemperate, unchaste, etc., but a crime or trespass he could not commit.

The full division of right is left incomplete by Hegel because it revolves only about property. He distinguishes (1) property, (2) fraud, (3) wrong. But fraud is itself a wrong, and the division must rather, according to his own dialectic rule of the negation of the negation, be thus: (1) personal right (personal freedom, property, contract); (2) wrong; (3) punishment. These are the elementary ideas of all right which can be separated from morality only violently by abstraction. Contract, e.g., imposes upon me the duty of fidelity and consciousness in the execution of the stipulation. Fraud is not only an action which affects right, but it is at the same time immoral; for through it I violate the duty of truthfulness. I do not question that in ethics right and morality should be one; but I ascribe right to ethics, which, even in its loftiest formations, cannot dispense with the objective form of right. The constitutions of nations, on the higher planes of state-culture, are not mere *naïve* traditions,

but written laws, in which they with consciousness express what conception of ethics and of good they have. The anti-thesis of ethics within itself is the individual right of the single person, and the particular right of the organic community, of family, of civil society, and of state. Particular sublates itself as universal right, which is brought out in the history of the state as the right of mankind in and for itself, and which we are therefore wont to call the right of universal citizenship. In his earlier plan of ethics, Hegel concluded with the conception of colonization, by which a state transcends its own limits, producing other states. The thought, however, of including the conception of history itself in the system of philosophy was more correct.

Hegel had avoided making use of the traditional terminology in his Philosophy of Right, unquestionably because it was not congruent to his ideas. He, therefore, named private right "abstract right," in order to indicate that in it abstraction was still made from morality, to which he first passed with the conception of imputation. This is, however, an error, for imputation [responsibility] is in general a conception identical with that of freedom. "Concrete" ought to be opposed to "abstract" right. Instead of that, Hegel goes entirely out of the conception of right over into that of morality. In ethics, which contained that which he was obliged to call "concrete right," he did not make use of the word "right" at all in the headings: he speaks only of family, of civil society, of state: only in the latter does he distinguish an internal state-right from an external. It is not to be denied that the Kantian division of public right as state-right, right of nations, and right of the universal citizen, is more simple and more compendious.

But where is church right? This is mentioned by Hegel only in a remark, in which he subordinates the church as a religious society to the ethical supervision of the state. Here he occupies precisely the stand-point of the *éclaircissement*, but in this point *éclaircissement* is right. The faith of a church should be left free from the state, for the sphere of religion is higher than that of politics. But in so far as the church, as such, comes to external manifestation, it should be treated as every other society, for a state-church is as bad as a

church-state. It is, in fine, the church which has to do chiefly with the fostering of morality and with the cultivation of conscience.

But all the blame which can be attached to Hegel's construction arises from the profound idea which he had formed of the state, in which he saw the realization of ethics. Hence it was that he subsumed family, society, and state, under the conception of ethics; for with this category he wished to say at the outset that the state was an end to itself, and not a mere means for the security of persons in demanding their eudæmonistic ends or their temporal interests. It is society which exercises its functions in the sphere of cultivated egoism, but in which that which the individual produces immediately for his own use, in the satisfaction of his necessities is converted into a contribution to the well-being of all. The family is the stand-point of the nature-state, of the patriarchal constitution. Society is the stand-point of the culture-state and of the constitution of community. It integrates the family in itself, but produces only the state so far as it rests upon necessity. The state which proceeds from the consciousness of freedom, and with it permeates all its communities, families, and individuals, is the true state. When Hegel is represented as though he had had in mind a centralized or bureaucratic state in which the omniscience or omnipotence of the government destroyed all individual vitality, as Fichte did in his exclusive, commercial state, he is entirely misunderstood. Stahl, who after Hegel distinguished himself greatly in the elaboration of natural right, directed against him a sharp polemic which derived its material from individual propositions wrested from their connection, and from methodic maladroitness. But if we regard the content we find that Stahl fully agrees with Hegel in seeing in the state the system of self-organizing ethics, and in constitutional monarchy the most perfect form of state. The two Greek words *ethos* and *pathos*, which Stahl so much uses, signify only that which Hegel expresses by the German word *Sittlichkeit* (ethics). Ruge in particular has attacked the Hegelian system on the side of democracy. Ruge, an old member of the student-corps, is indebted to the study of Hegel for all the categories with which he has often so hap-

pily and successfully figured as a publicist. He cannot forgive Hegel for considering representation of the people in legislation as organized, not atomically according to the mere census, but as socially founded on caste by means of a landed aristocracy, and by elected representatives of municipal corporations. By the orthodox Protestant and by the ultramontane Catholic party Hegel's deification of the state was rejected because he would not have the state a mere mechanism, a centralized or military state, but would rather transfuse it with the self-consciousness of vital freedom. The political dominion of the church was at any rate made entirely superfluous by the Hegelian conception of the state. The state was for Hegel the absolute might in all judicial and ethical relations. He did not make it absolute, however, in a sense that precluded him from knowing and recognizing another higher sphere. This was the sphere of art, religion, and science, for the external culture of which the state should be solicitous, but which internally in its essence must be left free. Here Hegel has expressly admitted that the state itself must have the interest to presuppose in its citizens the existence of a religious disposition, through which it exalts itself above all that is empirical, and above the history of one's own state, into direct relation to the pure absolute. Hegel opposed religious fanaticism most strenuously; and most strenuously has he defended that which ultramontanism scornfully treats as temporal, viz.: work, property, marriage, moral conviction as basis of action, without need of a confessor; but religion itself he did not reject. He was implacable against all superstition, and as a philosopher he was able to treat it psychologically, while at the same time as a philosopher he must scout it. Hence it was that he gave the political precedence to Protestantism over Catholicism, because the former demands freedom of thought and conscience, and thereby harmonizes with the principle of political self-determination; while Catholicism allows the criticism of scientific investigation only outside the dogmas it has fixed, and by the institution of oral confession it reserves to itself the leading of conscience by its priests.

The state is the peculiar work of freedom of mind, in which it has to deal with its own creations, and becomes revealed

as spirit for itself. Right and ethics are therefore in themselves holy through the good which constitutes their content, and do not first become so through the blessings of a church. Sanctification, in a specific sense, belongs to religion in so far as it is the purification of our will which arises from its immediate relation to the Divine will, which is the personal principle of all legality. Religion is internally connected with right and with science, but in their own necessity they are independent of it. The laws of æsthetic formation are now less independent than those of logic. Art proceeds according to the former, science according to the latter. Religion, so far as it is presentative, or in the forms of worship, must follow æsthetical laws; so far as it is scientific, or in the form of theology, it must follow logical laws; but for itself it follows its own law, as it springs from the relation of man to God, as the peculiar content of religion.

Hegel's doctrine of the state could satisfy none of the parties in the midst of which it appeared. By demanding conformity to law, he stood opposed to feudalism, which is so ready to claim itself a patriarchal constitution; by demanding monarchy, he stood opposed to abstract democracy, which complacently calls itself popular sovereignty; by demanding representation of the people, bureaucracy of state officers, and freedom of the press, sworn courts, the independence of corporations, he opposed the aristocracy; by demanding the subordination of religion, as it appears in the church, to the sovereignty of the state, and the emancipation of science from the authority of the church, he stood opposed to the hierarchy; by demanding ethics as the absolute end of the state, he opposed the industrial state, which seeks to entangle the people in the slavery of factory work by the bait of riches and material comfort; and by the demand of a constitution, he opposed the despotism of *éclaircissement*, which seeks to do all for, and nothing through, the people. We say nothing here of that cosmopolitan socialism which he contrasts with the historical and national character of the state. Hegel's contradiction was not, as it may appear, that of a yet unprejudiced, youthful, naivety, but that of a critically elaborated and matured judgment which was fully conscious of its range. Hence, he thoroughly embittered all par-

ties against himself. They turned upon and derided him, now as servile, now as radical. With true manly courage, Hegel held his position against them all, as the appended remarks, which after his death Gans had printed from his lectures on the philosophy of right, show.

A half century has elapsed since its first appearance. The progress of time has actually transcended Hegel in very many points, e.g. in that of the political culture of the masses; but in its chief features the Hegelian state remains still the most rational, and the expression which it attained in Hegel's presentation, the most beautiful. In treating of ordinary, natural right, his language savors of Roman right, in the manner of the definitions in the Institutes and the Pandects. Fichte cast off this dry method in his system of natural right, but did it in a confused way; while Hegel labored with artistic circumspection, and from the treasury of the German language he coined the purest gold.

IV.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

The conception of history must enter into the system of sciences, although it must be granted that history cannot become strictly a science in the same degree as psychology, logic, etc., because chance and arbitrariness influence the empirical development of Spirit.

The constant elements of history are found in the conception of reason, in the laws of nature, in psychology and ethics. By their necessity alone the actual becomes intelligible. So far as human action is controlled by this necessity, nothing new happens under the sun. We find the family, the community, property, labor, rank, professions, trades, government, laws, customs, and war, among all people and in all ages. Everywhere and in every age we observe the growth and decay of states, of reforms, of revolutions. If all these elements of phenomena were infinitely modified, a science of history would only be still more impossible. What then, in this tumult of facts, is the leading principle? If such a principle exist, the facts, as its consequences, must sustain an inner relation to each other. According to Hegel, such a principle does exist. He defines universal history as the progress of mankind in the consciousness of freedom. This is no less grandly and truly thought than it is simply and strikingly uttered.

That which is truly new in history is the deeper apprehension of the conception of freedom, which permeates and transforms all special elements of life with itself. So far, then, something new *does* occur under the sun. Mind, as phenomenal, is infinitely perfectable. In their material aspect the actions of men remain ever the same, but the consciousness with which they act changes. The more difficult question now arises for philosophy, Where in the system does history find its place? for art, religion, and science, belong to history. It may unhesitatingly be granted that the philosophy of history should be placed at the close of the system. It would be pedantic to deny this. Since consciousness finds its most

precise expression in philosophy, the conception of science might very well be combined with that of history, and be exhibited as its highest result. That Hegel brought his history to a close with the conception of the state, is accounted for by the essence of freedom, which, in the state, acquires indubitable objective existence, and gives distinct consciousness of right and duty to the moral worth of human actions, while in art and religion, phantasy and in science, doubt and error have large scope. The law-books of nations are the concrete criterion according to which this consciousness of freedom may be measured. The state embraces the totality of all relations which refer to the idea of good. Here, as in so many other passages, Hegel resembles Kant, who would likewise see the conception of the state made to preside over the development of history. In the introduction Hegel entered into an exhaustive justification of his thoughts, in which he essentially explained and completed that conception of the state which he had proposed in the *Philosophy of Right*. If any one still has scruples as to whether Hegel meant well for freedom, or how he understands the conception of ethics, he is referred to this derivation of the conception of universal history from the conception of the state. It is also an example how, with the purest German idioms, a profound thought may be presented with perfect clearness and intelligibility. The way in which he describes ethics, both here and in the *Philosophy of Right*, can be compared only with the inimitable art with which Jacob Grimm treated similar objects. The purest fountains of German words sprung spontaneously for both. A poetic ether hangs over the creative constructions of this great teacher even when they descend to the plane of the readiest intelligibility.

The constant elements of history he had already investigated in the *Phenomenology* as the science of the experience of consciousness. There, as we have already seen, no ethnographic, no chronologic or historic fact was mentioned; no person in history was named. Now he treated history from the principle of the state. In so doing he followed Kant, who in 1774, in an original treatise, had apprehended the conception of the historical process from this point, because consciousness of freedom attained to objective distinctness in the

state. Kant, however, had only made a plan, and had never entered into the details of its execution as Hegel attempted to do.

The geographic element, where we speak of the history of Asia, Africa, Europe and America, does not suffice for history. Nations transcend natural divisions. Geographic distinctness is a very important factor for the historical process, but it is only an external foundation, not a principle. Water, still more than land formation, is adapted to supply a guiding principle, for it mediates the movement of peoples. Kapp, in his philosophy of the knowledge of the Earth (*Erdkunde*), distinguished the oriental, the antique, and the modern world, respectively, as (1) the potamic, (2) the thallassic, (3) the oceanic. Asia produced great states upon the banks of rivers, Europe upon the Mediterranean Sea, and America, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is essentially oceanic. The next higher element is the anthropological one of racial differences, so far as the black, yellow, and white race exhibit not only a different outer type, but different psychical endowment. But races mix, so that there exists, however much Herr von Gobineau may sigh about it, less pure blood with every advancing generation. In America already all races mingle.

- (1) The Ethiopian is for itself unhistorical;
- (2) The Mongolian is historically at a stand-still;
- (3) The Caucasian is historically progressive.

An anthropological analogy is connected with the ethnographic element, which is derived from the ages of human life, and which is very often repeated. Herder brought it into acceptance and Hegel adopted it.

- (1) The Orientals represent the stage of childhood;
- (2) The Greeks that of youth;
- (3) The Romans that of manhood;
- (4) The Germans that of old age.

History cannot be comprehended under such an analogy, and therefore the abstract conception of time has been adduced, and history has been divided into (1) Ancient, (2) Middle, and (3) Modern, or simply into Ancient and Modern. Ancient and modern is, however, a purely relative conception; no principle is expressed thereby. If this is to be done, recourse is

had to the break which Christianity made in the world. Thus we come to religion, and it becomes manifest that it cannot be excluded from the development of the state. We speak, therefore, of Heathen, Mohammedan, and Christian States. (1) Paganism—Polytheism—(2) Monotheism, (3) the Christian belief in the Trinity, are qualitative differences in the field of religion. A fantastic element, however, lies in religion which transcends objective reality, while the sphere of the state lies in the indubitable relations of the self-conscious-will. So long as these relations are at the same time regarded as religious, or so long as they receive from religion absolute justification in an external manner, the state is not yet perfectly free and sovereign. Hegel demands, therefore, for the perfection of the state "good-will and consent." He will acknowledge right apart from morality. Right should not be an internally foreign, casual determination of man, but he should know himself therein according to his essence. He should regard the state not merely as an institution for the security of his person and possessions, for the advancement of his peculiar interests, but it should be sacred to him as the concrete realization of the idea of good. Hegel, as well as Fichte, Schleiermacher and Steffens, regarded the police state and the industrial state as mere caricatures of the true state. This was not a blasphemous deification of the state, as is so often said; for he recognized the spheres of religion as transcending those of the state. In his outlines of a new constitution for Germany, he said that the state could admit different confessions, and even that by so doing it would be more free. In his Berlin period he was inclined to regard Protestantism as that confession which alone makes the true ethical state possible. But it appears that the state, as such, has to concern itself merely with the reason of its laws and institutions, without reflecting thereby upon any creed. The modern state, as such, has no religion. This he leaves free to dispose of itself. He concedes to every citizen the right to relate himself to God according to his own peculiar conviction. The state must do all with the reason of human freedom, and nothing with eternal happiness. This he leaves to the belief of the individual. It is the highest right of man to be free in this from every outer constraint, for here he stands in the deepest mys-

tery. If it be said that the state, to correspond to its true conception, must be Protestant, then the question immediately arises whether Lutheran, or Calvinistic, or Anglican, &c. Thus the presumption that a state ought to have a confession is refuted as factious.

Hegel therefore, for the division of universal history, has ignored religion. He distinguished four ages of the world: (1) the Oriental, (2) the Grecian, (3) the Roman, and (4) the German. Of these four, the two middle periods, in antithesis to the Orient, are fundamentally only one, which we usually call the ancient world. A clear idea is not expressed by this designation. Hegel gives this, therefore, in the form of the qualitative judgment, that in the Orient one is free; in the antique world, several; and in the modern world, all: or, in another form,

- (1) Despotism—Orient;
- (2) Republic—Greece and Rome;
- (3) Constitutional monarchy—the German State.

For Hegel, history furnishes the empirical proof of the necessity of the latter form. He admits at the close of his observations that the main difficulty lies in realizing the justification and defence of all, in legislation. He was an opponent of Rosseau. He desired a representation of the people according to rank. How astonished he would be that, within scarcely twenty years after his death, Europe became politically reconstructed, and that every independent man of legal majority and of unblemished reputation, without distinction of station, race, culture, or fortune, was endowed with full active and passive right of franchise. He would have been shocked to behold in porters, watchmen, coachmen, &c., political persons who had an equal voice with merchants, professors, judges, and counsellors of state. With proper reflection, however, he would have been obliged to recognize in free suffrage the legitimate consequence of the constitutional principle. The idea of the state must pervade and civilize every peasant. It endures no longer plebean masses (Pöbel). The elective franchise of voters reconciles the sovereignty of the people with the royal sovereignty, in which the former individualizes itself as concrete personality. Since Herder we have had a great multitude of books which have proposed as

their end the philosophic consideration of universal-history. They have been for the most part forgotten, because their authors either could not master the empirical material and reduce it to an abstract formulization, or because, like Krause, they proceeded from abstract principles and neglected the empirical process. Talented historians like J. V. Müller, in his 24 volumes of the Universal History of Mankind, or Dippold in his Sketches of History, approached much nearer the true idea of history than the so-called *a priori* constructions. Hegel's work is the only one of these attempts which has proved enduring, because it presents an adjustment of these extremes which is deserving especial admiration. It will evince itself also as classical for the future, because in the form of simple narration it brings out the significance of the idea as the inner soul of facts; and conversely, because, by the very plain and unavoidable evolution of the idea, it recalls to mind the lucidity of historical phenomena, and especially serves, like an enchanting picture, to bring into the present great individuals like Alexander, Cæsar, and Luther. The great fact however remains, that he rightly apprehended the principle of universal history and the conception of freedom. The individual must not be blamed if he help himself as well as he can, through the life of vicissitude, with hypotheses. One appeals to fate, another to providence; but the necessity of freedom is the absolute might of events. The end of history is not the eudæmonism of sensuousness equipped with every comfort, but freedom, which is fore-knowing in the consciousness of its conformity to law, and by its providence shapes its destiny now tragically, now comically.

Of course, a much stricter carrying out of philosophical history may be conceived than Hegel accomplished, by which the question of the position of the Jews must especially be brought into closer consideration. Hegel ascribed to them different relationships in different fields. In the Philosophy of History he mentioned them only as a moment of the Persian kingdom; in the Philosophy of Religion he placed them immediately before the Greeks. The Jews, however, who constitute the middle term between the national states of the Orient and of classical antiquity, and the humanity-state of the Germano-Christian world, belong to universal history. In

political culture, in æsthetic refinement, in scientific insight, they are behind many other nations; but in religious inspiration they surpass all others. The universal criterion for the historical significance of nations can lie only in the degree which the conception of manhood has attained reality. From this stand-point the Jews are not only higher than all the nations of the Orient, but higher than Greeks, Romans, or Germans. As the absolute middle term of history they are a contradiction, and maintain still with their nationality a negative relation to the idea of mankind. They make the postulate of a general Theocracy, to which all nations, by their mediation, shall be subjected; but they condemn and kill those Jews who express the consciousness that the true God cannot be merely a national God, but must be the God of all men, from whatever national stock they spring. The nations of the old world fell into three great groups, each of which came to an end with the indifferenciation of its nationality.

I. The Eastern Asiatic group embraces the passive nations which, in contrast to the rough eudæmonism of those historical nations who lived in a state of nature, as the first nations of culture, brought forth at first only a negative ascetic ideal. Such are (1) the Chinese, (2) the East Indians, (3) the Buddhistic or Indo-Chinese nations. The Chinese are contrasted with Indians. The State-principle of the first is the natural ethics of family piety, which passes into moral discipline. The principle of India is the dignity of caste, which leads to a formal Legal state, which stamps the most striking inhumanity as a positive right, because caste and family are united, and the lower caste has no right which the higher must respect. Buddhism seeks emancipation from the inhumanity of a state resting upon caste, by mendicancy, which it exalts to a religion, and affirms the equality of all men in the sufferings of sickness, of age, and of death, as a principle of abstract brotherhood.

II. The Western Asiatic group embraces the active nations which pursue a heroic ideal, and make the enjoyment of the goods of this world the reward of conflict. These are (1) the Persians, (2) the Egyptians, (3) the Semites. The Persians wage war for conquest and dominion; the Egyptians,

to defend their states, canals, palaces, temples, and tombs; the Arabian Semites, for the sake of carnage and plunder; the Chaldean Semites, for the defence of their culture and riches; the Phœnician Semites, for the enlargement and defence of trade. Babylon became the seat of continental trade. Tyre and Sidon advanced from land to the sea, and this perfected the cosmopolitan character of trade. The secular disposition of the Semites is the affirmative counterpart of the monastic renunciation of Buddhistic mendicancy. Egypt's attitude of uniformity contrasts strongly with the fantastic excesses and monstrosities of India—the belligerent pathos of the Persians with the peacefulness of the much-eating and much-writing Chinese.

III. The European group embraces (1) the Grecians, (2) the Romans, (3) the Germans (before their conversion to Christianity). These are the nations of political individuality. Interest in the development of the constitution of the state becomes the life problem of the free man. Among the Greeks, the democracy of the community; among the Romans, the aristocracy of the patricians; among the Germans, the monarchy of the elective army-king, became the foundation of their development. The Germans, in their migrations and wars, effected the dissolution of the nations subjugated by the Romans, but freshened them with their own blood. They made themselves the greatest and most powerful people which thenceforth no other was able to withstand. This universal dominion became possible only by the acceptance of Christianity, because this consecrated their extraordinary and naturally developed power as the organ of the idea of manhood. The Jews are contrasted with all these nations chiefly as theocratic: they integrate all special elements by which the former nations made epochs in history, but give them a peculiar concatenation which cancels the consequences of their one-sided exclusiveness.

Nationality has for the Jew, not *as* but *through* the merely natural bond of unity, an infinite significance, viz. that the descendant of Abraham had the good fortune to come into immediate relation to the true God, and to His will as revealed in the law. The Gentile, by recognition of the law and by circumcision, can become a member of the theocracy,

just as, conversely, the defection of the individual estranges him from his people. In other words, the Jewish nationality does not rest upon physical but upon spiritual grounds, and is therefore stronger than mere nationality. Faith in the God of Abraham, and not parentage, which is only of secondary importance, makes the Jew a Jew. Moses, when very old, did not hesitate to espouse a negress. His brothers and sisters disapproved, but Jehovah punished them. Jesus expressed the freedom of faith from external hereditary descent, by asking the Pharisees, who were proud of their genealogy, if they did not believe God could raise up seed to Abraham from every stone. As Semites, the Jews did not deny a realistic sense for the goods of this world: they conquered Canaan, a land flowing with milk and honey; but the idea which inspired them, and pervaded their entire life, was that of holiness. A closer analysis of their ethical organization shows that in real humanity they stood higher, before Christianity, than all other nations, although the history of the Jews is crowded with traces of the most depraved and abominable transgression, because in no people has the might of passion been shown in greater intensity against the law of God.

By their faith they were free from the demoniac might of Nature which represses all other nations. This point alone makes it impossible to coördinate them with the other nations of antiquity. They were free from the pressure of history when its weight threatened to crush them, by the belief that their God still held out universal dominion to them. This faith consoles them to the present day, and causes them to regard Christianity as an episode in their history. The Jews, like the Chinese, honor family piety, but they do not make it an exclusive principle. Like the East Indians they divided into tribes, but have not petrified in castes; and the tribe of Levi, to which the discharge of priestly functions is committed, does not therefore enjoy the precedence of a holier or more divine tribe, for all are a priestly nation. Holiness is the injunction upon every Jew, but he need not like the Buddhist become a monk and a beggar. The Jews are soldiers, and, up to the revolt of Bar-Chochba under Hadrian, have shown an incomparable bravery which was adequate to contend with the most powerful nations. They did

not set out, like the Persians, upon a career of conquests, but were content with that of Canaan as the ancient settlement of the descendants of Abraham. The Jew pursues agriculture and pasturage like the Egyptians, and trade like the Babylonians and Phœnicians, without carrying this activity to a ruinous extent. In the constitution, he proceeds, like the Greek, from the conception of the community. The seventy elders constitute a senate — the aristocratic Roman element; the monarchical element can consequently reside only in God, who reveals His will to the people through the prophets. The kingdom was an inconsequence for the Jews, and the prophet Samuel expressly dissuaded them from it. After a short period of prosperity their state was brought to desolation through this very cause. After their return from exile, the centre of their entire organization fell more exclusively to the high-priests. The prophets, as the free representatives of the entire people, exercised the same function which we now call freedom of the press. The chief moment of the original German state, feudalism, was not wanting among the Jews, inasmuch as they held all Canaan as a fief of Jehovah, which every fifty years should be returned to Him. I believe, therefore, that the position of the Jews in universal history is found by contrasting them, as the only true Theocrats, with the nations of antiquity, but at the same time, in this antithesis, to place them higher than they. The Jews, like the Germans, are an absolute migratory people, which persists through all other peoples. The Germans generally lose their nationality among other nations and fuse with them, while the Jews know how to maintain theirs in every act of life. In the sketch which Hegel has given at the conclusion of his *Philosophy of Right*, he mentions the Israelitic people, on their entrance into the Germanic world, as that people among whom the ceaseless pain of the absolute separation of man from God made the transition to absolute atonement of God with men. This I believe to be the correct position of the Jews. The following division of universal history results: (1) the National state, (2) the Theocratic state, (3) the state of Humanity. He concludes with the Germans because, within the Caucasian race, they are in fact that race to which the initiative of all further movement in universal history falls.

From Europe they have spread themselves by navigation into every quarter of the world. They compel innumerable peoples in a state of nature, who have previously stood outside the process of universal history, either to enter into it or to vanish. They compel, also, the old historical nations of the Orient to remove their rigid exclusiveness, and to attempt self-regeneration by a higher principle.

v.

PSYCHOLOGY.

The presupposition for Hegel's philosophy of right, of the state, and of history, was not, as is commonly said, his logic alone, but no less his psychology. Since Locke's philosophy, psychology had become properly a central science, to which investigation was directed with special predilection, and proceeding from which it was attempted to ground the other sciences, ethics, æsthetics, and religious doctrine. In this the Germans had accomplished no less significant results than the English and French. With Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" the conception of consciousness advanced so far into the foreground as entirely to absorb psychology.

Kant left behind him an Anthropology which was an ingenious and elegant discourse on the principal elements of psychology; his scientifically established psychology will ever be sought in the transcendental æsthetics and logic of his Critique of Reason, especially in the chapter on the deduction of categories. Fichte had no psychology outside of the Science of Knowledge, Schelling none outside of his transcendental idealism. Herbart, again, had a psychology, because he replaced the ego as the subject, which maintains itself by notions (*Vorstellungen*), since he regarded these as psychic *quanta*, which are related to one another with external independence. His psychology became therefore essentially a theory of the mechanism of notions, which made the spontaneity of the ego illusory.

Hegel apprehended psychology from a higher principle, which distinguished his philosophy from all others—from the idea of Spirit. He distinguished (1) the subjective, (2) the objective, (3) the absolute mind, and thus brought light into a region which had been desolated by the most extreme confusion. Under the first designation he understood the individual mind, which he developed from its naturalness to formal freedom; under the second, mind, as it determines itself in its action by the idea of good; under the third, mind, as

in art, religion, and science, it elevates itself to intuition, to feeling, and to the conception of the absolute.

The conception of subjective mind, again, Hegel distinguished in three special moments: (1) that of the soul; (2) that of consciousness; (3) that of mind. As special sciences, he named them, respectively, anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. This latter designation I think he would have done better to omit, since the name "psychology" had already come into use for all which he comprised in the doctrine of subjective mind. It must remain the general name, and Hegel might quite properly have called the third part pneumatology, a name of which earlier metaphysics had made use. Under this term Hegel understood the entire sphere of the unconscious in man, so far as it was still determined by nature immediately as mind. It is the passive side of man so far as it appears in its natural qualities, changes, and in the conflict of the soul with its corporeity in order to make it the symbolic expression of its interior (or content). One should contemplate the confusion with which, before Hegel, the conception of race, temperament, talent, sex, periods of age, sleep and waking, dreaming, custom, mimicry, &c., had been casually treated in order to realize the immeasurable progress he has made here. Here, as in ethics, he causes to be conceived a still more strict ordination, a still more interior concatenation of determinations, than he has presented; but the credit of laying the foundation for this connected treatment must remain with him.

The chief difficulty in human psychology lies in correctly apprehending thought in its unity as well as in its distinction from sensation. The animal cannot pass beyond sensation, while with man thought constitutes the active principle from the very first, and even in his sensations. Apparently he sets out empirically from sensation, but essentially he bears himself even in sensation as an intrinsically rational subject. The animal, as sentient, remains in individuality; man exalts himself from the individual to the universal. We call thought, so far as it is opposed to sensation, consciousness. Consciousness, however, does not arise at first successively, but is originally present in man as his thinking relation to himself. Immediately man does not yet know

that he thinks. Original consciousness is unconsciousness. The ego already exists in itself (*an sich*), but not for itself. Hence consciousness, within the sphere of the unconscious, can be apprehended only as a self still in its natural state. Sleeping and waking, &c., are natural changes, contrasted conditions. The human state of wakefulness is distinguished from that of animals by the fact that man comes into relation not only to sensuous objectivity, but that he also distinguishes himself for himself from this relation. It may be contested where the conception of waking should be treated, but in this case we must not be confused, but must hold fast to the principle. It is for this reason that the dream belongs to the sphere of the unconscious, although it presupposes the formation of notions and of intuitions. While we dream, the free distinction of self as subject from objectivity does not occur. The condition of dreaming is sleep. Sleep is, however, an act of natural vitality, i.e. of a natural process which is independent of thought. Lunacy is likewise a decadence into unconsciousness. The lunatic has a formal consciousness, but he is involved in a condition of unconsciousness so far as concerns his crazy notions. With respect to these he is not free, like the dreamer with respect to the images which hover past in his chaotic soul. When the lunatic is freed from his illusion, this return to free subjectivity is analogous to awaking from a dream. The condition of day-dreaming as well as that of somnambulism must be placed in the category of unconsciousness, although their mediation may belong to much higher spheres.

Hegel treated the conception of consciousness under the name of phenomenology. It constitutes the antithesis of anthropology, for in this all determinations are necessary, are posited by nature; while with consciousness the freedom of thought arises, as in itself infinite self-determination, as subjectivity, which makes as its object its own entire psychic individuality, with all its qualities, changes, and conditions. As moments of phenomenology, Hegel distinguished: (1) consciousness; (2) self-consciousness; (3) rational self-consciousness. Subject distinguishes itself, first, from others; secondly, from itself; thirdly, from the universal conception which it finds as the identical bond between its outer and

inner world. Reason is the identical essence as well of objectivity in itself as of subjectivity in itself. Unquestionably, this course is a process of knowledge, but very different from that which he presented later under the name of theoretical intelligence. For consciousness, recourse must ever be had to the antithesis of subject and object. The object is either given in existence external to me, which I seek to know according to its truth; or I make myself an object, but find objects outside of myself which, like me, are subjects for themselves; or, finally, I find the conception of reason, the necessity of which is the same without as within me.

In this development Hegel organically integrated the great achievement of Kant and Fichte in finding the conception of consciousness for science. By so doing, however, he aroused the greatest opposition. Philosophy had again given up the doctrine of consciousness and had again fused it with that of theoretic intelligence, just as even so strict a Hegelian, as Michelet seeks to be, had done. But here also we must submit to the consequences of the principle. The antithesis of natural, psychic individuality is subjectivity, as which thinking, yet inseparable from will, distinguishes itself from itself as ego.

That which, in the third part of his "Science of Subjective Mind," Hegel calls especially mind, is a conception which transcends that of the rational self-consciousness by virtue of the fact that the subject, as rational, becomes content no less than form. As individuality, it bears a passive relation; to be, as it were, a genius, the individual must become self-complacent. As subjectivity it is essentially actus; consciousness itself posits the difference as well as the unity of subject and object; but it is still dependent upon that which is presented as its object, and does not itself produce the categories of reason, though it explores the entire world without and within self. Knowledge of these is what it produces. The subject in itself is truly free only when it produces itself in both form and content. Freedom holds the antithesis of theoretical and practical in itself. The theoretical is the condition of the practical in the same way that individuality is the condition of subjectivity, or that this latter is the condition of spirituality. In the treatment of theoretical intelligence,

Hegel distinguished: (1) intuition (*Anschauung*); (2) imagination (*Vorstellen*); (3) thought. Mind, as immediate substance, is feeling, which, as the proper content of mind, is progressively formed through it from intuition yet involved in space and time, to pure thought. The content is the same through all the different steps of intuition, imagination, and thinking; but I change its form, and thereby give myself another relation to it. I intuit e.g. the sun as a luminous, round body. It becomes night, and I see it no longer; but I have a mental image of it within myself. By this image I have freed myself from the externality of the phenomenon. The image as a purely ideal object is absolutely fluid. I can bring it into relation with a thousand other objects. It is also general. I can subsume other similar bodies under the notion "sun." But necessity is wanting. When I add this to generality, I change imagination to thought. The sun is the central body of a planetary system. With this apprehension, these relations, which I can arbitrarily give to the notion of a sun, cease, and necessary relations take their place. Nothing is more frequent in the ordinary psychology and logic than the confusion of intuition, imagination, and thought, because they cohere most closely in fact. It remains an immortal service of Hegel's that he has elucidated their difference upon the foundation which Kant's "Critique of Reason" afforded. The first and exhaustive discussion of his doctrine is found in Carl Daub's "Anthropology," but it is as though this labor had never been performed. There is also a presentation of the entire doctrine of the subjective mind by Hegel himself, which is generally entirely ignored. When, after his death, his entire works were published, Dr. Bouman undertook to add a commentary from Hegel's lectures on the corresponding topics, to the short paragraphs of the "Encyclopedia," which he very admirably executed. Here Hegel entered very intelligibly into all the difficult points of his systematology; he showed in how extended a way he was familiar with the empirical material; in the expression of psychic phenomena he evinced himself an ingenious soul-painter, whom the most delicate shadings of his object did not escape; this he did especially in his delineations of the diseases of the soul, of somnambulism, custom, temperament, &c.

Among the numerous dissensions of psychologists, two points have become especially prominent since Hegel's death, which we will briefly mention. One is the conception of attention; the other, that of language. To attend is, according to Hegel, the act by which the mind distinguishes a content which is present to it as sentient, from itself and from other content in itself. The condition for this act is, therefore, that I am subject; that I distinguish myself as ego from myself, and thereby from all which immediately I am not. He presupposes consciousness. So long as I exist only as sentient, I cease to exist in the specialty of that which I feel. But because I am subject, I can distinguish myself from myself as a sentient individual. I can direct myself in free self-determination to my immediate being. This spontaneous direction is attention. Sensuous certainty and apprehension are moments of this act. Through it I make my feeling an object for myself. I strip off from its content the external time and space conditions wherein I find it. I transfer it into the ideal space and the ideal time of consciousness. By so doing I make it an intuition, which, as being in me and remembered by me, becomes a mental image. The animal is also attentive, but only as a sentient individual. It remains dependent upon sensuousness. There exists a movement of sensation, but not a free activity of self-determination. The animal cannot form its sensations into intuitions; and since intuition again is a condition of representation, it can still less reach the latter. An animal cannot make its conditions present to itself. When a man says he feels that it is warm, he has already advanced beyond feeling, although it still exists in him as a condition. The word "intuition" is of course derived originally from the sense of sight, though it has acquired a general significance for that content which is projected from feeling into consciousness. The expression "representation" is correct in so far as it is intuition which is reproduced by the subject in and from itself. Representation is free from the connection which intuition bears to feeling. It makes the content of intuition independent in a free image, from which all that is casual and unessential in the original genesis is omitted. Representations, e.g. stream, wood, animal, anger, command, &c., are general. Every representation

as such is different from every other. But the representing subject distinguishes itself also from its representations and is free from them, since they attain existence only through his own activity. When a subject ceases to hold the power over its representations, it either becomes lunatic or it dreams. That which the school of Herbart has elaborated as a mechanism of representation into an extended dynamics and statics of representation in the intelligible tract of consciousness, is essentially a psychological disguise of the laws of thought. We can cast heterogeneous representations promiscuously together, as e.g. in reading-books for children, in order to exercise them on a particular letter, *bridge, book, buck, blood, ball, &c.*, occur promiscuously. But when we arrange our conceptions, we do it according to logical laws.

Language originates, according to Hegel, from the incitement which we feel at the moment in which we wish to express a conception, to make a sound as its sign. If we had no organs of speech, we should, of course, be able to produce no word. In this respect, there exists between our mind and organism a teleological connection. Without thinking, we should only express feelings by inarticulate sounds, like animals. Deaf mutes can, of themselves alone, advance only as far as notions; but, since they can have no idea of sound, they remain dumb, and can furnish themselves with a language only by the indirect method of writing. As soon as a child, endowed with perfect senses, begins to form notions, it begins to take pleasure in words. When we say that language is produced without consciousness, we mean to designate merely the unintentionality of the form of the sound and of the grammatical organization. This latter is an actual proof that the language-forming mind is rational in itself. Language is the *renaissance* of notions in phonetic forms, which are the peculiar product of mind. The reproduction of the notion as such, without reference to the sound which custom has fixed for it among a given people, we call recollection, or *reminiscentia, recordatio*; recollection in the form of words is memory. Language, on the one hand, is the product of the thought which is latent in its construction; on the other hand, it is the condition of its development. Now also it becomes clear how much the self-formation of thought in the construction

of conceptions, in the passing of judgments, and in drawing conclusions, is distinguished from those forms which it possesses as consciousness, i.e. as relation of subject and object.

There exists no psychology except the Hegelian, which so well develops the inner connection of the forms of the theoretical intelligence, the origin of language, the consequent process of the transformation of knowledge from step to step. The practical relationship of mind proceeds also from feeling as impulse, but is mediated especially by difference of theoretical relation. It is indeed very pleasant to speak only of will and of representation, as Schopenhauer's philosophy does, without actually deducing its idea, so that instinct, appetite, desire, passion, and will, are thrown promiscuously together; but, for the critical inspection of science, a process so full of confusion cannot succeed. Such expressions as "desires," "will," &c., admit of a very indeterminate usage; but science, it should be said, exists precisely in order to determine their usage more accurately, without thereby destroying their current identity.

Hegel assigned also to Eudemonism its systematic position in his *Psychology*, and thus freed ethics from all those errors which arise when it is confounded with the idea of good. Instinct, propensity, appetite, desire, passion, comes to an end in attaining satisfaction. It is agreeable to the subject, but the enjoyment of this happiness is quite relative. The manifoldness of natural individuality modifies the kind and manner of satisfaction unlimitedly. The composition of the means of enjoyment opens in another direction a new infinity of qualitative and quantitative differences, which, by the opinion of men, by popular prejudice, and by fashion, are modified again without limit. That which was at first felt to be pleasure, is converted by excess into its opposite, or is degraded to something quite indifferent. Here is never firm ground for ethics. Schopenhauer has made a great impression upon his contemporaries by choosing the words of Goethe's "*Faust*,"

"Thus I reel from desire to gratification.
And in gratification I pine for desire,"

as the text of his gospel of Pessimism. The thinking man who, by his intellect, knows the torment to which the will of

Nature condemns all that has life, can only have the profoundest pity for that which he attempts to make the principle of ethics. But pity is also an entirely relative feeling, for it depends partly upon the notion which I form of the wretched condition of myself or of another, and partly upon the degree in which this notion is developed. Here, also, is nothing but relativity. Eudemonism demands continuous pleasure; there must be no pain. Here Hegel adopted all the rigorism of Kant in regarding happiness as an element out of which, for ethics, a motivation, but no principle of action, could arise. The difference of desires, inclinations, and passions, compels man to reflect as to which of them he shall yield the precedence of satisfaction. The eudemonist is constrained to moderation in order to compute for his well-being the correct total. Well-being must, however, be subordinated to good, the idea of which alone is adequate to stand for the thinking man as the principle of ethics. With Hegel, eudemonism is not represented as a mere illusion, as imposture, as it is by Schopenhauer. Well-being, with its pleasure and displeasure, should have no other justification than is permitted it by the idea of good. Hegel's philosophy may be regarded as the interpretation of another passage of Goethe's "Faust," who, at the close of his experiences, sums them up in the result:

"They alone deserve life and freedom
Who are daily obliged to conquer it."

VI.

SCIENCE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF
ABSOLUTE SPIRIT?

Psychology is the substructure of ethics. The latter treats of the idea of the Good as it becomes the problem of the human will. The Good, as idea, is absolute, as Hegel has expressly admitted in his doctrine of ideas in the *Logic*. It would, therefore, be a mistake to suppose that he ascribed only a relative content to right, to morality, and to ethics. He has designated the entire sphere of the practical mind as objective, because man himself must produce the good, and is unavoidably linked with finitude in his action.

Human labor has, first of all, as its end, man's enfranchisement from the limitations of finitude.

Man is brought into negative relation to nature, in order, through its transformation, to impart to it an ethical organization as the organ of his freedom. Freedom itself has only itself as its content, but the form of this content is capable of improvement, and has therefore a finite side. The world which it produces for itself in the state is indeed the objective expression of the Good; it is in so far good, but it must always progress toward the better. The laws of a people correspond to a stage in their development, but they become inadequate with progressive knowledge of the good. They need to be reformed; new laws must be added to the old; history never reaches a state of repose. Likewise, too, the individual can never arrive at an ultimate conclusion for himself, but must forever morally renew, reform, purify himself.

It would be a very sad thing if the ethical man did not, even in his struggles, enjoy the consciousness that he was in the Absolute. There is no more pitiable virtue than that which expects blessedness as a result external to, and separable from, the conflict itself, or as a reward distinct from freedom. From this miserable eudemonism, which seeks to make virtue at last a means for arriving at a state of existence which involves a sensuous well-being, with however fine

phrases it may be concealed, Hegel can decidedly be acquitted, as well as from that misconception which apprehends freedom as something other than the characteristic activity of man. That, therefore, which he calls absolute spirit has this productivity as its condition, but is distinguished by the fact that the unrest of the conflict is sublated. In art, religion, and science, man exalts himself above the historical process to absolute reconciliation with the absolute. As phenomenon these elements of the absolute mind belong to the historical process. They are also perfectible, but in their manifestation they negate at the same time the finite part of the national and personal individuality which pertains to them. The beautiful, in whatever form it presents itself, enchants us at once by its harmony. Religion, however much of error is mingled with it, exalts man above all the tumult of history, above all the narrowness of his personal interests, above all the good and ill of fortune into the earnestness of eternity. Science, finally, has the conception of the True as its object, which belongs exclusively to no people and to no time. The fact that in a right-angled triangle the square of its hypotenuse equals the square of the other two sides is and absolute truth independent of all history and of all men. We now call it the Pythagorean theorem, that we may be gratefully reminded of the man who first uttered the knowledge of this truth; yet the name of Pythagoras is indifferent as far as the truth itself is concerned. That which science produces among a people at a particular period is acquired as the possession of all humanity and for all time. The scientific form with Hegel is the last and highest of the forms of the absolute mind, because it contains the mediated unity of truth and its certainty. Art requires for its development a sensuous material; religion possesses indeed the substance of the true, but it only *believes* it at first. Belief (faith) represents the absolute in forms more or less addressed to the phantasy, while thinking advances to conception, the simple logical forms of which admit of transformation to no higher or simpler form.

It admits of no doubt that Hegel understood by the expression Absolute Spirit, only the human mind as it raises itself to the absoluteness of existence. It might naturally be ex-

pected that under this designation he would understand that which we men are wont to name God—the Absolute as absolute-subject. Yet it cannot be denied that Theology proper is not found in Hegel's system, and that he rather laid stress upon carrying the idea of God through all parts of Philosophy. There is one point in his system where the reader cannot but expect that he will admit the above expressly. This is the metaphysical foundation of the Christian religion, which he declares absolute, faith in which he makes to coincide in content with the philosophical conception of God. It may be observed from his interpretation of the notion "God," as Father, Son, and Spirit, that he identifies the Father with the logical idea that under the sonship of God he subsumes nature and the finite mind, and that by the name "Spirit" (mind) he understands mankind as it is realized in the church, in which the atonement of man with God is achieved. With special emphasis he here inculcates that God is real spirit (mind) only by virtue of the fact that he exists as spirit *for* spirit; i.e. he affirms the incarnation of God as an eternal act, as an immanent determination of his essence, and uses therefore for the description of spirit (mind) the term *return of the absolute into itself*. We might acknowledge ourselves satisfied with this if the subjectivity of God, as soon as we come to speak of it, were not confounded with that which Hegel loved to name with emphasis "conception." If we ask e.g. why Nature exists, Hegel answers that it is the nature of conception [or Idea] to distinguish itself from itself as reality. This merely logical determination does not satisfy us when we contemplate the vast universe with its millions of worlds.

If we posit reason as unconsciously active in matter, which first comes to consciousness in man, then there exists no God as subject in and for himself. It remains inconceivable how, in unthinking matter, thought, without being thought of, can be active.

If we presuppose a God as special subject of the world, he must not only carry the conception of nature in distinction from its existence in his own being, but he must also produce its reality, which transition we call creation.

It cannot be doubted that the latter was the view of Hegel

when it is considered that he made the logical idea the *prius* of nature, and affirmed that it emits itself freely to its other (*ἄλλοτερον*), to nature. If we find the exposition of the conception of creation at the close of the Logic under the category of the absolute method, we find ourselves for the moment entirely at fault. With Hegel we must not merely have the totality of his system ever in view, but we must also not forget that life, truth, goodness, as well as will, are predicates of his logical idea. They bore for him the significance of God *in statu abscondito*, who must first reveal himself as God through nature and history. It may be allowed, moreover, to remember the express declaration which Hegel has given concerning the personality of God in the previously mentioned critique of Jacobi in the Heidelberg Year-Book.

DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARISE FROM HEGEL'S DIVISION OF THE
SCIENCE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

We must distinguish a twofold presentation of the spheres of absolute mind by Hegel. One is given in the Encyclopedia, the other in an extensive development of art, religion and philosophy which he presented in the form of lectures, and which have been published by his scholars. The textbook paragraphs of the former were clearly only a brief abstract of that which the last chapters of the Phenomenology had presented upon these subjects. They alone would have left us in great obscurity had they not been completed and elucidated by the more extended expositions of the lectures. We are surprised at their richness, their manifoldness, and their originality. The depth and breadth to which Hegel had elaborated each of these domains astonishes us. Each one of these expositions was of itself sufficient to insure to their author an undying fame. It might have been thought that by the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Philosophy of Right, he would be exhausted; but now there appeared an *Æsthetics*, a *Philosophy of Religion*, and a *History of Philosophy*, of fully equal merit.

The division of these spheres of the Absolute affords two different stand-points, which in and for themselves must coincide; that of content, and that of form. According to content, it is the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of

the true; and on the side of form, it is the differences of theoretical intelligence as sensuous intuition, representation [or conception], and thought.

In the doctrine of ideas, in the *Logic*, Hegel defined and determined the conception of the idea (1) as life; (2) as knowledge; (3) as absolute idea. The idea of knowledge he has analyzed in the theoretical as the True, and in the practical as the Good. The idea of the Beautiful is wanting. In the introduction of the *Æsthetics* he developed the Beautiful as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, according to which it would occupy the place of the absolute idea; i.e., according to Hegel, that of the absolute method. In the *Encyclopedia æsthetics*, under the name of art-religion, precedes revealed religion (Christianity) and philosophy. When we now inquire the relation of the idea of the Good, we find that its realization falls within the sphere of ethics in the science of the objective mind. Hegel plainly affirms that the Good is the condition for the spheres of absolute mind. When we take a retrospective view of the entire doctrine of ideas, it seems to be full of indistinctness and confusion.

It is not so easy, however, to dispose of Hegel. We must acknowledge that the eudemonism with which the *Psychology* ends is sublated by the conception of freedom and by the idea of the Good. Knowledge of the Good is the condition of its realization. Virtue rests upon no instinct where it can become a custom. If we compare the ideas, we shall find that that of the Good stands higher than that of the Beautiful—higher even than that of the True, so far as we understand by it the scientific knowledge of the idea. The Beautiful is essentially concerned with the harmony of form, and it appears in relation to the True and the Good as a sort of superfluity. When Schiller, in his masterly letters upon the culture of the human race, proposed to mediate freedom through beauty, he made an error which, though itself beautiful, was quite natural for a poet. As idea, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, are coördinated with one another.

In other words, the entire doctrine of ideas, as it subsisted from the time of the Greeks to that of Kant and Hegel, has fallen into disuse, and the concrete conceptions of Reason, Nature, and of Mind, have taken its place. This is the ground

of Hegel's distinction of the domain of absolute mind according to its psychological side of form as art, religion, and philosophy. In the system of science, he concludes with its absolute conception or notion. With this apprehension of the subject many difficulties arise. These may all be reduced to the fact that art presupposes religion. It is art which brings the notions of the religious consciousness to sensuous intuition. Art builds temples, carves statues of the gods and of the saints, paints mythical stories, and makes hymns and pæans. So far it seems to be dependent upon religion and must follow it. But the principle of art does not lie in religion, which as such can dispense with art. A grove or a mountain-top may serve as a temple, a rude stone as altar, and deity may be imaged within. When Ulysses in his extremity prayed to Pallas, he called up her image within. And when she appeared to him, she assumed manifold forms which suited the time and occasion, and not the form which a Phidias had given her. Religion is the higher presupposition of art, so to speak, progressively; regressively, it is ethics which is premised as its condition. Æsthetics must here anticipate, just as psychology furnishes presupposition to higher spheres. When Hegel, first in the *Phenomenology* and then in the *Encyclopedia*, apprehended art as art-religion, he was led aside by Grecian traditions.

It may also be remembered that it is art which, by the artistic and poetic elaboration of religious notions, prepares the ground for science. Artists become æsthetic interpreters of faith and thereby aid the elevations of figurative conceptions into thoughts; but the principle of science does not lie in art nor in the Beautiful, but in thought which struggles after the unity of certainty and truth. It is doubt which distinguishes it from religion.

The Hegelian classification into art, religion, and science, must however remain; for religion stands above art by virtue of its contents; and philosophy, which, according to Hegel, has the same content as revealed religion, transcends it in form, in subjective mediation of conviction which no longer requires authority. The idea of the Good does not suffice for the conception of religion, but it is the idea in its absoluteness, the idea as absolute mind, which is concerned

in the conception. It is the relation of the temporal to the absolute mind, to God, by which the spheres of religion are established. The Good becomes here the Holy. In the laws of a people concerning personal freedom, property, taxes, courts, war, &c., no direct reference need be made to God. In religion the entire realm of finitude enters, with all its defects and errors, in order to be sublated. The state, however high it may stand, can afford to man no absolute reconciliation; this is possible only in personal contact of spirit with spirit. The state can punish crime, or it can mitigate or entirely remit punishment, but it cannot forgive sin. This is the divine prerogative. I sustain moral relations to the conception of duty in my conscience. This is a high standpoint; but my conscience can only reproach me for the offences, errors, vices, baseness into which I have relapsed, but it cannot free me from the consciousness of their guilt. This burden I can cast off only in so far as I raise myself absolutely above my entire empirical existence, and, in unity with God, let all imperfection, all misery, and all sin, fall as something unessential.

In religion first we find the deepest deep; the difference between it and philosophy, therefore, subsists only as a formal one without thereby jeopardizing the independence of science. Hegel often said that all philosophy was theology, and that philosophy, when it had attained its true conception, had but to look back upon the development behind it. Thus it appears as if this final step has no special content, and really it seems very barren under Hegel's treatment, as though, having already arrived at the highest, he had known nothing more to say, or as though, as in the second edition of the *Encyclopedia*, he needed to help himself by a citation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. But we need to conceive the retrospect as made in the same manner in which he had treated absolute knowledge in the last division of the *Phenomenology*, and the error of such a judgment would become at once clear.

The retrospect may be conceived as subjective and objective. As subjective it presents the history of philosophy as the side of absolute confirmation of truth; as objective it furnishes a series of definitions of the absolute as they begin

with the abstract and go on to the concrete. (1) Reason is God; (2) Nature is God; (3) Spirit is God: (a) Man is God, (b) Humanity is God, (c) Absolute Spirit is God. These several definitions are the foundation of as many lines of proof for the existence of God. Hence are presented three different stand-points: 1. Logotheism; 2. Naturalism; 3. Anthropologism. From these are developed (1) the ontological, (2) the cosmo-physico-teleological, (3) the anthropological; the latter of which is again divided into the proofs from perfectability, from morality, and from the *argumentum à consensu gentium*. The presentation of the essence of God is here united with the proof of his existence which results from the conception of his essence. The definitions are inadequate until they arrive at the conception of the pure and simple absolute. The first, i.e. "Reason is God," is changed rather into the proposition, God is reason. As special subject he not only is reason, but has reason; as rational God, as Logos, he creates Nature. He is not Nature, but he posits it as his absolute object, as his other. In nature as such he does not come back to himself; first, when through its mediation man is posited, God becomes object for finite spirit, which exalts itself to him, and in this process He himself first becomes real spirit. Of Himself alone, without a world of mind, he would be only a mindless mind.

With the apprehension here indicated, the final division of the system became a vital, pregnant recapitulation and a summary higher reconstruction, a speculative theology; and all those misconceptions of the Hegelian philosophy which imagined atheism, materialism, and pantheism, to be necessarily involved in it, were made an end of. It can admit of no doubt that the need of such a theology was impressed more and more vividly upon Hegel's mind. We find a proclivity to the Philosophy of Religion in lectures which he undertook upon the proofs of the existence of God with the twofold intention, first of giving in them elucidation of the Logic, and then of opposing the prejudices which since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had grown so strong against proofs of the existence of God, because current opinion had come to fancy in them only the antiquated trash of an empty scholasticism. Hegel here opened a way by which to pass

from the cosmological argument to the physico-teleological, and from this to the ontological, because this is the psychological-historical course of the human mind in its elevation to the thought of God.

It sounds incredible, but it is literally true, that in all the innumerable and barren quarrels which have arisen concerning the theological character of Hegel's system, neither Hegelians, if I except myself, nor the opponents of Hegel have taken into consideration this admirable work. From the dialectic stand-point it may be affirmed that Hegel has never written anything in which depth and clearness, rigor of thought, and fantastic illustration of it, have been so clearly painted as here. It remains a matter of regret that he could not himself have completed this subject, and that for the ontological proof a completion must be borrowed from copied manuscripts. Its great significance for science lies historically in the fact that it constitutes the antithesis of the dialectics by which Kant thought he had destroyed speculative theology.

Although at the close of the Encyclopedia such a concrete totality and resumption as we have indicated is wanting, we must not imagine that he has not presented the conception of the idea of God expressly within his system. This is done in the Philosophy of Religion at the beginning of the treatment of the Christian religion, in the division which bears the title, "The Metaphysical Idea of God."

ÆSTHETICS.

Our age has become political. The æsthetic interest has retreated behind the great impulse which the state has received since the July revolution, and still more since that of February. Our æsthetic culture is now so moderate that we are scarcely able to regulate facts of daily life æsthetically. In Hegel's time it was otherwise. Although the greatest political catastrophes were then taking place, interest in the productions of art and in æsthetic theories was very general and vital. The enjoyment and the criticism which the works of Goethe and Schiller furnished occasion for could not be dispensed with. The Romantic school had disseminated the study of English, Italian and Spanish literature, and by

Hammer-Purgstall Arabic and Persian poetry had been drawn into this circle. It should therefore excite no surprise that Hegel was exceedingly well-read in this field, and had a most intimate acquaintance with all the prominent art-phenomena, for he resided six years at Jena, the chief seat of the Romantic school, and near Weimar, the æsthetic capital. His *Æsthetics* is replete with all the elements which that period produced.

In order to designate its stand-point it may be regarded as the continuation of Schiller's idea of the difference between the naïve and the sentimental in poetry; through his predilection for the Hellenic, Hegel stood fast by his classico-antique ideal which Schiller had characterized as naïve. The highest beauty is to him the absolute unity of the spiritual content as the internal, with the sensuous form as the external. The statue, as the perfect accommodation of the internal with the external, from which all the casualty of motion and all the limitation of individual existence is elevated to eternal significance, and purified to absolute ideal form, must consequently seem to Hegel as the highest achievement of art. This mean, however, has a *prius* and a *posterius*. The *prius* is the search after it, mere symbolic beauty, in which the external corresponds to the internal, but not adequately. The *posterius*, conversely, is the form in which the interior becomes superior to the exterior, which does not suffice to express its depth. This is the Romantic, ideal, called by Schiller the sentimental.

In this lies all the peculiarity of Hegel's æsthetics. With fine dialectics, with many-sided erudition, and with imposing sequence, he construes the doctrine of the symbolic, classic, and romantic ideal, while he arranges the system of arts upon this conception.

I. The Ideal in general. II. The Ideal in special: (1) symbolical (oriental); (2) plastic or classic (antique); (3) Romantic (Christian). III. The Ideal in the unification of the system of arts: (1) symbolic art—architecture; (2) classic art—sculpture; (3) Romantic art—(a) painting, (b) music, (c) poesy.

The result of this construction is a very strong accentuation of the historical process of art and great profundity in

showing the connection of art with religion. Although much that is admirable and surprising has been accomplished by this method, yet the defects and the one-sidedness which must result thus cannot be overlooked. The labors of Weisse, Vischer, and Carrière, have striven to obviate this defect, and to give to the æsthetics that completeness which distinguishes Germans above all others in this department, which, without Hegel's all-embracing labor, which has brought the most stubborn materials into rhythm, would have been impossible.

The idea of the beautiful had not been developed by Hegel in the speculative doctrine of the Idea, so that this remained to be done at the beginning of the Æsthetics; and here Hegel began with it, but in a very curt, inaccessible way. He confined himself to a few general determinations concerning the unity, symmetry and proportion of æsthetic form, together with a brief discussion of natural beauty, in order to exclude it from æsthetics. According to Hegel's method, however, (1) the conception of the idea of the Beautiful; (2) the negative, i.e. the conception of the disagreeable; (3) the conception of the sublation of the disagreeable and its emancipation to beauty in the comical,—must be exhibited. The Comic, under the category of the ludicrous, is generally treated far too narrowly, and as the antithesis of the Tragic or of the Sublime, while its conception has quite another origin and a much wider significance.

The idea of the beautiful is realized by art. Its conception constitutes, therefore, the second part of the Æsthetics. As a problem of production it becomes ideal. It is the artist who by his genius and his technical virtuosity, brings the ideal to existence in single concrete works of art. (1) The objective side of the ideal and (2) the subjective side of artistic production unite in (3) the work of art. The work of art, however, requires at once a determination of the material of its presentation, whether it is to appear in space for the eye, in time for the ear, in imagination by word addressed to the phantasy. Thus arises (1) constructive, (2) musical, (3) poetic art, which unites all arts in the theatre as dramatic. By the rigid definition of his ideal forms Hegel has been compelled to confusion and *tours de force*; to confusions, e.g., of style-

forms, by which the severe or sublime is made the analogue of the symbolical ideal, the beautiful of the classical, the charming of the romantic; but in and for itself the latter has a quite, general significance. Hegel has thus identified the ideal forms with the Oriental, the Antique, and the Christian. They must, however, be taken as quite general conceptions. The Romantic is the subjective inwardness of disposition which loses itself with ardent longing in the infinite. Although it culminates in Christianity it may be observed elsewhere, where it will not be wanting in the element of adventure, which, in the varied complication of events and their surprising contrasts, is often the result of such a disposition. How can the old Arabic poetry and the new Persian be called other than Romantic? Firdusi's Shah Namah is often much more truly Romantic than the stories of our mediæval epics of Iwein, Lancelot, Wigalois, Wigamur, &c., which have sprung from Celtic sagas. How can we help calling the Indian poetry Romantic? Tieck once said he saw no reason why the Odyssey should not be called a Romantic poem; and none exists. All art strives for perfection of form, i.e. to become classical. Hegel's view should be so enlarged that the ideal may become national, and thus pervade all stages of the determination of form. Why should we hesitate to call Calidas the classical poet of India, since the Romantic ideal attained in him, in both content and form, its most perfect expression? The Christian ideal, æsthetically considered, is only a special, higher grade of the Romantic. The expression Oriental is, moreover, far too wide and indefinite to be exhausted by the term Symbolical. The Chinese, Indian, Persian, Hebraic, and Arabic, to say nothing of the Mahommedan ideal, are widely divergent.

Hegel has recourse to forced constructions, however, because he attempted the unnecessary limitation of æsthetic conceptions by his historical limitation of ideal forms. The dissolution of the classical idea thus leads to satire. "No other satire," he says, "has ever equalled Roman satire." Although it be granted that Horace, Persius and Juvenal are our masters in the poetic form which we call satire, yet the satirical is a quite general æsthetic conception, of which the idyllic and the elegiac are coördinate and related concep-

tions. Our judgment concerning Roman satire is inaccurate because we no longer possess the Grecian Iambographs and Sillographs; and yet the Romans, as artists, were scarcely more than imitators of the Greeks.

Forced constructions are still more manifest in the application of ideal forms in the system of arts. "Architecture," he says, "is symbolic"; certainly, but this general character does not prevent it from being at the same time classical and Romantic. The Greek temple, e.g., is classical because it indubitably indicates that a god dwells in it. Every other purpose is excluded by its form. The cathedrals of the middle ages are symbolic in the cruciform pattern of the nave, and in the opposition of choir and spire, &c.; but, at the same time, in pillars, arches, windows, and in their extent and the manifoldness of their details, they are Romantic.

When, finally, he calls the arts of painting, of music, and of poetry, Romantic, the error of his division becomes quite manifest in poesy, for this art more than the others can assume any stand-point and adopt any form. Hegel here contradicts what he had himself said concerning the identity of the Romantic and the Christian. The interest in Hegel's Æsthetics lies in the thorough sequence with which he has elaborated his ideal forms in contrast to the then common division. No one can deny that thus, not only for the history of art, but for a multitude of scientific definitions, he has presented insights and views which are quite new. He draws always from a well-filled mind. With the exception of music, of which he was intensely fond, but concerning his own knowledge of which he always spoke very modestly and unpretentiously, he showed a wonderful familiarity with an immense mass of material, all of which was perfectly at his command. If good taste consists in being able to distinguish the truly beautiful from all that is false, artificial, partial, or doubtful, with consciousness of the motivation of the judgment, then Hegel possessed a remarkably fine taste.

In style, the Æsthetics is incomparably fine. All which had previously existed in this field was surpassed by it. Schlegel, Jean Paul, Solger, and Schelling, have, in different respects, achieved great results in the presentation of the æsthetic idea; but such a perfect elaboration of the entire

domain of Art, with such uniform freshness, with so noble and soul-full penetration of tone, was unknown before Hegel. Simple-minded men still conceive of Hegel as an abstract metaphysician who was at home only in barren abstractions; but here it may be seen with what striking delineation, with what lively coloring, and with what power of poetic individualization, Hegel knew how to depict all the richness of phenomena.

His description of the condition of the heroic world as condition of the epic, his description of the painting of the Netherlands, of Mohammedan mysticism, of the gods of Olympus, of the colossal structures of the Orient, his defence of the unity of the conception of the Homeric poem, his presentation of the specific Christian ideal, &c., are distinguished from the rest as especially ornate passages. By the mild and friendly way in which Hegel here entered a domain of the most heterogeneous contents, he opened the way for successors to become acquainted with the phenomenal world in its fundamental conceptions. In the struggle to compel phenomena to manifest their essence in language, he is often venturesome, has often arrived at the borders of the doubtful; but he has avoided the error which we have subsequently found so distracting in the æsthetic domain, viz., that of joining predicates and verbs with subjects which belong to entirely heterogeneous domains; for such combinations, though allowed in poetry, are forbidden in prose.

Hegel has been reproached with ignoring the beauty of Nature and of sacrificing it to that of Art. This is by no means the case, for he devoted more attention to the forms of nature than, before him, had been customary in æsthetics. He had analyzed it from the crystal to the animal, and had not forgotten landscape beauty. Vischer and still more Köstlin have carried this thought further. The beauty of art reproduces the beauty of nature, removes all its meagreness and empirical contingency; for nature ceases with the production of life, and with it the æsthetic moment is subordinated to expediency. The reproduction of the natural form by art reveals as ideal the beautiful which is possible in nature. It will be best in the future to mention the beauty of nature only in a relative way, especially in a system of arts, in

treating the specific material of each of them, and to leave the treatment of natural science to morphology, for, in the transition from one step to another, form also advances.

Hegel's conception of humor has also been attacked in so far as he finds in it the limit of all art, and declares it appropriate only to poetry, and more specifically to Christian poetry. This is justly made a matter of reproach; but the theory of humor, as it has been formed for us by the abstraction of English and Spanish works of poetry, by German imitations, and especially by Jean Paul, influenced Hegel too strongly and made him consecrate humor as the modern, sacred *humanus*. Humor must, however, be conceived in connection with the complete idea of the beautiful. This is possible only when we are emancipated from false logic, with which the moments of the beautiful are generally treated, because antithesis and contradiction are confused the one with the other.

The conception of the Beautiful embraces antitheses which sublate themselves. The Beautiful, as such, has a formal and a real side. The former concerns the unity of the æsthetic figure, its symmetry, proportion, rhythm, and harmony. These are the elementary determinations of all beauty, in which the reality of the sublime and the pleasing stand in contrast. It is remarkable that ordinarily the comic is contrasted with the sublime. The sublime, like the pleasing, or the charming, is the antithesis of the Beautiful in itself, which sublates itself in the absolutely beautiful, in its dignity and its gracefulness, as Schiller has shown once for all. The case of æsthetic *contradiction*, the disagreeable, negative beauty, is quite otherwise.

Formlessness and deformity contradict the formal determinations as positive. Amorphism, unsymmetry, disproportion, and disharmony, are æsthetic contradictions.

The vulgar and the repulsive contradict the real determinations of the beautiful, the sublime, and the agreeable.

Absolute beauty is contradicted by caricature, which in its baseness still includes the possibility of becoming comic, because in its monstrous distortions it is related to the ideal.

The comic is the solution of the ugly, and hence is in itself the totality of the æsthetic idea. Aristotle, in his simple lan-

guage, has already justly said in his work on poesy, that the ludicrous is the ugly in a harmless form. The tragic may appear in the forms of the ugly when it passes over into despair, rage, distress and disgust, and calls up what is fearful, terrible, or dreadful. The essence of the comic requires that the ugly annihilate itself as something without content. Take, for instance, a stammerer—stammering is, without doubt, disagreeable. If a stammerer wishes to narrate what seems to him important intelligence, but only stutters the more as he waxes earnest, he becomes comic—presupposing, of course, that the substance of what he would say is of no great moment. The Tragic is only a species of the sublime, while the comic is a quite general idea which is founded on the ugly. It is remarkable how zealously the attempt is still made to consider the ugly as a necessary moment of the idea of the beautiful, because in life sickness, in truth error, and in good evil, is never forgotten. The comic integrates all elements of the æsthetic ideal, because it may become sublime, charming, vulgar, and distasteful; yet, as humor, it must rest upon the stand-point of absolute atonement which is victorious over all pessimism, and bears up not only against the disgust of commonplace, but against death and devil; and assures us that truth, beauty, and goodness, compose the eternal essence of the world, while pain at finitude and nothingness, though it cannot cease to exist, yet is annihilated in the free blessedness of this feeling. Without absolute earnestness and joviality humor becomes bald and empty, its sagacity degenerates into impertinence, its tenderness into morbid sensitiveness, and its wit into similitude with artificial egg-dancing.

VII.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

If Hegel's delineation of the symbolic, classical, and romantic ideal, in the middle part of his *Æsthetics*, be duly considered, it will be understood how he could designate it, in the *Encyclopedia*, as the science of art-religion, for the motive for these distinctions of the ideal is chiefly taken from the religious stand-point. The entire development, in so far as it embraces at the same time the ideal of the oriental antique and modern world, is historico-philosophical even in the third part. In the doctrine of the system of special arts the historical physiognomy is predominant, because the particular ideal forms are retained as the ground of division. This is omitted only in music, in which department Hegel had not enough confidence in his own knowledge. It must not be thought that the logical definition of the essence of the arts is too briefly treated, but the historical tint which often covers logical precision must be removed in order to grasp the idea in its purity. If religion had been treated before art many repetitions would have been rendered unnecessary. This he did not do because the stand-point of religion is higher. Art elaborates the content of religion; but its principle is not this content as such, but the form which appears to the senses, in which it is shaped for intuition, feeling, and imagination. Its productivity depends on casual individuality of talent. He who enjoys a work of art regards it as a beautiful phenomenon. It is said of certain painters, that, before they began a picture from sacred history, they consecrated themselves to their work by the most ardent prayer; yet, when they took up the brush, they must submit themselves to the laws of painting, and thus pass out of the religious into the æsthetic domain. So too, conversely, a believer may be incited to devotion by the view of a picture or a statue, and pass over from the starting-point of æsthetics to religious introversion, forgetting the work of art as such. Hegel recalls to mind the well-known experience that æsthetic perfection contributes nothing to the requirements of the reli-

gious process, and that very poor pictures of the Virgin Mary have had far greater fame in the Roman Church and have produced more wonderful effects than Raphael's Madonnas, none of which have wrought miracles. Art proposes to religion a problem of the very highest content; but, outside of this domain, it embraces all nature, the social life of man, his natural occupations and conditions, and the facts of his history. The female dancers whom we see hover with such infinite grace in the frescos of Pompeii; Alexander's battle upon the mosaic floor; the equestrian group which Lysippus made of Alexander and his generals; the cow of Myron on the pnyx at Athens, have no religious contents.

Religion is the direct relation of the temporal to the absolute mind, to God. This relation is the highest, the absolute, into which all else is cancelled, in whose mystic depth all else, even the splendor of beauty, vanishes. Hegel was a man who, in his impulsion toward substance, left all that was merely rhetorical behind, while the power of the content which occupied him breathed into his nervous words a pathos of which the unsought and therefore startling language transports us with its irresistible power. At the beginning of his *Philosophy of Religion* he presented a poetic description of it which has justly been universally admired and often quoted. He sought at once to emancipate his readers from all that is finite, and fitly to prepare and dispose them for knowledge of the purely absolute. There is a certain charm which is diffused throughout the language of the *Æsthetics* which ceaselessly engages the phantasy with the metamorphoses of manifold phenomena. The tone which pervades the *Philosophy of Religion*, however, is quite different. It becomes strict and formal. A certain heaviness of style may be observed in the struggle of the philosopher with the ultimate mysteries of our being. The naïve good sense in Hegel's expressions reminds us of the old Strassburg mystic, Eckhart.

English skepticism, French atheism, and German deism, of the eighteenth century, had entirely disposed of religion. They had put morality in its place. If nature follows its own laws regardless of history, if history has no other causality than human freedom; what would then be left for God? The

blind necessity of nature as well as the self-determination of human action excludes Him from their domain. Then Kant, who seemed to have destroyed theological scholasticism at the end of the century, published his "Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason," and, to the surprise of his contemporaries, took his position essentially upon the side of Christian orthodoxy by interpreting its dogmas as symbols of moral truths, and by affirming, in opposition to Rousseau, whom he greatly loved, that man has a root of evil dwelling within himself. Since Kant, German philosophers have, without an exception, treated of the science of religion. This was to be expected from Hegel all the more, because, during his residence in Switzerland and in Frankfurt, he had occupied himself with it so extensively, and in the *Phenomenology* had already given the outlines of a philosophy of religion.

He constructed these thoughts more elaborately and in more systematic form for the purposes of his academic lectures. They were published by Marheineke after his death. As his revision was so defective, the second edition was given into the hands of Bruno Bauer, who edited it admirably, so that both in perfection of contents and in the finish of its form it takes rank second only to the excellently construed *Æsthetics* of Hotho.

Not one of Hegel's works has received more, and probably none more ill-founded, partizan, unjust or superficial criticism than the *Philosophy of Religion*, because in none did Hegel assume a more polemic attitude toward his age, and in none did he grapple with dominant prejudices with a stronger spirit of resentment. He attacked the deism of *éclaircissement* which hypothetized God as the highest essence, but affirmed that of the essence of this essence nothing could be known. He opposed the theology of feeling, or theology of the heart, which is conscious of feeling and anticipating God in his infinitude, but held knowledge of God to be impossible and a temptation to atheism. He opposed the learned supernaturalism which knows how to speak of God only historically, without having an independent or original conception of Him. He opposed also pantheism, or Spinozism, which apprehends God as one absolute substance, and not at the

same time as the One, as absolute subject. He had a very distinct consciousness of his relation to all these parties in the same way in which, in the Philosophy of Right, he was conscious of his own antithesis to the various tendencies of the present. His extraordinary didactic skill is brilliantly exhibited in the introduction of the Philosophy of Religion, and none of the preliminary questions which could naturally arise concerning the relation of religion and philosophy, or concerning the attitude of the Philosophy of Religion to the System of Philosophy, remain unanswered. The course he has here followed may be summarized briefly as follows:

I. He treated the conception of religion in its universality as faith and as cultus.

II. The various religions which preceded the appearance of Christianity he regarded as specializations of the universal conception.

These are distinguished by the antithesis, 1. Natural religion, and 2. Religion of the spiritual individuality. Natural religion is (α) Immediate religion, or the religion of magic and witchcraft of savage peoples; (β) The disruption of the religious consciousness in itself—as α . The religion of measure (temperate conduct of life), β . The religion of phantasy, γ . The religion of Being-in-itself—which have their historical phases in the Chinese, the Indian, and the Buddhistic religions respectively; (c) Religion in transition to spiritual individuality— α . as the antithesis of good and evil, β . as the religion of pain, and γ . the religion of enigma, with their historical phases in the Persian, the Semitic, and the Egyptian religions.

The religion of spiritual individuality rises above nature in the thought of a Final Cause—(α) of the absolute might and wisdom of the one God, who made nature, and consecrated from among the nations one to his exclusive service; (β) of the free cultivation of individual perfection; (c) of universal political dominion.

Sublimity, beauty, and prosaic conformity to an end, make up the distinctive character of these religions, the historical phases of which were Jewish, Grecian, and Roman. Their fall, and the absolute despair of the human mind which resulted therefrom, gave rise to a period of birth.

III. The absolute religion, in which the conception of religion attains its adequate reality. This religion is the truth of all which have preceded it. It does not pass over into another, for it is the last and the highest, because it reveals the intrinsic unity of the divine and the human nature in the person of a man who knows his essence to be the same as that of God, and in his life and death realizes only the consciousness of this inseparable unity.

The Christian is the manifestation of the absolute religion. It expresses the absolute content in forms which, psychologically considered, belong to imagination (representation), and in so far admit of being sublated into the non-sensuous form of pure conception by speculation, but in subject-matter can be surpassed by no other new religion.

The fundamental middle-point of these representations is that of God as tri-personal, as Father, Son, and Spirit, or as trinity. That which philosophy presents in its complete development is represented by the Christian faith as the eternal history of God. The problem of science, according to Hegel, can here only consist in showing what is to be understood, philosophically speaking, by the kingdom (*a*) of the Father, (*b*) of the Son, (*c*) of the Holy Ghost.

Procreation—sonship—is a form of representation which is taken from natural relations, and corresponds only relatively to the conception of the idea, for under the comprehensive name of Son the entire process must be understood which pertains to the realization and incarnation of God and to the establishment of the religious community, in which, within humanity, God, through religious self-consciousness, *actu* really is, because here he is not only spirit in self as Father, or spirit for self as Son, but spirit for spirit, pure manifestation of his essence as theanthropic freedom. This for Hegel is the same as that which is usually designated as love. By the kingdom of the Son must be understood the principle of antithesis in God, his other-being, from which he eternally returns to absolute unity with himself. Hegel, therefore, subsumes (*a*) nature; (*β*) the world and the finite mind; (*γ*) Christ, under this category. Christ is the absolute man, who comprises the *prius* and the *posterius* of all history in himself in an absolutely unique manner. He not only

taught the truth, not only died for the confession of it, but in all his existence manifested nothing but the inseparable unity of God as his Father with himself, as the Son in whom the Father is beheld. That by nature man is not what he should be; that the natural man is evil in his appetites and passions, and must be born again by knowing and willing freedom—all this is elucidated by Hegel in admirable words. He himself said at the conclusion of this labor, "This is now the profoundest depth." No less remarkable is his presentation of the necessity that God's essence should become manifest in an individual concrete form, in this man Jesus of Nazareth, in order to prove *ad hominem* that man in his self-consciousness is capable of taking up into himself the entire fulness of the divine. The absoluteness of this Man does not consist in his manifestation of an encyclopedic versatility as general, artist, philosopher, statesman, &c., but in the fact that, in spite of the destitutions of his nature, in spite of undeniable moral defects, in spite of the imperfection of his culture, he knew himself to be one with God in faith. What is all virtuosity of culture, what all the weaknesses of our ascetic struggles, what all the fortune or disaster of our existence, when compared with the consciousness of this atonement!

The reproach has been made against Hegel, that, for the presentation of the Christian religion, he did not enter upon an exhaustive study of exegetical and dogmatic history, &c.; but, as a philosopher, he could not do this; and he has himself said very often in this regard, that that certainty with which philosophy has to deal cannot be mediated by history, but that conversely we are wont to test the reality of history by the conception of its truth. He did not, however, avoid the historical domain; he spoke of Jesus, of his miracles, of the all-conquering *parrhesia* of his words, of his death, and of the faith of the disciples in his resurrection. A critical history of his life, however, such as Paulus, Strauss, Neander, Lange, Hase, Renan, Schenkel, &c., have lately produced, would have transposed him out of the speculative domain to that of erudition and its endless strifes, and would have made him liable to the reproach of having become untrue to his own problem, viz., that of deducing the necessity of the Christian religion

from the conception of the idea. It should be remarked that Hegel proceeded with the Christian precisely as with the other religions; first presenting its metaphysical conception, then its historical existence, and concluding with a description of its cultus. So too, when he arrived at the absolute religion, he brought forward the religious conception of God upon this high stand-point.

He distributed the proofs for the existence of God by ascribing the cosmological proof to the religion of nature, the teleological to the religion of spiritual individuality, and the ontological to Christianity as the absolute religion.

In order to recognize the magnitude of Hegel's labor, it need only be compared with that which had been done before in the same field. We find all that which Hegel collected into an organic totality, widely scattered. The elementary conceptions of religion had been treated by the followers of Kant and Jacobi, e.g. by Köpper; mythology and symbolics by Görres, Creuzer, Meiners, Benjamin Constant, &c.; and the Christian religion by Herder, &c. A unification of all sides of religion, and a permeation of them by one principle and by one method, had never been attempted until Hegel. His work rose like a massive temple from the midst of the above endeavors. Warm religious feeling, immense erudition, a strict scientific earnestness, a diction simple yet not dry, enlivened rather by a rich intuition, all are blended in rare harmony. By affirming that man could attain to a knowledge of God he attacked the dread of knowledge which pietists and theologians often feel; by clinging fast to religion he repelled the atheistic tendency which desires to know only morality, and in all religion discerns nothing but an expression of human ignorance and incapacity, or even the designed hebetation of a venomous and despotic hierarchy; and finally because he polemicized strongly against Roman Catholicism, especially against its worship of relics and of saints, against monasticism and transubstantiation, he made himself inimical to Catholic theologians. The public at large believed that a true philosopher stood upon the heights of science only when he was a republican in politics, and an atheist, or at least a pantheist in religious philosophy. If, like Hegel, he declared himself opposed to atheism and to Spi-

nozism, either he incurred the suspicion of being a hypocrite in case he otherwise exhibited energy of thought, or he was depised as immature and weak-minded. All these inculpations were suffered in turn by Hegel. It has even been charged that, out of love to the Prussian policy of restoration, his religious philosophy was moulded retrogressively upon the pattern of mediæval scholasticism, with Jesuitic calculation. What a monstrous slander! The Prussian government carried on the work of unification without debate, by the agency of force; the *agenda* of the cathedral at Berlin—a mosaic composition of Hebrew psalmody with very insipid prayers, which furnishes sad evidence of the sordid prepossessions of the then existing military-police-state—was to be imposed upon the religious communities; preachers of Lutheran congregations were either cast into prison or compelled to emigrate, and Hegel, who both from the professorial chair, and on the occasion of the celebration of the Augsburg confession in an academic oration, publicly expressed his preference for Lutheranism; would he support this enormity?

A great part of the general disfavor with which Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* was received was caused by the breach between himself and Schleiermacher. But as I was myself the first who attacked Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith from the stand-point of the Hegelian philosophy, I will not dwell upon this event.

It is often said that Hegel has never distinctly declared what he understood by the words "God," "immortality," "miracles." This declaration has no objective warrant. After the introduction to the *Philosophy of Religion* comes a chapter upon "God," in which he most unambiguously declares that He must be apprehended not merely as substance, but at the same time as subject. Only finally, in the result, can the conception of God be properly apprehended by scientific knowledge. That which is final in the system is in itself the first. The beginning of the system embraces, indeed, nothing more than the most abstract conception of being, but it presupposes the conclusion, viz. the conception of being as the absolute mind. The human mind for itself, even in its generic universality as humanity, is not the abso-

lute mind. It becomes absolute, however, as far as, by thinking and willing, it exalts itself to God. If, conversely, God had over against himself only a nature which He has made, He would not be the Absolute Spirit. This he becomes, on the one hand, by relation, by objectivization in mankind.—Whether Hegel believed in immortality in a carnal sense, as family egoism wishes, cannot be doubtful. This he rejected, as well as belief in a God who is made only the obedient executor of terrestrial interests, which impose upon the heart the piety of eudaimonism. In two places he speaks of immortality, in treating of the Egyptian religion and of the resurrection of Christ. He extols the Egyptians for having conceived so profoundly the thought of immortality, and of the latter he remarks that immortality is a quality of mind which is already present, and need not first be mediated by death. We can form absolutely no conception of a condition after death; but since in thinking and willing, we sustain a negative relation to nature, we cannot prove that our consciousness must be annihilated by the death of the organism. It is among the most unhappy errors of mankind that they have expected the truth of spirit, the so-called eternal life, as a Beyond, or something which begins after death. He everywhere inculcates that we are now and here in the midst of the absolute, and that we degrade the state and the church when we condemn ourselves to a state of religious tutelage, or of unhappiness, or admit the sentiment that we are in need of compassion.—The belief in miracles Hegel could very well understand. The origin of this belief is as little perplexing to philosophy as the origin of its decline. The miracle is the form in which man represents the independence of his freedom from the causal nexus of nature and history; but a miracle is impossible, since ethical organization, which is possible only in so far as natural and moral law becomes invested with an inviolable existence, would thereby be destroyed.

If I make myself a cause of something, I must have confidence in the presupposed effect. If this could not be avoided by a natural chance, but could be clandestinely attained by the arbitration of a God, all ethical freedom would be destroyed. That which should be religion must in con-

tent be absolute, eternal truth for the whole universe. Belief in the rectitude of a casual event is not religious. Changing water to wine, the withering of an accursed fig-tree, the resurrection of a dead man, the stilling of a tempest, walking upon water, &c., are things which have nothing whatever to do with religion. The reality ascribed to them was that of myth, and not of fact. In this sense Hegel rejected belief in miracles as superstition; but he rejected likewise the now prevalent disbelief of natural science in the existence of spirit, and in the might of freedom, as superstition. The true miracle of mind he believed to be reconciliation with God, the undoing of what has already taken place, by repentance, new birth, and the continual emancipation into freedom.

In the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel often made use of the expression, that the content of religious feeling, that its intuitions and its representations, must be elevated to thoughts in order to be understood. It is especially the form of imagination in which the content of religion becomes popular. The misunderstandings which have originated here would perhaps have been avoided if Hegel had separated the conception of the religious process from that of its phenomena in consciousness, and both from the morphological system of religion, in some way like the following:

I. The religious process. It contains the general elements of all religions: (1) as the subjective process of immediate unity, separation and reconciliation of man with God, which takes place entirely within the inner being; (2) from this it finds expression in the objective process of prayer, ceremonies, and sacrifices; (3) as absolute process it is organized into the faith and the cultus (worship) of the religious community.

II. Religious phenomenology. Religious consciousness is bound up in these forms through which mind, as theoretical intelligence, must pass from feeling, through imagination, to thought. The content of religion is felt, or imagined, or thought. Whence arises (1) the religion of feeling; (2) the religion of phantasy; (3) the religion of logical comprehension. The first appears in the religion of nature, the second in the religion of art, the third in the religion of reason, as its peculiar form. These distinc-

tions must not be embarrassed by unnecessary limitations, but must be taken as quite general. Every religion may pass through these formative stages. The Jewish religion, e.g., is already principally one of pure thought. It has, however, contemplated the feeling of this thought in flame and fire. It has produced no plastic art, because this would have contradicted its own principle of formlessness; but in poesy, and in its companion, music, it enters the stage of the religion of phantasy, until, in the Talmud, it passes over to the form of thinking. Thought is the highest form of intelligence, the simple non-sensuousness of which it does not transcend; but in itself may still be distinguished as (a) understanding, (b) reflection, (c) reason. Understanding publishes the content of faith in the form of dogma. Reflection criticises the dogma as *éclaircissement*. Reason rises to concrete conception, which no longer has negativity external to it to criticise it, but embraces it as a moment in itself. The Greeks had no catechism, but the dogmatic element was not wanting. When the sophists inaugurated their *éclaircissement*, it became at once evident that certain general representations were current concerning the gods and their labors. Popular tribunals condemned those philosophers who contradicted those forms of the popular faith which were held as canonical; e.g. Anaxagoras, because he declared the sun to be a body glowing with heat; Diagoras of Melos, because he doubted the justice and the foreknowledge of the gods; and Socrates, because he believed himself to be directed in all his actions by an in-dwelling "demon," &c., all of which would have been impossible without a dogmatic consciousness. The stoics sought to justify the dogmas of the popular faith precisely as the scholastics did the dogmas of the Christian religion, and as the neo-platonists strove, by the deduction of plurality from unity, for a gradation of the gods, and, by mystic allegory, to exalt polytheism to the religion of reason. Hegel applied the term art-religion exclusively to that of the Greek; but every religion is liable, as soon as it translates the content of feeling into intuitions, and intuitions into imaginations, to deck out the latter in beautiful forms, and thus to become art-religion. Especially if a religion lays obstacles in the way of the transfiguration into beauty, art encoun-

ters impassible limits, as e.g. the religion of India, in the many arms of the gods; or that of Egypt, in the animal heads of many gods. It can only temper and moderate, not annul, the ugliness of such forms. The Indian religion first attained a plastic character in Buddhism, because it made a purely human form its centre, as we still see among the ruins of many temples in Farther India.

Hegel rightly considered the thought of God as the soul of all religion. When, however, this is understood as an attempt to sacrifice feeling to understanding, it is forgotten that the forms of intelligence, in passing from the lower to the higher, are not thereby destroyed but preserved. When, from the stand-point of phantasy, I represent to myself a content of sensation, sensation does not therefore cease, but continues in the imagination; and in the same way feeling and imagination accompany, or rather are immanent in, thought. The philosopher who conceives God as the absolutely universal substance, as absolute subject, brings feeling and imagination into his thought, and becomes neither unfeeling nor unimaginative. When first the universal necessity of this course of the human mind is known, it is clearly seen that Philosophy is the divine priestess that reconciles and unites the various positive religions concentrically into the sanctuary of its own self, and therefore coördinates the feeling and the phantasy of comprehensible thought.

III. The system of religions. Hegel made the antithesis of natural religion and spiritual individuality the centre of his construction. This dichotomy of a divided middle term he described as peculiar only to nature. It is soon discovered that it was only the Jewish religion which induced him to leave the triad of the oriental, the antique, and the Christian world, which he had so admirably depicted as phases of the symbolic, classical, and romantic ideal in æsthetics. The constraint of the transitions from the Egyptian to the Jewish, and still more from the Jewish to the Christian religion, is also soon detected. Although the Jews were brought out of Egypt, and, at the behest of their Jehovah, took with them the gold and silver vessels of the Egyptians, their religion was not derived from Egypt. This Hegel does not mention, although it should be said at this point in his construction

of these religions. According to the fundamental intuition of the entire Hegelian philosophy, the division of religions could only result from the antithesis of substantiality and subjectivity in God. All religions which proceed from the intuition of substantiality may be called natural religions, because in their cosmogony nature is first, and theogony follows. The Greeks conceived earth and heaven to be the First. The enlightened Roman, Ovid, went beyond earth and heaven to a still more barren abstraction, yet he allows nature to subsist as the First.

*"Ante mare et tellus et quod tegit omnia cœlum,
Unus erat tantum naturæ vultus in orbe."*

All religions which proceed from the conception of the absolute subjectivity of one God who made heaven and earth, are theistic. Here there can properly be but one religion; the difference is not qualitative. Mohammed recognizes Abraham, Moses, and David. The absolute religion is the sublation of the antithesis of substance and subject through the conception of spirit.

Hegel labored to apprehend the different religions in their characteristic distinctions and to designate them accordingly, as e.g. when he designates the Chinese religion as that of measure or moderation, the Indian as that of phantasy, the Egyptian as that of enigma, it cannot be disguised that his apprehension, though very profound, admits of much improvement.

All natural religions—or, as it is now customary to say, all ethnic religions—constitute a totality, the development of which cannot be separated from the process of universal history as we have previously regarded it. When Hegel determines the religions of Farther Asia as the sundering of the religious consciousness in itself, and those of Western Asia and of Egypt as transitional to spiritual individuality, it becomes clear that this process is erroneous, and that the category of a transition from one step to another is not sufficient to furnish a clear conception. Eastern and Western Asia should rather be contrasted as pantheistic and dualistic. The antithetic character of dualism reached its ultimate phase in the individualism of the Greek, Roman, and German religion, which, in principle, cannot be distinguished from eth-

nic religion. The historical element in general must be subordinated to that of the idea, under which therefore religions which are found in Africa, America, and Australia, may be subsumed. The conception, nevertheless, will even produce for itself historically a pregnant form which presents the conception as a phenomenon quite correctly, and which therefore may be used as a representative type. The first stage of the phenomena of religion, e.g., Hegel called the immediate, and specified witchcraft and sorcery as its peculiarity, which have ever prevailed most widely among the negro tribes of Africa. They may, therefore, be taken as the representatives of this stage, especially as they are the unhistoric races and typify the childhood of mankind. The conception of magic, however, is universal as the first naïve, and, for us, superstitious reaction of the freedom of the human consciousness against the might of natural necessity. In the enchanter, who conjures wind and weather, sickness, &c.—who, by the exertion of his will and by his glance, brings sickness upon men and cattle, excites a sensation of the superiority of mind over nature. Magic is found also among all races who live in a state of nature outside of Africa. In the progress of mind to higher stages it ceases to constitute the centre of religion. It is reduced to a subordinate moment, but it does not vanish from the group of natural religions. The religions of abstract spirit declare expressly against them. Moses as well as Mohammed forbade magic, conjuration of the dead, the determination of days by lot, &c. It continued still in secret as an outlawed superstition, and thus maintains its subsistence even in Christianity. The Roman church formally readopted it into its system of dogmas as exorcism. Under the name of miracles it dragged in a superstitious belief in magic.

We employ the term "natural religion" in general for all religions of ethnicism. More strictly it should designate only the religion of magic and fetichism, which Hegel calls "immediate religion." In the Chinese religion the ethical element attains such prominence that the physical is more and more sublated in it. The following scheme of the ethnic religions may be presented: I. Pantheism: (a) religion of magic—the Chinese and races in a state of nature; (b) religion of metempsychosis—East Indians; (c) quietism—the

Buddhists. II. Dualism: (a) astral religion—the Persians; (b) necrolatry—Egyptians; (c) the religion of orgies—Semites. III. Individualism: (a) the æsthetic—Greeks; (b) the practical—Romans; (c) the demonic—Germans.

These designations are more definite than those of Hegel. He termed the religion of Eastern Asia the sundering of the religious consciousness in itself. This is not proper. Sundering takes place in all religions; it takes place especially in dualistic religions because it is immanent in their very principle. This is the case with the religions of Western Asia, which Hegel apprehended too indeterminately only as religions of transition, while the word dualism designates them positively. The religions of Eastern Asia, on the other hand, are pantheistic. Individual existence here has the significance of absolute misfortune. Metempsychism is at the same time *metensomatism*, and the soul wandering from one incarnation to another longs for absorption into nothing. Quietism comes to its consequent end in nihilism. When Hegel called the Indian the religion of phantasy, he hit upon an ingenious characterization of one side of this religion, viz. its fantastic mythology; but the Greek might equally well be called the religion of phantasy, i.e. of the Beautiful, or of the Ideal. Metempsychosis expresses more correctly the peculiarity of this stage, for it reminds us at once that the soul determines its own fate by its actions in whatever caste or animal body it attains existence, and this is the point upon which all here turns.

As the antithesis to the Persian religion of light Hegel adduced that of Asia Minor under the category of pain, but this is erroneous. The antithesis of Persia should be sought in Egypt, where it became very manifest at the conquest of Cambyzes. The Egyptian mythology with its thousands of statues of the gods, with its worship of animals, and its worship of the dead, was an abomination to the Persians. The latter worship was the specific centre of their religion; the judgment of the community concerning the dead was the chief factor of their entire ethical life. The Persians placed corpses naked in the open air, that the birds, as messengers of Ormuzd, might devour them. The Egyptians, in order to eter-

nize the body, laid it away in rocky chambers and in coffins of stone, after it had been made lasting by embalming it with resin. Service for the dead plays a great part in all religions; even in natural religion, as in necromancy, and as the cultus of divination, especially among the Chinese; but Egypt lived, so to speak, for nothing but death. Its Pharaohs would have built no pyramids had they not desired to preserve their own bodies for a future resurrection. The religion of Egypt may therefore rightly be termed necrolatrous. Hegel, with ingenious reference to the sphinx, termed it the religion of enigma. It was a riddle, however, only to strangers, not to Egyptians themselves, who were by no means the gloomy, sad mortals they are often represented, but were lively and joyous, though earnest men, as, independently of Herodotus, the *genre* pictures of the catacombs show, in which their customs were so charmingly delineated. The transition from the Egyptians to the Greeks is made in the schools by these pictures. Creuzer made Egypt the basis of his symbolics, and more recently Röth and Julius Braun have strenuously defended the dependence of the Grecian upon the Egyptian religion. Afterward, in the interval since Friedrich Schlegel's book upon the wisdom of the Indians, they held for a time the place of chief honor. But the transition from the Orient to Greece was mediated especially by the races of Asia Minor, whose religion, as Hegel said, was characterized not only by pain, but also by voluptuousness, by intoxication, and by freely giving vent to all the instincts that are in human nature. This we term orgiasticism, whose fermenting fulness the Greeks transfigured to a beautiful proportion. Orgiasticism may be (a) Sabæan—astrological, like that of the Chaldeans in Babylon; (b) androgynous, like that of the Syrians and Phrygians; (c) heroic-utilitarian, like that of the Phœnicians, whose Melkarth is the Semitic antetype of the Hellenic Hercules. All these religions were at the same time fatalistic.

Here, as elsewhere, Hegel concludes with the Romans, but, with them and the Greeks, the Germans are the third people with whom the principle of heart (*Gemüth*) enters universal history. Their deities were high and pure forms, which

Plato would not have had to purify morally as the Greek gods for his Republic. The myth of Balder and Loki is deeper than that of Osiris and Typhon, or that of Prometheus and Pandora.

Monotheism stands opposed to ethnicism with its manifold forms. It was found originally only in one nation, the Jewish, concerning whom enough has been already said under the Philosophy of History. Islamism is not distinguished from Judaism in principle; but only in that, from the very first, it was not national, but rather cosmopolitan; while Judaism, although it hoped sometime to gather all people to its Jehovah, conceived of this as their unification with the people of Israel under its Messias.

Islamism is fanatical and fatalistic. It wages war with other nations to compel them, by the force of arms, to serve Allah. The Jews waged war, but only to conquer Canaan, and never to convert other people. They believe in a guidance of their nation by Jehovah, but not in an unconditional predestination, whence their feeling of sin is much deeper and more vital. When, by the dispersion, the Jews were compelled to dwell among other nations, they must have reflected upon the concessions which they were called upon to make to the peculiarities of other nations without giving up those of their own. Hence originated the prefaces to the Talmud, which calls itself the hedge about the law. This tendency to compromise in the Talmud is the inner transition of national to cosmopolitan monotheism.

It is only when the antithesis of ethnicism and monotheism is held fast that Christianity can be rightly apprehended in its historic genesis. Christ sprang from the Jewish and not from the Roman race. All the elements of error in Christianity are a relapse either into abstract substance or abstract subject, into abstract naturalism or abstract spiritualism, into Gnosticism or Ebionism, into heathenism or Judaism. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that the phenomena of the Christian religion ever oscillate between two extremes, for these, in and for themselves, make up its higher unity, and by these, conversely, it first becomes perfectly understood.

It cannot be made a matter of reproach that, as a philosopher, Hegel did not enter upon the history of Christianity in the Philosophy of Religion, for this he did not do for other religions, because, before all else, it devolved upon him here to arrive at their conception. This, however, was amply done in the History of Philosophy and in the Philosophy of History.

VIII.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The third great work which Michelet elaborated from Hegel's posthumous papers was the History of Philosophy. This subject was treated with very unequal merit in its different parts. Ancient philosophy is treated as a totality, and its presentation is quite uniform and is made from original authorities; that of the middle ages is very inorganic, and is composed from secondary sources and with the manifest wish to get through it as quickly as possible. Recent philosophy again is studied exhaustively from original sources, although more according to the chronological succession of the chief systems than in a proper historico-genetic bearing and construction. Often there are only extracts from cardinal works, with brief introductions and critical remarks, which give a rich fulness of insight in pithy, characteristic words; and the readiness with which he assumes a kind of frank superiority aids him here to the most happy and vigorous periods.

Hegel prepared for no other undertaking so carefully as for this History. He exhaustively wrought out the determination of its domain, its distinction from related departments, its position in the system, its divisions, its ordinary conception, its sources, and its necessary method of treatment. The History of Philosophy records facts, but facts which are thoughts, and not merely thoughts in general, but such as have the conception of the absolute for their content; if it states, in a merely objective way, that a philosopher then and there taught this or that, it remains without a connective idea. It should rather show how the thoughts of different philosophers are developed from one another, what relation subsists between the false and the true in a given philosophy, and how progress cannot refute its previous stand-point as a mere error without at the same time confirming its positive content. All philosophies in and for themselves are only philosophy itself. The system of philosophy must integrate all

stand-points as organic moments, as categories of its different spheres.

Philosophers do not elaborate their systems apart from all connection with universal history. It is often thought that they project unique ideas of God and the world from purely speculative idiosyncrasy, while in fact they stand in the most intimate relation with the spirit of peoples and with the movement of mankind. They seek to fathom, by solitary reflection, that which more or less engages all contemporaries, and to express with all possible clearness what is often the open secret of the age. When the sequence of philosophical systems appears only as a gallery of fortuitous opinions, nothing seems more comfortless than the study of the history of philosophy, and nothing but superficial skepticism, the profane stand-point of a Pilate, can be the result. Criticism, according to Hegel, does not consist in applying the measure of one presupposed system upon another, or upon all systems. It should arise from the development of a system as its own critique, in which the consequences of its stand-point reveal the imperfections which it involves, and at the same time disclose the positive germ which constitutes its imperishable truth and thereby its historic right. Philosophy must be learned from the history of philosophy. Hegel would say that philosophy, as well as every other science which has a name—or, as we often say, an authority—may recall a necessary and eternally true conception. Harvey and the discovery of the circulation of the blood, Copernicus and the true theory of our planetary system, are synonyms. So too, in philosophy. The Eleatic stand-point and the conception of self-identical Being, Plato and the conception of true, affirmative dialectics, Aristotle and the conception of teleology, &c., are all identical. Were this not so, philosophizing would be entirely without results, which is indeed a very common view of it, ascribing to it at most the utility of a certain formal exercise of thought. The highest system is not merely an external summation of foregoing systems, but their vital unity, which sublates them into itself, and thereby acquires for itself new illumination and a relatively changed significance. Hegel claimed to have harvested into his own the truth of all preceding systems, and

not merely to have gathered them synthetically into a syncretistic aggregate, but rather to have posited them at the same time analytically with immanent dialectics and as self-producing and cancelling moments of the totality. It should not be imagined, as it often is, that he expected to find, point for point, in history the sequence of the determinations of his system, or, in its determinations, to find the temporal succession of philosophers, although on the whole a marked coincidence might be admitted. In a philosophy one side of the absolute will be emphasized as its qualitative element, but from it the philosopher will seek to apprehend and present the whole; as Plato not only established the conception of dialectics, but from it sought to develop the conception of nature and mind.

In the perfect and clear consciousness which Hegel had concerning the process of the history of philosophy down to his own time, he stands alone among modern philosophers: I say modern, because among the ancients Aristotle took a similar position, as his Introduction to *Metaphysics* and his other numerous references to other philosophers show. Leibnitz also was unusually well versed in the history of philosophy, as his treatise *De arte combinatoria* especially shows; but he lacked the proper conception of its inner connection, which gave Hegel so great superiority and externally so great repose. Brucker, Tennemann, and Buhle, Hegel's predecessors in this department, were perhaps superior to him in the extent of their erudition, but they lacked depth of speculative penetration, imitative vitality of reproduction, and the sharpness of universal criticism, which is not confined within the circle of Wolffian or Kantian categories. When Hegel expounds foreign systems, he does not merely quote the decisive words in the language of the original—all the others do that—but he translates and expounds them; and it is this attempt at correct objective apprehension which throws a charm over such passages, as well as the exquisite tact with which he discriminates between the essential and the unessential, the philosophical and the unphilosophical.

According to human seeming, it is much to be regretted that Hegel was not himself permitted to bring the history of philosophy out of the crude state of lecture-manuscripts to

full maturity and perfection for the public. What an entirely different finishing it would then have received, and how the grouping of single parts would have been transformed! As it is, it is invaluable, and has exercised a most abiding influence upon the elaboration of this discipline. In its philosophical content it is classic, but in form it is imperfect. From single extracts we may compute what he sought to have achieved. His presentation of Plato's system, made with such predilection and perfection, deserves especial praise. Other historians, e.g. Brandis, in his history of ancient philosophy, has presented a very true and comprehensive picture of the Platonic doctrine, but it is dry and cold; so that, with all the citations which he printed under the text, we can attain to no vital understanding, to no penetration into the real essence of Plato's system. The poetic endowment and the myth-building phantasy of Plato have been ever admired, but where, down to Hegel, do we find a single rational word concerning the relation of this mythic system to speculation proper? Hegel does not merely refer, but, as a philosopher, coöperates in the formation of a principle; he strives with the striver, and this invests his statements, even where æsthetically they are unsatisfactory, with an infinite charm. We feel ourselves transported to the secret laboratory of thought where mind thirsts for knowledge. How many and voluminous reproductions of Spinoza's *Ethics* and of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* we have had within the past century, and how weary we became in reading them, and how duped with the expectation that now the true light was about to dawn upon us; while the brief, somewhat slovenly presentation of Hegel, penetrating however with freedom into the ground of the subject, enlightens us at once! This he did often, with a sort of rude pedagogical manner, even in dealing with the greatest philosophers.

It might be expected in the construction of this *History* that Hegel would divide it into Oriental, Antique, and Christian. This he essentially did. Yet he is unwilling to recognize Oriental philosophy. He makes a beginning first with the Greeks because they first formed states with free constitutions, and true philosophy is impossible without political freedom. He discourses nevertheless upon Chinese and In-

dian philosophy. It has been often remarked that the abstractions of the Oriental world do not suffice for the critical estimates of concrete history. The Chinese and Hindoos have not philosophized like the Greeks, but they have philosophized. The Chinese, as rational moralists, have cultivated practical philosophy; the Hindoos, as essentially religious men, have cultivated metaphysics and psychology. How can the Chinese Mengtseu, who vindicated to the inhabitants of a state under certain conditions the *jus revolutionis* against their prince, from the conception of the state, be called other than a philosopher? This he did not do as a poet, or a prophet, or a priest, but as a prosy-thinking Confucian.

Or, among the Hindoos, can Kanada, whom Hegel mentions on account of his doctrine of categories, be refused the name of philosopher? After all it avails nothing, especially since the further investigations in this domain since Hegel's death, to seek either to ignore or to exclude the Orientals; for they have philosophized, though they have taken a lower standpoint than the Greeks.

The History of Ancient Philosophy is Hegel's historical master-piece. Details may be disputed, here and there he may be corrected and supplemented, as Zeller has done; but in essentials he is correct, and in the delineation of details he is unsurpassable. He preserves his power to the end, while that of historians often falters before Neo-platonism. They generally excuse themselves by loudly disparaging it as eclecticism and mysticism, so that we seek in vain for a clear conception of it, and are lost in wonder that philosophers like Plotinus and Proclus, who have evidently studied Plato and Aristotle profoundly, should have erred so extravagantly.

The History of Mediæval Philosophy, in spite of a few genial touches, is the weakest of all his works. He had a general dislike for the middle ages. To him it was an age of barbarism, where little that was congenial was to be found. Erdmann, a follower of Hegel, in his admirable text-book on the History of Philosophy, has especially treated scholasticism after the French, e.g. Cousin, Rousselot, Hauréau, and others, had preceded him.

Respecting Hegel's disposition and criticism of Arabic and Jewish philosophers there is much to be said, but this would take us too far from our proper theme. We must conclude the same also with reference to the History of Modern Philosophy. It is too desultory, and lacks, from the effort at compendious abridgment in order to hurry through with the material before the end of the semester, a formal completeness. It becomes, in fact, even more difficult to follow and describe the movements of thought in Modern Europe, because, by the mediation of printing, the diffusion of systems has become much more rapid and wide, and extends from nation to nation in a way and to a degree which cannot be estimated, so that a wide margin must be left for chance; but especially because religious (or more properly ecclesiastical and political) interests now play so great a part. The crossing of systems, and the number of hybrid formations and of syncretic mediation, as well as the numerous efforts which have the appearance of originality, but which are often the misunderstood reproductions of long anterior systems, grows towards infinity. How much of all this mass deserves notice? The literary historian of philosophy is unquestionably bound to register subordinate and even inferior authorities, the philosophical author must be allowed to confine himself to the epoch-making central figures. If principles are strictly adhered to, the divisions of the history of philosophy, in accordance with those of universal history, will be found to arrange themselves very simply about the antithesis of ethnicism and monotheism, and their sublation into Christianity.

I. The Philosophy of Ethnicism.

1. Chinese philosophy; realism.
2. Indian philosophy; idealism.
3. Græco-Roman philosophy; ideal realism.

II. Philosophy of Monotheism.

The Jews and the Mohammedans have themselves produced no independent philosophy, because they were under no necessity to do so. Only by contact with the Greeks were they impelled to make the attempt to construe the world of thought in accordance with their faith, as was first done by Philo with extraordinary acuteness and with remarkable

phantasy. The vast number of the philosophical writings of the Arabians must not make us forget their dependence upon the Greeks. All finally centres about the substantive and operative predicates of God. Christian scholastics have borrowed from the Arabs and Jews, but the converse has never taken place. Christians quote Averrhoës and Moses Maimonides, but Arabs and Jews do not quote Abelard and Thomas Aquinas.

III. The Philosophy of Christianity.

- A. First period: the philosophy of faith. 1. Gnosticism. 2. Patristic philosophy. 3. Scholasticism.
- B. Second period: philosophy as an independent science. 1. The reaction of national individuality against ecclesiastical scholasticism. (a) Dogmatism in Italy; Platonic in Florence, Peripatetic in Lombardy, individualistic in Campania. Bruno, Vanini, Campanella. (b) Skepticism in France; Pierre de la Ramée, Sanchez, La Mothe le Vayer, Montaigne, Charron, Gassendi. (c) Empiricism in England; Bacon of Verulam (already anticipated by the scholastic Roger Bacon). (d) Theosophy in Germany; Paracelsus, Weigel, Jacob Böhme.
- 2. Philosophy as a rational science. (a) The idealism of the principle of substantiality; (a) Cartesius, (β) Spinoza, (γ) Leibnitz. It recedes partly into mysticism and scholasticism. (b) Realism of the principle of subjectivity as *éclaircissement* of the understanding; (a) in the sensism and skepticism of England, (β) in the materialism and atheism of France, (γ) in the eudæmonism and deism of Germany. (c) Kant's critical idealism and the systematic formation of philosophy resulting therefrom.

Let this simple outline be kept in mind and it will not be difficult to group into their proper place all the enlargements of a principle, its amalgamation with others, its often striking correlation with seemingly contradictory potencies, without forced or artificial constructions. What Hegel says respecting individual thinkers is always profound, but his construction is not free from confusion, and often conceals the natural course of development which he followed. What is individual also naturally finds its proper place in the

epochs here indicated, and thus the colossal genius of Kant, who first grasped together the antithesis of the subjective and objective principle in a truly scientific synthesis, may be recognized even more justly than it has been done by Hegel.

The history and the absolute system of philosophy should, according to Hegel, cover the same ground. There should be found in history no system, of which the principle wherein lies its truth and its justification, cannot be proved to be an organic moment of the systematic totality. Thus the history constitutes the critique of the system of philosophy, and the system the critique of the history. By this, of course, it is not to be understood that the same stand-point may not be empirically repeated in history, i.e. Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Scholasticism, Materialism, &c., may appear repeatedly, and thus far they belong to history; but, first, they would always appear in new connections, which, in the general identity of its principle, would individualize it again and again; and, secondly, they would always be final stand-points to which history had advanced from former stand-points which here became merely relative. Hegel himself furnishes a very plain example of this. In his characterization of Proclus, it is plain that he fully accords with him in his general apprehension of the idea as a triad of triads. He commends Proclus because he so affirms the unity of the absolute that every triad within its own peculiar domain is at the same time a totality, because otherwise they could not harmonize with one another. He commends him because he distinguished triads as essence, life, and mind (*οὐσιονδῶς, ζωτικῶς, νοερῶς εἶναι*). He commends him because, in the conception of essence, following the Philebus of Plato, he distinguished limit, the unlimited, and measure (*πέρας, ἄπειρον, μέτρον*, or, as Proclus says, *συμμετρία*), precisely as Hegel himself began with the categories of quality, quantity, and measure. He commends him because he characterizes the *νοῦς* as the return (*ἐπιστροφή*) to the logical idea, just as he himself did, &c. Is Hegel's system, therefore, a mere repetition of that of Proclus? Certainly not. Contrasted with Hegel's system that of Proclus is only an abstract sketch with tedious and diffuse dialectics, with nature wrapped in shadows, and with a superabundance of artificial theology, while the

logical idea of Hegel becomes real flesh and blood, and freedom organizes itself into the concrete form of the State. Mention had often been made of a law in the History of Philosophy. Dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism; or objectivity, subjectivity, and the absolute; or idealism, realism, and ideal realism; or analytic, synthetic, and eclectic systems, had succeeded one another; it is also quite right to discern such connections, because every one-sidedness engenders its antithesis, and the antithesis demands sublation into a higher unity, but, since the element of chance pervades history, no scheme can be established as an unconditional norm without incurring the danger of putting a forced construction upon facts. The principal fact ever remains that every system does criticize itself in its own consequences, and thus aids in producing from itself a relatively higher stand-point. This Hegel saw more profoundly than any of his predecessors, and explained most admirably, in the Introduction to his History, as the conception of the development of philosophy. This idea embraces what is sought for under the name of a philosophy of the history of philosophy, or a law for its process. Because Hegel believed that he had articulated all essential stand-points, of both previous and contemporary systems, into their proper place in his system as organic moments of the idea, he rightly regarded it not merely as the most perfect and complete, but as the most critical, because a vital unity pervaded all parts of the whole, and thus, in an immanent way, brought to bear, not only positively but negatively, a criticism of details.

COMPLETION OF THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM IN THE SECOND EDITION OF THE "ENCYCLOPEDIA" IN 1827.

The exoteric occasion of a new edition of his *Encyclopedia* determined Hegel to make his system as accessible as possible from without. This he could not do without foregoing further discussion upon its subject-matter, and striving to give to it a finished and final form. This edition, which was completed but a short time before his death, remained unaltered. He added a new chapter to the Introduction, in which he presented the attitude of thought towards objec-

tivity, as metaphysics of the understanding, as empiricism, as critical philosophy, and as immediate knowledge. He gave greater scope to philosophy of nature, psychology, and to practical philosophy, and shed light on many questions of the day, e.g. the relation of philosophy to religion, the conception of state constitutions and of the budget, and in how far the name *law* was unfitting for a pecuniary grant, &c. The simple articulation of the whole suffered from the addition of these didactic ornaments.

His *Philosophy of Nature*, a department of such intense interest for our age, was printed, in the general edition of his works, with the appendices which Michelet gathered from Hegel's lectures in this field. Valuable as these are, it is still to be regretted that he did not treat this science as exhaustively as he did the *Æsthetics*, or *Philosophy of History*, or the *Philosophy of Religion*. The form of a commentary upon paragraphs as they occur in a text-book brings unavoidable repetitions, misplacements, and, from the nature of the material treated, great contingency. In the sciences of organic nature these appendices sink to the rank of mere extracts which Hegel had made, for the purpose of his own study, from Treviranus, Authenrieth, Bichat, &c. We may, however, hence infer to how great an extent, and with what extraordinary attentiveness, he pursued empirical sciences, while at the same time the wish becomes strong to see this mass more clearly and sharply organized. We may conclude from many merely casual and passing expressions that Hegel was not wanting in a poetic sense for nature, as is often affirmed of him; but that the picture of the phenomenon, which hung before him clear in all its most exquisite details, became often very loosely bound by its logical frame, and that much which is admirable and original—which indeed is often found—did not attain to the reality to which it was entitled on account of this incompleteness. It is to an Italian philosopher, August Vera, that the great merit belongs of having translated Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* into French, and of furnishing it with an admirable commentary in which the peculiarity and fruitfulness of Hegel's intuitions on nature are convincingly exhibited.

Recent natural science declares that nature can be con-

ceived only atomically. It is resolved, it asserts, to proceed only empirically; its method must be inductive, i.e. analytical. An atom however is an hypothesis, for experience cannot make it a subject of observation. Instead of being empiric, it is also metaphysical; instead of being inductive, it is deductive. The atom, it is said, is matter as the infinitely small, which is absolutely unchangeable. In order that a movement of atoms may become possible, a void must, in the second place, be postulated for it, which the originators of this doctrine quite rightly did. This void modern thought has determined to be not merely space but æther. Since, then, æther must be distinguished from space, it has been found necessary to make it also consist of atoms, so that we have on the one hand the atoms of æther, and on the other the atoms of concrete materiality. In order that they may not be idle, a repellant force is ascribed to the former and an attractive force to the latter. All these fictions aim to give to the phenomena of nature a purely mechanical basis, and to subject them to the laws of the calculus. Since physical and especially chemical processes cannot thus be reached, a warm envelop has been ascribed to atoms. Thus they are made small planets.

All the real progress of recent natural science has been made by observation conducted according to the conclusions of induction and analogy. The atomic theory and its calculus has contributed nothing to this progress, but has rather obstructed and limited it. The category of quantity is in great requisition for the processes and forms of nature; but this must not, because it necessarily contains the extremes of the infinitely large and the infinitely small, be identified with atomism.

The Hegelian philosophy of nature is very far from undervaluing mathematics. It has expressly accepted it as a moment of natural science, but, in place of the artificial constraint which is put upon natural phenomena by premature expression in number, it seeks to posit the realism of spontaneous self-formation. The work of arithmetical formalism depends only upon the facts upon which the computations are made. If the former are false, the latter are barren. Very important rectifications, e.g., have become necessary in

modern astronomy for the distances between the sun and the planets, as a result alone of a more accurate measurement of the velocity of light.

Hegel attempts to apply dialectics to the scientific treatment of nature. He did this himself in a very imperfect way, but there is no doubt that science will be compelled to come back eventually to this method. He distinguishes (1) Mechanics, (2) Physics, (3) Organics. If we put in their place the content of these special sciences, we shall have (1) Matter, (2) Force, (3) Life. If we translate these conceptions into abstract categories, they will read, (1) Substantiality, (2) Causality, (3) Teleology.

According to the Hegelian method, each of these spheres has an immanent conformity to law in itself, which becomes phenomenal (1) as weight, (2) as qualitative change, (3) as determination of form. But these differences sublate themselves, as consecutive, both forward and backward. The truth of matter is force, and the truth of force is life. Life, as the absolute end of nature, presupposes the other spheres as its conditions. Of late only matter and force are talked of, though form is equally important in nature, because, by virtue of it, first the individual, and then life, become possible. Organic cells are now treated atomically in order to construct organisms as mere mechanisms from them, but the cell is essentially an individualizing power developing itself into a distinct shape. It is not enough to say that organism is endowed with vital force, for the former is, through and through, the *nisus formandi*, according to Blumenbach, or inner conformity to an end, according to Kant.

Hegel's apprehension of the conception of life is profound, but its depth is but little elaborated in the extent of the thousand-fold forms of nature, i.e. all morphology is omitted.

Hegel believes the earth to be the only star upon which life exists. This may easily excite surprise, and it is readily admitted that, empirically, we cannot know whether or not organic beings exist upon other stars, e.g. Venus and Mars. As a strict systematizer, however, he could not do otherwise than vindicate to the Earth this superiority. Bessel, in a treatise on the physical constitution of the world, and Well, in his "Plurality of Worlds," have arrived at the same

result. The further conclusion that, in the entire universe, a history has been unfolded only upon the Earth, is unavoidable.

The infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies did not embarrass Hegel. This he regarded as a "mere" infinity which was no more imposing than the infinite multiplicity of infusoria, or insects, &c. He disapproves of the measureless admiration of natural phenomena which placed them above the productions of mind. Thus a tiny infusorium, because it was a living individual, stood infinitely higher than a constellation which is inorganic, although ever so gigantic in its mass.

IX.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.

It was natural that during Hegel's intimate association with Schelling, his expression should become somewhat colored by the latter, in whom we may observe the converse of this influence. When Schelling left Jena in the spring of 1803, Hegel returned more to his own individuality. He resumed also the collegia which he had somewhat neglected during his activity as an author. He lectured especially upon logic and metaphysics, and also upon a philosophical encyclopaedia, *totam philosophiæ scientiam, philosophiam logices, naturæ et mentis*. This distinguished him from Schelling, who did not lecture at all upon logic or metaphysics, and had critically treated the various philosophical sciences, only once, in the lectures on the methods of academic study. A systematic totality was what lay at Hegel's heart. He collected himself gradually for its production, and intended to bring it out in two parts, of which the first was to contain a critical justification of his stand-point, and the second the system itself. The first only, at the close of his abode in Jena, was brought to press, and appeared in Bamberg, 1807; "The Phenomenology of Mind, or the Science of the Experience of Consciousness."

This work included, first, the theory of consciousness; second, a critical review of history, to see at what result the history of mankind has arrived in respect to science. It united psychology with the philosophy of history. Hence it has been called a psychology confused by history, or a history distracted by psychology. It is easy to represent it as a monstrosity if narrow criteria are applied, but the inner unity of Hegel's thought was to have consciousness criticise itself by its development, not only in respect to form, but in respect to contents. The title "Science of Consciousness" indicates the content. The mind of mankind itself is summoned to state what form of consciousness it assumes as present, as now final. The chief title, "Phenomenology of

"Mind," recalls the phenomenology of Lambert's "Organon." Mind advances in its consciousness from step to step. Each lower stage is shown up on the next higher to have been a relative error, but it is not therefore nothing, but a necessary condition of the higher. This, when it is entered upon, seems to be the highest, but progress reduces this to a mere seeming. It is therefore not entirely false, but only relatively so, in that it was taken as ultimate. In designating the phenomenology as that of *mind*, Hegel indicates the difference which existed between himself and Fichte, Schelling, and previous philosophers in general. In a former treatise upon natural right Hegel had brought the conception of mind into prominence, and had said that it stood higher than nature, while Schelling made nature and mind parallel as coördinate factors of the absolute indifference. The conception of mind had hitherto been treated under the conception of reason, consciousness, thinking, and willing, but not in and for itself, not as an adequate conception of the absolute. Reason and nature are presuppositions which mind makes for itself, but which, as Hegel says, it takes up. Reason, Nature, and Mind, are mutually coördinated in their independence as *idea* in general. In respect to compass, reason is ranked above nature and mind; but in respect to content, reason is put with and in nature, and nature with and in mind. Nature is rational, but it is something other than mere reason, for it becomes specific in gases, metals, earths, plants, animals, and constellations. Mind is also in itself rational, but through consciousness it is free from the power of nature, and uses the latter as the organ for realizing its purposes, and thereby spiritualizes it. In its history it annuls nature. It is higher than nature because it is the highest, the absolute in aggregate, which knows itself as truth. Hegel's Phenomenology is the preliminary conclusion of the transformations which had begun with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This critique was no psychology or logic or metaphysics in the sense of school-wisdom: it was all these, yet was nothing of them all; it was one of those anomalous products which appear at epochal points in the development of mind, and in which the past is concluded and a new future is ushered in. Kant's Critique, although no definite science, was the foundation of

the great modern revolution of philosophy; Fichte's doctrine of knowledge and Schelling's system of transcendental idealism were its consequences. Hegel's *Phenomenology*, after many intermediate formations, is also a result of the same, an analogue of Kant's *Critique*, and, like it, the source of a new movement.

The *Phenomenology* may be, and has been called, the proædæutics of Hegel's system; but the name is appropriate only so far as he sought therein to lay the foundations of his stand-point: it must not indicate, as it usually does, a philosophizing outside of philosophy, which is to make the latter easier, to introduce it by gentle gradations, or as far as possible to economize individual thought. On the contrary, the *Phenomenology* is very difficult, for it is still more profound than Kant's *Critique*, than Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, or than Schelling's *Transcendental Idealism*. The two latter were the immediate and extended consequents of Kant's *Critique*, and are in so far transition stadia from Kant to Hegel. At the same time, the relation of the *Phenomenology* to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is most intimate, as is manifest in the first words of the Introduction, which commences thus: "It is a natural notion that in philosophy, before the subject-matter itself—namely, the real knowledge of that which in truth is—be entered upon, it is previously necessary to arrive at an understanding concerning the faculty of knowing, which is regarded as the tool by which man possesses himself of the absolute, or as the medium through which he describes it. This solicitude seems to be justified partly by the fact that there are different kinds of knowledge, and among them one may be better adapted than another to the attainment of this ultimate end, so that a false choice may be made among them; moreover, partly by the fact that, since knowledge is a faculty of a definite kind and compass, clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth will result unless a more accurate determination of its nature and boundary is accomplished." It is impossible in these words, and in the entire subsequent exposition, not to detect constantly implied allusions to Kant's stand-point in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, although Kant is not named. Hegel decidedly dissents, towards the end of the introduction, from the view that phenomenology is a mere

preface, outside of philosophy. For consciousness which is established in its phenomenal form, that which arises through its own mutations is ever another object. But for our consciousness which detects the becoming of phenomenal consciousness from stage to stage, this movement itself becomes an object of our knowledge. Hence Hegel says: "Through this necessity this way to science is itself already science, and, on account of its content, science of the experience of consciousness."

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason began with transcendental æsthetics, with the receptivity of intuitions of space and time, and ascended through understanding of the analytic logic to the dialectic of reason, to the ideal finality of speculative theology. It ended with the result that the absolute object is incomprehensible to us, since the intelligence of the understanding cannot be adequately applied to the conceptions of reason, but can be brought into relation only to phenomena. Hegel began in the same way with sensuous certainty, which comes to intuition here in space and time. From this, like Kant, he ascended to the absolute, but differed from him in affirming the possibility of absolute knowledge. The final result of the *Phenomenology* is exactly opposite to that of the Critique. The interval between sensuous certainty as the beginning; and absolute knowledge as the end, has, of course, an entirely different content from the interval between Kant's transcendental æsthetics and the ideal finality of theology. It should be well observed that Hegel regarded absolute knowledge as the limit of the development of consciousness. Not a negative limit, such as, according to Kant, the understanding opposes from fear of the truth of reason, but the positive limit of the highest satisfaction of consciousness, beyond which a higher is impossible; for only the absolute is true, but only the true is absolute. Hegel makes consciousness advance by its own dialectic from one stand-point to another; sensuous certainty makes it have to do, not only with this single object, here and now, but, as soon as it attempts to say what it feels, tastes, hears, &c., this must resolve itself into generality. The predicate which it utters of the object as its essence, is a generality which, as such, is not sensuous. The sensuousness of the certainty thereby

sublates [annuls] itself; while consciousness is driven onward from the unit (as this being) to generality, another and new stand-point arises. And thus it proceeds from stand-point to stand-point. Formally, the same process is ever repeated for us, but not to the infinite, not progressively to the endless, but with a distinct conclusion in absolute knowledge, in which being and intelligence naturally cover each other. In knowledge of the truth, mind first finds, not the rest of the church-yard, but a rest which is vital and full of content. Science is therefore the absolute power in human life, against which all opposition is vain. What Science has once demonstrated, gradually makes its way as law into the knowledge, and finally into the action, of the people. No polity, no religion, avails against it. Copernicus overthrew the mediæval heaven with his solar system. The Pope contradicted him for centuries, until in 1821 he was obliged expressly to recognize the Copernican system. Buckle, in his history of civilization in England, made the assertion that mankind advance in knowledge, but not in morals. This I regard an error, for it is impossible that the knowledge of truth should not tend to make men both freer and better. "Know the truth, and it shall make you free," said Christ.

Since, then, the phenomenology is the science of the experience of consciousness, it nevertheless stands at variance with the conception of science, in that it transposes and adulterates it with historical elements.

Attention must now be drawn to the reproach always urged with so much emphasis, that in the *Phenomenology* Hegel nowhere mentions the name of a philosopher, a people, or an event. He allows each stand-point to characterize itself with relative absoluteness. Nevertheless it is unmistakable that he has in mind distinct historical phenomena. Does he employ them, as it were, by chance, as we select any example to illustrate an abstract proposition by a concrete notion? By no means; but we observe that he fixes upon such a phenomenon as can validate itself in universal history as the classic type of the stand-point which is to be elucidated. He borrows his colors from it because they are the most striking and expressive. From the peculiar collusion of this view in the background, with the conception of the particular stages

of consciousness in the foreground, springs that charm of exposition which the *Phenomenology* has ever exerted upon the temper of those who were cultured enough to enjoy it. Hegel gives no illustrations in a dry, scholastic manner, yet we do not miss that insight which we seek in illustration. Hegel must not be understood as though he would say that the general stand-point which he describes is present only among this people, in this condition, at this epoch of history; his meaning is, that that which occurs in and for itself in the development of consciousness, as a necessary moment of its becoming, has attained in this form of historical phenomenon its purest objectivity. When, for example, in the conception of the ethical mind, the Hellenic world seems to glimmer through, it should not be understood that he abstracted the conception of ethics from the history of the Greeks, and therefore adduces it here; but this conception is in and for itself universal, and is therefore found, as an essential element, among other people, although among the Greeks in its most pregnant beauty and truth. This procedure is therefore by no means wrong, but is in most exquisite taste.

One should first attempt to understand the *Phenomenology* from itself, rather than apply it to the criterion which Hegel has given in the preface, which is swollen to the length of a formal treatise. Prefaces are ordinarily printed before the work itself, but are written only after it is completed. It is quite right that the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* should have been regarded as his manifesto against the excesses of romanticism, and the degeneracies of Schelling's natural philosophy; but the consciousness to which Hegel has given utterance could arise only after the completion of the *Phenomenology*. We shall, therefore, speak of it later.

The more obscure and confused the conceptions which are wont to be made of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the more necessary it becomes briefly to review its outlines, though it is a work so peculiar, that, before conclusions are reached, it must be made familiar in the originality of its earliest form. Hegel distinguished as the most general determinations—(1) consciousness; (2) self-consciousness; (3) reason. Consciousness is knowledge which has for its object that existence which is given it through mediation of the senses: (*a*) as

sensuous certainty, (b) as perception; (c) as understanding. Sensuous certainty takes the individual thing as truth; but as soon as it undertakes to say what the thing is *in se*, it finds itself compelled to utter a generality concerning it. It supposed itself concerned now and here, and with this which presents itself immediately as an exclusive unit, but in this unit the universal is at the same time contained. To this, consciousness must accordingly direct itself as the truth. It becomes perceptive to discern the properties of the thing in which their generality inheres. Things are what they are through their properties, but at the same time they dissolve themselves through these, for through these they cohere with other things, and in this coherence they undergo change. The force which determines things is, therefore, a new object for consciousness; the latter becomes understanding in that it searches out the laws which preside over the play of forces. These laws, in their immutability, as contrasted with things, constitute a supersensuous world.

Consciousness has thus advanced from sensuous certainty to the certainty of the understanding, that within the sensuous the supersensuous, viz. law, is truth proper. Rather, it is itself the supersensuous; for that which knows laws is not an object of sense, has no properties which can dissolve themselves, but makes itself its own object. It is thus self-consciousness, in which are distinguished, (a) its independence; (b) its freedom. It is independent in so far as it subjects life, with its passions and lusts, to itself; dependent, in so far as, conversely, it subjects its own self to life and its passions and lusts. But how does it learn this distinction? Not by distinguishing itself, within itself, from itself, as ego; nor by distinguishing the likeness of the ego from life and its manifold passions and lusts; but by coming to itself in another ego, and entering upon a life and death conflict with it: for thus alone can it become truly self-certain, both whether it has exalted itself above the attachment to life, and whether the opposing consciousness has done so. Should either self-consciousness renounce the conflict, or fear death, or cherish life more than self, in so doing it unselfs itself, becomes dependent, subject to another self, and degrades itself to the service of a lord. This conflict for recognition, to find itself in

others, its equals, is the origin of the relation of master and slave. This position of Hegel has often been invidiously perverted into the doctrine that slavery is a righteous necessity, which he never intended. It is generally said that slavery originated in the captures of warfare. Hegel goes deeper, and inquires how there arose the subjection of one man to another. He answers, "From the want of self-subsistence in self-consciousness." And, "Whence arises this?" he inquires. "From fear of death, from the subjection of self to life."—Hegel develops the mysterious ethico-psychological process from which the fact of slavery arises. By culture, the slave can gradually make himself worthy to be recognized by his master as independent; he gives him freedom because it is already present in him. The freedom of self-consciousness lies in its self-determination as a thinking will. It appears, according to Hegel, in the forms (a) of stoicism; (b) of skepticism; (c) of unhappy consciousness.

Stoicism retires from all reality into the purity of thinking, into the thought of freedom, to which no access from without can be obtained, and in which it is indifferent whether the subject exists as servant or sovereign; for, though in chains, it can still think. Skepticism, conversely, frees itself from the pressure of reality by construing it as mere appearance, as a turmoil of contradictions. Nevertheless it adapts itself to the dominant order of things, which for it is a falsehood. It subjects itself to a reality which is naught to it, since of every distinction which empiricism can find, its opposite exists. The repose of the stoic, and the unrest of the skeptic, absorbed in the detection of contradictions, coalesce in the unhappy consciousness, which, from the unrest of the phenomenal world as the Present, rises to the rest of the Beyond as its true essence, but from this exaltation sinks back again into itself. The Essence which is in the Beyond is universal, immutable; that which is here, on the other hand, as an individual is exposed to mutation. It attempts by labor to escape the sundering of the Present and the Beyond; but labor augments its independence, its property, its enjoyment. Hence it thanks the Eternal for what is mutable: it renounces the attempt to bring itself into harmony with its activity; but, while it thanks, it acquits itself of its obligation to the Im-

mutable, for thereby it recognizes the latter, and returns to its individuality. To express the same still more earnestly, it makes sacrifice of its possessions through the priests of the Immutable, who, in place of the latter, receive his gift. But the priest, who renders thanks in its name, is no more the Immutable than the sacrifice is the individual who offers it through the priest. Hence self-consciousness denies itself the enjoyment of the gifts which the Immutable presents it; it fasts, chastises itself, and finally, in order spiritually to annihilate itself, allows itself to be determined by priests as the council of its conscience. In order to be free from itself, it has renounced its freedom of self-determination, and acts as the slave of priests. It is unhappy, for it is broken down; and does not escape from itself even when it surrenders itself to authority, for it must resolve to do even this. It must will to be unselfed.

But since the Beyond is pure thought, no less so than self-consciousness, it experiences that, at bottom, the Immutable is united in itself with the Mutable; and that the Eternal, which seemed to be a Beyond, is really present in the Here. This consciousness of the unity of the idea and its reality is reason. Rational self-consciousness is, according to Hegel, (1) certainty of the truth of reason; (2) mind; (3) religion; (4) absolute knowledge. The certainty of the truth of reason proceeds directly and instinctively to discover itself. It becomes (a) observing reason; (b) realization of rational self-consciousness through itself; (c) individuality, which is real in and for itself. Observing reason applies itself (a) to nature; (b) to purity of self-consciousness and its relation to external reality; (c) to the immediate reality of self-consciousness. Objects of nature are described, arranged, and investigated, according to their laws. Inorganic as well as organic nature is appropriated by observation as rational. Reason observes—and so does self-consciousness in its purity—how it follows logical laws in thinking, and how it is subject to psychological laws in its development; for individuality, in its reciprocity with the circumstances which casually surround it, evolves nothing which was not involved in its instincts, propensities, and faculties. The great influence which is wont to be ascribed to circumstances is valid

only in so far as the individual admits and incorporates them into his activity. Hence in immediate reality as it appears in physiognomy and in the brain (or, since this cannot be directly perceived, in the skull), observation recognizes the existence of self-consciousness. The mental is one with the material, as brain and spinal marrow. Without brain, observing reason can find no self-consciousness, no thinking, no mind.

The antithesis of observation is the attempt of self-consciousness to realize the conception of reason through itself—not to find, but to produce, the reality of the conception. Hegel distinguishes here (a) pleasure and necessity; (b) the law of the heart, and the frenzy of self-conceit; (c) virtue and the way of the world. Under the stand-point pleasure and necessity, he included that form of self-consciousness which reason seeks in the satisfaction of the appetites and passions in pleasure; but experiences that enjoyment has a limit, and that pleasure is contravened by necessity arising out of itself. Pleasure would make all a means of enjoyment; but the world, the Universal, is not to be consumed. The consciousness for which pleasure has decayed, seeks happiness in the heart; to make itself and all being happy, becomes its law. But the world, by its nature and its institutions, renders this high undertaking difficult; so that, as soon as it experiences this contradiction, the good heart in its self-conceit revolts to frenzy. Self-consciousness, therefore, concludes to renounce happiness, and to follow the law of the heart. In duty it recognizes law as general necessity, and is ready to sacrifice its individuality to it. Virtue must perform duty for its own sake. All inclination must be excluded. The Good exists only through virtue; if it be not realized, it is a mere thought. Virtue is thus brought into conflict with the way of the world, for the world, as such, is not virtuous. It guards individuality, and contends against vice only so far as it violates public law or becomes crime. Up to this limit individuality even in its infirmities and vices, is allowed wide scope. Virtue revolts at the wickedness of the world, and spends itself in pompous delineations of its conflicts, its purity, its nobility, its incomparableness, its sacrifices. It thinks it very sad that virtue must so often



succumb. The vicious world, strange to relate, does not collapse, but preserves itself in tolerable order.

Individuality, by its varieties, produces manifoldness and interest. The world cannot dispense with it, nor indeed can virtue; for without it there can be nothing to contend against, nothing to be resigned to. Without the existence of temptation, of vice, the hero of virtue would have no cause for pride. Thus it is individuality which, by the resignation of virtue to it, has shown it itself preëminent. It is in and for itself real, i.e. it no longer seeks out of itself what it possesses within. In its immediacy it is indeed only natural individuality, but as the certainty of reason it appears (a) as animal kingdom of mind; (b) as law-giving, (c) as law-proving, reason. As animal kingdom of mind, it produces itself in works in which it gives its peculiarity an objective expression. Such a work is not absolutely universal, for this it can represent only according to what individuality in its particularity is able to do; and therefore the latter modestly asserts that it intended merely a contribution to the Universal, and that it designed what was done to be referred not to itself, but to the subject. But the work also stands in relation to others who apprehend and judge of it. Since these are also individualities, their judgment is also colored by this peculiarity, although they likewise modestly insist that not themselves, but the subject alone is concerned. Thus deception arises from both sides. The producer makes the subject his own, wishes to display himself in it—to put his own talent, culture, skill, mind to account. Thus not only the subject, but essentially he himself, is concerned in the work. The critic, on the other hand, rightly says that he must judge of the work as good, bad, or indifferent, only because the subject demands it; but, at the same time, the judgment is his, and expresses his penetration, erudition, taste, and mind. It is, therefore, his own individuality which comes into account in his judgment, and he deceives himself and others if he asserts that it remains neutral. When this deceit is recognized on both sides, consciousness ascends to that instance in which both producer and critic have to subject themselves to the conception of reason as law. Reason is the criterion which must be applied both to production and judgment. Reason gives laws, practical,

æsthetic, &c. But these numerous laws, which exist with and through each other, require in turn a demonstration of how far they are rational and at one with each other.

Law-proving reason seeks not, as it were, to annul laws, but to refine them by its critique, to liberate them from their isolation and one-sidedness, and imperfect construction, in order, in them, to become absolutely certain of the truth of reason. This is the result of the development of reason, i.e. of the stand-point of mind. Mind is self-certain of reason as its truth. It is (a) immediately the *true mind*, or the *morale*; (b) self-estranged mind, or culture; (c) mind certain of itself, or morality. To these conceptions Hegel limits the conception of mind, which he distinguishes from that of religion. True mind, as moral, appears, according to Hegel, (a) in the ethical world; (b) in ethical action; (c) in the condition of rights.

The moral world is immediately included in the family and the nation, for here freedom and necessity are indistinguishably one. Natural individuality, its external reality, pleasure and its limits, necessity, the good heart and its vanity, creative activity and criticism, law-giving and law-proving reason, are annulled in ethics. Man and woman as husband and wife, the latter as parents, parents as trainers of children, children as brother and sister, stand in spiritual relationship by virtue of their natural connection. Brother and sister sustain the purest relationship, because here the sexual passion is not concerned as it is between parents, after whose death the brother is the natural supporter and protector of the sister. All families are individual in one people. Only the princely family in its individuality is at the same time the collectivity of the state. The ethical act springs from the ethics of the people, in which the reason of mind is present. The law which animates the ethical appears partly as divine, partly as human; as divine, in piety, which is especially cherished by woman, who is ordained by nature as guardian of the hearth; as human, in the law of the state, whose prime guardian is the prince. Divine and human law may collide, which for the individual is his fate. He bears the guilt of his fate, but in it becomes conscious of the right which summoned him to the doing of his deed. He acted because, as a member

of the family or state, he could act only so, and not otherwise. Right itself, in turn, acquits him of his guilt and his wrong—as Orestes, Creon, Antigone, rightly did wrong, wrongly did right. The consciousness of right makes man a person, and in the atomic individualization of personality, ethical unity resolves itself into the multiplicity of the indifferent masses, which again can be held together only by a single person as a despotic power. Right is cold and egotistic as long as it seeks only to accomplish itself. When husband goes to law with wife, parents with children, brothers and sisters with each other, the spirit of the ethical has vanished. The individual insists on his right whatever consequences may follow, but just for this reason right is cold and regardless. Mind which is estranged from itself presents itself (a) in the world of its estrangement, partly as culture, partly as belief; (b) it becomes *éclaircissement* in that it opposes and makes an end of superstition; (c) in absolute freedom estrangement has the sense of self-renunciation for something other than we ourselves really are. The right of person inheres therein as far as in this act the entire will is expressed. The importance which the individual attains outside himself in society, depends upon whether he possess power or riches. Power is attained by state service; riches, by augmenting possessions. In the former, he acts nobly when he devotes his efforts and his activity, even to the sacrifice of his own life, to the state; in the latter, when his possessions, even to self-retrichment, are given up to benefit the poor. Still the state is not without distrust of those in power, who serve it, lest they misuse their power against it. The client, the pauper, is not without inner indignation that benefits must be presented to him. It seems to be chance that a person can elevate himself by means of power, riches, or indeed both—for power may lead to riches and riches to power—since individuality, as such, is originally a stranger no less to power and honor than to riches. It can lose as well as possess both.

Mind, therefore, seeks a possession which is inalienable from its individuality, and which can be affected by no mutations of power or riches. This possession is culture, which the individual gives himself. But culture is estrangement from his immediate naturalness, for it makes of man some-

thing other than he is by race, sex, &c. It raises him above the hazard of power or riches, for it is the self-consciousness of mind in its universality which can be snatched away by no fate. In cultured society the individual is significant, not because he is powerful or rich, but because he is culture. Each signifies only what he has made of himself by culture. But there are of necessity different departments, grades, peculiarities, in culture; therefore it becomes its essential interest to set up a standard of culture for individuals, for just here is shown *how* one is cultured; for the criteria which one applies characterize the stand-point of his own culture. Judgments become also involved in contradiction; nay, one comes to appear talented by so much the less as he agrees with the judgment of others, or indeed with the judgment of the multitude. Thus arises a universal disintegration of mind, in which the chaos of various cultures and naturally contradictory judgments begets finally a chaotic confusion, above which only faith emerges, which subordinates culture as a vanity of the present. Before God is no respect of persons. Neither might, nor riches, nor culture, entitle one to blessedness; heaven demands from its own, not the evidence that they are talented, but the poor in spirit are blessed if they are pure in heart. But faith which is indifferent to it, agrees with culture in that it estranges the mind from immediate reality, for it transports it to the representation of a Beyond, of which, here, we can have no experience. In this fantastic world it is quite at home with its representations, and discerns that all must be just as it is.

The *éclaircissement* overtakes it nevertheless, because on the one side it clings to the supersensuous, yet on the other cannot deny that it wishes to find the supersensuous in the sensuous. *Eclaircissement* is the unavoidable product of culture which seeks satisfaction only in thought, and upbraids faith with its double housekeeping in the present and in the Beyond. Faith, as genuine, does not think of making the sensuous the ground of blessedness, but it always contradicts itself by the weight which it lays upon the sensuous; for, in spite of its insight into the transitoriness of what is earthly, and the nothingness of what is external, it believes in sacred places, times, and pictures; it believes in sanctifi-

cation by washing, and by partaking of consecrated food and drink; by acts of sense, pilgrimages, fasts, scourgings, &c. It believes that eternal truth is contained in writings which have been preserved by chance, &c. Especially it represents the Beyond again in a form which is really only a copy of the human, of the Present. Its gods, angels, devils, have human shape. Angels play on harps, sing, &c. Faith revolts against this critique, which lacerates its very heart, just as the talented consciousness of culture revolts against its own distraction because the latter derisively expresses it.

Éclaircissement has its truth in the thought of the usefulness of things, for therein it attains the unity of being and of thought. Prosaic as the category of use may be, it still contains the thought of the end and aim for which things are present as means. It twines itself through all things as the bond which unites them to each other. All is useful. In nature, earth is useful to plants, plants to animals, animals to animals. All nature is useful to man, man to man; and even religion is useful, for it constrains man patiently to endure the pains of the Present in view of the future To Be.

The category of usefulness also contains the unity of thought and being, of the idea and its reality, which, as deism and materialism, are widely separate; on the one hand, into the abstraction of a supreme essence, and into matter on the other. Its metaphysics knows only things and their properties; and among things, useful and natural, full as many have hurtful relations, for what is useful in one respect harms in the opposite; yet through this twofoldness of all things *éclaircissement* affirms the ever uniform stability of the world.

As the true, the moral mind is merged in the condition of right; so likewise the culture of the self-estranged mind is merged in absolute freedom and terror. The thinking of the *éclaircissement* has disposed of all, and has left to consciousness, at last, only the thinking of thinking, for *éclaircissement* supremely respects the logic of the understanding that twice two is four. If pure thinking would give itself a content, it must determine itself as will; but the will, conformably to the stand-point of thinking, will have to be a pure will, which wills itself in its universality. Yet since in its reality the will is always individual, universality as such can hold only a

negative relation to will when it wills to realize itself. It becomes a fanaticism which would exterminate the existing order of things. In so far as will assumes the form of government, the purpose of which is to care for the general well-being, and to realize the will of all, individuals become an object of suspicion, because as such they possess the possibility of dissenting from the will of the government which assumes the stand-point of universality. To meet the danger thus arising, nothing remains but to put such to death. But government, conversely, becomes an object of suspicion to individuals because it is government, and in their determinations they do not seek the pure will of all, but rather some special end. Government is therefore accused of being partisan, and its members, in turn, are executed. A new government is instituted, which in a short time succeeds no better. The terror of death is the result of absolute freedom, which detects slavery in every ethical relation, in family, rank, office; and fears, persecutes, and slays every individual who does not seem to come out into the colorless abstraction of freedom as absolute.

In the dissolution of the world of culture, the only stability is the mind's certainty of itself, or morality. The individual who ascends the scaffold, not because he has committed a crime, but because he has expressed an opinion other than absolute freedom has declared valid by the stamp of universality, dies with the certainty of having remained true to himself, of having acted correctly, morally. This certainly exalts him above death, and destroys the terror which it is said to inspire. The moral view of the world looks above the Present far beyond into a relationship in which all the contradictions of history shall be conciliated. In reality, to be sure, the highest good, the harmony of virtue with happiness, is not yet present, but is striven for as that which should be. If it had not to contend with vice, virtue would not be virtue. Without instincts, desires, passions, temptation, it would be without the material of conflict—would be an unemployed, inactive virtue. It should prosper externally, for through its exertions to overcome the allurements of vice it acquires a certain claim upon happiness; but experience shows that the virtuous often find the world very unfriendly, while the

vicious find it very comfortable. While, then, virtue postulates happiness, although it confesses that in reality it by no means corresponds with the conception, its claim is no less unfounded than when the envy with which it looks askance at the prosperity of the vicious, claims to be called virtuous. The moral order of the universe, according to Hegel, is a dissimulation [*Verstellung*], which its bad conscience, that it is not really virtuous or free from sensuousness, conceals under the complaint of the difficulties which assail the virtuous, and against the course of the world when the bad thrive and the good suffer hardship. And yet conscience can in fact become self-certain, because it is determined not by feeling, but by the conception of duty which is clear and unambiguous. The new difficulty which now arises consists in the fact that duty which would perfect virtue as pure duty for its own sake, resolves self into a plurality of duties, so that although each individual is determined for himself, he may fall into doubt which to perform, or at least which to perform first. But in fulfilling one duty other duties may be violated, though it be only by omitting their performance. Hence, to act with perfect morality, it seems best not to act at all, for in so doing one stains himself in some way with finitude. By the determination of an act, no one can avoid exciting contradiction, or reaping blame. The fear of degrading its high ideal by expression in action, of soiling it by contact with vulgarity, drives back the æsthetic soul into itself to refresh itself in the purity of its inactivity, and with other æsthetic and congenial souls to fall into criticism of those who act and therefore err. The erring, however, who confesses his sin, thereby annihilates it. Should the æsthetic soul close itself against him, it would itself become wicked. It must pardon him who confesses his wickedness; for as he became wicked, so can he become good again. Thus the good must recognize the essence of equal freedom in the wicked, and if he has confessed, cannot hardheartedly hold itself aloof in privileged exclusiveness. The forgiveness of the wicked is the breaking through of religion, for it is the mind's act of majesty to make what has been done as though it were not done. In the act mind becomes conscious of its sovereignty over nature and history. The wickedness which I repent of, is as though it had not occurred.

I break off from my past, estrange myself from it, cast it from me as a nullity.

In religion, mind as human ascends to unity with the divine, to certainty of absolute truth; for this unity is truth. This sphere, in turn, begins as such from the bottom to build itself up, step by step, to perfection, viz. from the natural religion, through art-religion, to revealed religion. In natural religion, mind beholds the absolute still in natural existence, in the heavenly bodies, in plants, animals, until, as Hegel expresses it, like a master-workman, it encloses the hull of mind, its corpse, in the habitation which it has prepared for it out of stone. Building now becomes the *cultus*. With it, mind passes over to art-religion, which venerates the divine in the Beautiful, which it produces in statues of deities humanly beautiful, in the beautifully formed contestants at gymnastic sports, and in epic, lyric and dramatic poetry. In Phenomenology, Hegel has treated art only as religion, because it here simply gains the significance of the absolute, and in no sense serves as an ornament for prosaic ends, or as a means of recreation. But this æsthetic religion, after it has passed through the earnestness and pain of tragedy, dissolves into the frivolity and pleasure of comedy, after it has made all, even the gods of the nether world, its wanton sport. Now it becomes evident what mind is. Trust in the gods has vanished—the oracles are dumb—the altars empty—hymns are words without power—priests are needy, weak mortals like others—the statues of the gods are but cold figures to which Faith no more lends a soul—Consciousness shudders back into itself in this mental waste, and can no longer save itself from the despair of its absolute misfortune by the scorn of comic perversion. God can be found as the true God neither in nature nor in art, but reveals Himself as such only in the real man who knows that he is one with Him in self-consciousness. God has not only human form, is the æsthetic God, but becomes a man who can be felt, seen, heard. The absolute substance appears as an actual subject, which also really dies, i.e. the divine is the essence of the human self-consciousness; all alienation is extinguished in the Atonement.

Religion, therefore, already knows what truth is; but its knowledge is yet imperfect, for it has not yet the form of

pure self-consciousness, of the conception, but of intuition and representation. Indeed, revealed religion cannot yet detach itself from the sense-colored breadth of representation. It goes back into the past, or forward to the future. In the course of the year, on its festal days, it lives through the circle of its representations in which truth presents itself to it in historical forms. It remains, therefore, to give to the absolute content absolute form. This is the final stand-point of phenomenally absolute knowledge, a beyond which has no passage to another, because in it not only truth but also certainty is posited as absolute. To elevate religious representation into the form of thought, is to *dissolve* it as representation; to dissolve does not mean to destroy its content, but to free it from its contradiction of representing the eternal in forms of adjacency and succession. That which should be absolutely conformable to self-consciousness, must be, like itself, pure idea, which, as absolute presence, is independent of time and space. Religious consciousness forgets itself momentarily in its representations, but falls back from them into itself again. Absolute knowledge conceives not only its object in and for itself, but it conceives itself also in its knowledge.

The position which Hegel has given to absolute knowledge, i.e. to speculative philosophy, became later the occasion of much opposition, since priests and theologians very naturally found in it an insufferable presumption which degraded religion to a "mere representation." We will here only remark that science cannot dispense with the critique of faith, and faith can assume no privileged immunity from being really thought. The particular science of faith struggles against being dissolved in the general science of nature and of mind; but really it cannot escape this fate, because this is necessarily involved in the relation between representation and thought. The miracles of faith are incomprehensible because they lack a rational nature. They can be represented, but not thought. Thought can find in them a general content, symbolically expressed, an abiding truth; but, with this discovery, thought elevates its truth above its sensuous actuality, and transforms it into allegory. Miracles are to remain for faith an individual fact, which it devoutly gazes

upon; for science, they are to become a universality which is absolutely true.

When we glance back upon the *Phenomenology* in its totality, we must admit that it is a work which can be ranked in no traditional department, but at the same time we cannot refrain from the opinion that its greatness lies in its strangeness and uniqueness. An ordinary schoolmaster's understanding, which revolves with economical exactitude within the paragraphs of the text-book, never would have hit upon such a monstrosity. The mastership with which Hegel characterizes each particular stand-point of mind may pardon the occasional artifice of its deductions. His appositeness justifies, upon reflection, the apparent strangeness of his expression. When, e.g., Hegel calls culture the self-estranged mind, the word has acquired the partial meaning of confusion of mind, like the French word *aliéner*. All culture sustains a negative relation to our immediateness. We have in schools Greek and Latin, which we do not speak in life, but in which we estrange ourselves from our every-day reality; our companions travel among "strangers" in order to exalt themselves above the narrowness of home-life, &c. Hence the expression "estrangement" is quite right. Each new stand-point which consciousness enters upon is absolute for it so long as it deals with it; as, conversely, the world—in itself ever the same—is new for every new generation. It was with deep design that Hegel included the practical side of mind in the *Phenomenology*, a deduction of absolute knowledge from dogmatism and skepticism; realism and idealism would not have corresponded to the totality of mind. The forms of consciousness which *Phenomenology* exhibits in a long series, are constant elements of mind which lie between the extremes of sensuous certainty and absolute knowledge, and which hence always and everywhere reproduce themselves; in their individualization they may likewise modify the form of their appearance. Each is relatively the whole, but it is first in the absolutely free self-consciousness of spirit that it comprehends itself as the idea of truth. No one will deny that sensuous certainty and perception, that the conflict of self-consciousness for recognition, that stoicism and skepticism, that the efforts of the unhappy self-consciousness to solve the

contradiction between heaven and earth,—are stand-points which ceaselessly renew themselves among men. The case is the same with reason, which can never become weary of observing the nature of natural phenomena, in order therein to find itself. It has been supposed, in considering the laws of physiognomy, that Hegel intended, with Lichtenberg, to deride a presumptive science, and that only a transient mania of his time induced him to incorporate this matter; but the interest of mind to rediscover itself in the external reality of its form is constant. Our interest will always be excited in observing the physiognomy and cranial development of a Raphael, Schiller, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Socrates, and others, and therein tracing the expression of their minds. The realization of rational self-consciousness in pleasure and necessity, in the good heart and in the frenzy of conceit, or in virtue and the course of the world, astonishes us at first by the originality of its delineation; but it makes, nevertheless, a constant factor in the phenomenal knowledge of mind. Among the Greeks, e.g., it was the Cyrenian school which gave utterance to the experience that pleasure has its limits in necessity; and the Hegesians, who proceeded upon the attempt to constantly fulfil pleasure, concluded upon suicide because they found it impossible. The author of the *Koheleth*, among the Hebrews, expressed the same experience of the vanity of all things. Individuals ever repeatedly attempt to make pleasure their principle, but in the satisfaction of their desires they ever find the experience unavoidable, that in enjoyment they have subjected themselves to a necessity inseparable from pleasure. It is the same with the good heart and virtue in their one-sidedness and inexperience. When Hegel shows that virtue may be overcome by the course of the world, it may seem that he places no high estimate upon virtue; but only that virtue succumbs in the conflict with the course of the world, which wrongly estimates its own principle, the right of individuality, and regards its own sacrifice as the Absolute. Eating and drinking, sleeping and begetting of children, working and recreation from labor in sport, and the accumulation of property, will ever strike out new courses. The existence of monks and nuns presupposes as its condition the existence of the course of the world, from

which they retreat behind high walls. Individuality then makes its appearance as that which is real in and for itself. This stand-point also makes a constant element of the *becoming* mind, which produces itself as its object in what it creates, in which it deposits its entire peculiarity, but thereby calls out the judgment of other individualities. This "animal kingdom of mind," as Hegel sportively and wittily expresses himself, is likewise a constant element of history; and to become convinced that this is the case it is only necessary to read prefaces to books which are published, to find the assurance that their authors are concerned only in their respective subject-matter, to which they offer their modest contribution; or, on the other hand, to read the critiques of books in which the reviewers assert, with praise or blame, that they are concerned only about the subject-matter. Law-giving and law-proving reason are constantly present in the constitutional conflicts of states. It is proposed, for instance, to abolish the death penalty; the law is subjected to criticism, the grounds which sustain the proposition are examined, &c., whether they are in accordance with reason.

In the description of Mind it has been said that Hegel at first had before his eyes the Hellenic ethics as Æschylus and Sophocles depicted it, but in the dissolution of the true ethical mind in the legal condition which strengthens the egoism of persons, the Roman empire. Then he makes the process of the estrangement of mind complete itself in Feudalism and Catholicism; but the culture of humanism, on the other hand, reacts in *éclaircissement*, and absolute freedom culminates in the terrorism of the French revolution. In the stand-point of morality he alludes to the dualism of German Philosophy in the Fair Saint, especially to Jacobi's ALL-WILL and Waldemar. It may be unhesitatingly granted that from the phases of history he derived his colors for these stand-points, but it does not follow that these are not constant elements in all history. Hegel depicts—in the act of the ethical mind—e.g. blood revenge, with unmistakable reference to Orestes and Œdipus; but blood revenge is a constant element of the ethical in the family, among all peoples who are making the transition from the sphere of their natural condition to that of the state. The Arab who avenges the

death of his father, is in this respect as ethical as Orestes. That Hegel opposes right, as private right, to the ethical, is likewise to be understood generally, although Roman jurisprudence carried out the conception of personal atomism most perfectly. When children, as heirs of their patrimony, do not quarrel about their respective shares, but seek to terminate the strife by judicial decision, the very spirit of the ethical has vanished. Even Aristophanes, in his comedies, attacked the bad disposition of the citizens, who became entangled in their private interests and their lawsuits about *meum* and *tuum*, and allowed the ancient virtue of Marathon, which guided itself in view of the whole, to fall into decay. Culture, in a distinct sense, where the word denotes primitive civilization, is also a constant element among all people, who, by reverence of the power of the state, or by the splendor of riches, have elevated themselves above the significance of the individual, to self-consciousness of mind. When Hegel here, in characterizing the peculiar distraction to which this standpoint leads, borrows a few features from Diderot's dialogue, *Rameau's Nephew*, one must not be so narrow as to believe that he thought only of the intellectual French society of the 18th century. This language, which levels all difference of station; which expresses with spirit all the phenomena of mind, even the most depraved; which discloses with shameless publicity all the contradictions of mind,—attracts interest to itself whenever the individual, by way and manner of speaking, attests that he is a man of culture, and when comparison of tendency of independence and of degree of culture is the chief topic of the general discourse. Lucian among the Greeks, Petronius among the Romans, Heine among the Germans, give us a language similar to that of Diderot among Frenchmen. *Eclaircissement* is no less a constant element of history, for it arises from culture. The Sankhya philosophy of the Indians is an *éclaircissement* of their Mythology. The doctrine of the sophists was an *éclaircissement* among the Greeks, as in modern times the movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. Over against the popular belief of the Greeks, Plato with his critique of their Mythology appeared as an apostle of *éclaircissement*, and, like those in England, France, and Germany, would substitute morals in its place.

The stand-point of absolute freedom, i. e. of that freedom which wills the will only as universal, may seem to be so designated by Hegel as though only the first French revolution hovered before him; but in itself this form of consciousness is a constant element of history, where democratic and communistic tendencies pass over into fanaticism. This element was present in the German peasant war, among the English Puritans, and the social reformers of the Paris revolution of February, as well as among the Jacobins who overthrew the Girondists. Morality is depicted with extraordinary accuracy by Hegel; no one can doubt that here he detects one of the most general stand-points of mind; but the turn which Hegel gives to it—viz. in making religion, or the certainty of the unity of the human and divine mind, to emerge from the wicked man's confession of guilt and from his pardon—may seem peculiar. Otherwise, morality appears as that inclination which religion absorbs in itself, as private right absorbs the æsthetic *morale* (ethical condition). But morality has exalted itself above this stand-point; and now Hegel shows how mind, apprehending itself in conscience, passes over from the isolation of its self-certainty, through pardon of the wicked, to the truth of the community. This is one of his most profound and beautiful developments. That religion is construed as a constant element of mind is of course self-evident, and the question can only arise how far the differences between natural religion, art-religion, and revealed religion, are constant. This question is answered by the fact that every man must in childhood pass through the stages of fetichism and pantheism, which compose the essence of natural religion. Even if people existed no longer in a state of nature, still the contemplation of nature, in sun, moon, plants, and animals, would precede the representation of a creative God, even for children who grew up within the pale of a revealed religion. Children often sustain the same relation to animals which men in a state of nature do in animal worship. Hegel treated art-religion in general as the presentation of art, because only as religion does it make the beautiful a pure Absolute. Art lies without as a moment in the stand-points of production and culture. The beautiful is now, to be sure, the absolute in respect to

form, but only the æsthetic stand-point sublimates the truth of the absolute and must subordinate itself to it, as occurs in revealed religion, which makes art a means in its *cultus*. Roman Catholicism, in architecture, sculpture, music, and poesy, has produced as excellent works of art as the Greek art-religion; but religion as such has ever distinguished itself from these works even when superstition has con-founded them.

Finally, absolute knowledge exists in all philosophical endeavor as a constant element, for philosophy must strive for such a certainty of truth that even the formal side of knowledge may be complete, that certainty may become true, and truth certain. Philosophy is, therefore, capable of endless development, since neither its breadth nor the depth of knowledge can have a limit. That all moments of the experience of consciousness make up constituent elements of mind, Hegel distinctly affirms in saying that the Phenomenology has the same content as the system of science. The latter is not power, nor is it riches. The difference lies in the fact that that which the Phenomenology presents as a stand-point of phenomenal knowledge in the relation between consciousness and its object, so that knowledge during its becoming does not conceive itself until by its mutation it has arrived at a result, although we who observe its process can apprehend it before it becomes clear to itself—that this appears in the system as a pure, organic conception, no longer confused with consciousness.

The sequence of the conceptions is in general the same in both spheres, although with the difference which is conditioned by the nature of consciousness. In the history of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, mind, religion, and absolute knowledge, follow in order; but in history many modifications occur through freedom, chance, arbitrariness, which are eliminated from the necessity of the system. The stand-point of natural religion, e.g., may be interrupted by the violent intrusion of revealed religion; for what wide extremes may be united in consciousness! Take a New Zealander of to-day, as he may be seen and spoken to in London, who in his youth has participated in cannibal feasts, but is now converted to Methodist Christianity. Thirty or forty years ago he ate

human flesh, now at the Lord's table he partakes of the body and blood of Christ. An important point of the succession is that each higher stand-point elevates each lower into itself, and reduces it to a moment which disappears in itself. That which in an earlier stage had absolute significance for consciousness, loses it in the higher. The most earnest occupations of earlier ages, as Hegel expresses it, sink in an advanced stage to be childish plays. It might be asked whether many of the elements which Hegel adduces have not now entirely vanished. Under art-religion, for example, he speaks of living art-work, and understands thereby the reverence in which the Greeks held beauty, and the strength and suppleness of the human body. The Greeks, indeed, deified beautiful men because they were beautiful. This element exists among us no longer as a religion. We build temples to no man now because he is beautiful, but in the circus we admire the beauty, strength, and gymnastic virtuosoship, of the human body, i.e. the living art-work. It is degraded to a mere moment of secularity, but it is not wanting. The successive connection of the forms of consciousness, which advances from sensuous certainty to absolute knowledge, is therefore necessary. If we have attained a certain grade of consciousness we must advance to philosophy; and hence, not only in Greece but in China and India, not only among Christians but among Mohammedans, not only among Europeans but among Americans, we see philosophers arise; for even the practical, gain-seeking, pure utilitarianism of the Yankees has not prevented the appearance among them of a Parker, an Emerson.

Hegel preceded his *Phenomenology* by an extended preface, in which he defined his relation to the dominant views respecting the essence and method of philosophy still more distinctly than in the introduction to his article concerning the difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling. He strongly contended, moreover, against the degeneracy of Schelling's philosophy, which among many of its adherents had sunk to a mere formalism, and which sought to conceal the want of scientific earnestness partly by fantastic decoration, and partly by the assumption of dictatorial impertinence and prophetic unction. Hegel contended no less against

the insipidity of *éclaircissement*, which sought a narrow satisfaction in the temporal, than against the pseudo-geniality of romanticism, which was designed to supersede the pains and the thoroughness of learning, by simple inspiration. He gave a careful critique of the method of the scientific knowledge, which, with precipitate construction according to superficial antitheses, is not adequate to the task. The truest method, he affirms, is the dialectic, which makes the negative an immanent moment of development, because negation is not only negative, but at the same time positive; for its result is not pure nullity, but rather a higher determination, in which that which was denied is ideally preserved. Nothing is lost to this method, but it enriches itself, in its progress from negation to negation, by an equal number of positions. He expresses this thought in such a manner as to affirm that the philosopher must entirely abstract from himself, and in the movement of thought reserve for himself only the attitude of a spectator. "Substance must be grasped as subject"; — with these words, which have become so full of fate for his philosophy, he would indicate that the idea for itself is independent; that, although we think it, it determines itself entirely independent of us, and that its relation to other ideas can really proceed only from it and not from us. When, e.g., we think the idea of identity, it, and not we, is the ground that the next idea is that of difference. It is not we who determine identity to difference, but identity determines itself to difference, for difference has a meaning only as difference of identity. The idea of identity moves, therefore, of itself to its opposite idea, to difference, and leaves to the philosopher only the observation of this process.

It is, in fact, the original sense of the word that substance in itself is subject. "Substance" here signifies the essential content, "subject" the form of knowledge. The subject must here be not the knowing philosopher, but the idea itself. Still the philosopher is also the subject which thinks the idea, but his thinking is not bound to the self-determination of the idea, into which the philosopher, with absolute renunciation of his own individual subjectivity, must think himself. Hegel's thought may be thus explained: In common logic, it is said that in judgment we join a predicate to a sub-

ject. In this the subject appears as passive, and receives the predicate through us. According to this logic, it is we who bind the predicate to the subject by the copula. Hegel reverses the matter by saying that it is the subject which determines itself to its predicate; for, if this be not the case, it is in vain that we join a predicate to a subject, because the judgment can be only in so far true as the predicate either inheres in the subject as a casual and relative determination, or is immanent in it as a necessary and absolute *natura sua*. When I judge, "This circle is large," this judgment is true only in so far as greatness inheres in it. But greatness is only a relative determination in the relation of this circle to others. A circle may just as well be relatively small. If I judge, "The circle is a self-enclosed curve," this judgment is a necessary, absolute one, for without this determination the circle would not be a circle. Thus it is the idea of a circle itself that immanently determines itself to its predicate. It is not I who produce this idea, but the idea which produces itself in me. The predicate of the subject circle, by which it is a circle, does not depend upon me. I recognize it, I utter it, I make it my object; but I do not produce it. But the circle, because it is a circle, produces itself in the object.

By the example which I have just chosen, I am reminded that, in the preface of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel would make of mathematics merely a science of the understanding, partly because its content, space in geometry, and unity in arithmetic, is so meagre, and partly because the construction of mathematics turns upon formal identity. A synthetic or an analytic course rather than the dialectic must be referred to mathematics. But when, as Hegel affirms, truth can become certain of itself only in the form of dialectic method; when further, according to him, mathematics forms a necessary member in the system of science; when, finally, it is the conception of space with which the idea as nature first found its existence,—it is hard to see why mathematics should be an exception to all other content. That it never has been, is no reason why it never should be treated dialectically. The conception of the one of quantity, &c., i.e. of arithmetic, Hegel has already presented dialectically in the first part of his *Logic*: "Why should geometry dispense with the dialectic?"

Quantity does not even exclude qualitative distinctions, but is partly a moment of them and partly qualitatively distinguished in itself; for an arithmetical progression, e.g., is not only qualitatively different from a geometrical progression, or the acute angle is not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from an obtuse angle. The one is smaller, the other larger, than a right angle; and just for this reason they are opposites in form. The lack of rational nature [*Begriffslösigkeit*,] which Hegel charges upon quantity, is only relative. Through the integral and differential calculus, and through descriptive geometry, modern mathematics has in fact already become dialectic.

Hegel believed that an example of the dialectic method was afforded in the *Phenomenology* itself. Without boasting, yet with profound self-feeling, he expressed in the preface the consciousness of having found that method which the future would confirm as the only true one. Though it be acknowledged that he is right, that henceforth without the dialectic method philosophy would no longer be in a condition to satisfy the conceptions of science, and that it no less than others cannot submit to an arbitrary treatment; still it cannot be denied that the method is open to great danger, and that it no less than others may degenerate to arbitrary treatment. The philosopher shall remain out of the question. The idea shall determine itself through itself, shall adopt nothing into itself from without. This is the postulate. It is, indeed, justified; but, in fine, it is the philosopher even here who advances with his thoughts as thinking subject from conclusion to conclusion, and what he holds to be a necessary correlation describes as such. Just this description is the most dangerous moment, for its extent, its tone, its address, remains more dependent upon the philosopher than its form would indicate. Experience has subsequently shown that the descriptive manner of the Hegelian school, especially through imitation of the *Phenomenology*, degenerated into a mere assertory procedure, which was in no respect better than the polarities of Schelling's philosophy, the antitheses and syntheses of Fichte's, or the categories of Kant. The dialectic, which was to have engendered the most active self-movement of science, stiffened into the most arbitrary and

lifeless dogmatism, which often became the more contradictory the more it set up pretension to absolute infallibility. If the application of the dialectic method had been guarded from every error, Hegel himself, for instance, would not have set the example of altering the position of ideas in his system. Without the Logic, the danger would have become still greater.

For profound penetration into the essence of science, for sharp criticism of the delusions behind which scientism has taken refuge in order to preserve itself in the public mart as authority, for noble dignity of scientific temper, for spirited apprehension of the entire turning-point of the age,—the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* can only be compared with that which Kant introduced in the second edition of his *Critique of Reason*. This is its counterpart in literature.

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